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Introduction1 
People value green areas between urban areas (for an example, see Figure 
1.1). However, these landscape values are not always taken into account when 
decisions are made that affect the landscape. For these values to play a role 
in such decisions, they need to be internalized. This thesis investigates how 
various institutions for green landscapes in metropolitan areas work, which 
problems hamper them, and how these institutions can be improved.
The quality of green areas close to cities is an established concern in plan-
ning practice. The green belts around cities such as Vienna (Abercrombie, 
1910) and London are classic examples. Other well-known examples are the 
Green Heart in the Netherlands, the green wedges between the fingers of Co-
penhagen, greenways in the USA, and more recently, the Emscher Park in the 
German Ruhr Area (Shaw, 2002; Maruani & Amit-Cohen, 2007; Gailing, 2005). 
The distinction between urban areas and open space is a basic principle in 
Dutch spatial planning doctrine (Faludi & Van der Valk, 1994), and the Nota 
Ruimte, the new Dutch memorandum on spatial planning, follows this tradi-
tion, with the protection of open space continuing to be a major principle of 
spatial organization (Ministry VROM et al., 2004; Priemus, 2004).
However, despite the planning attention given to green areas close to cities, 
projects and policy strategies to protect and improve these green open areas 
often fail to produce the intended results. (For some international examples, 
see Alterman, 1997; Bannon & Cassidy, 2000; Romero, 2003; and for the Dutch 
case, Rekenkamer, 2006; Farjon et al., 2004; VROM-Raad, 2004a.) These areas 
are confronted with many claims for housing, water-management, nature de-
velopment, industrial sites, and office buildings (Jacobs, 2004). Built develop-
ments are usually more profitable than green types of land use and therefore, 
they constantly threaten green areas near cities. The Netherlands Environ-
mental Assessment Agency (Milieu- en Natuur Planbureau) predicts an increase 
in built-up land and a decrease in green areas (Borsboom-van Beurden et al., 
2005). More research is needed to determine which factors can strengthen fu-
ture institutional arrangements.
Changes to the institutional context also make it important to study insti-
tutions for green landscapes in metropolitan areas. Changes to the welfare 
state, including privatization, deregulation, and decentralization, have affect-
ed the ability of central planning departments to guide urban containment 
(Korthals Altes, 2002). Together with new EU-policies, these developments also 
affect green areas, for example due to rising agricultural land prices and re-
trenchment of governmental investment in agriculture. Taken together, these 
developments make it necessary to examine measures aimed at strengthen-
ing the countryside (Brody et al., 2006; Gallent & Shaw, 2007).
This research project is about institutions that aim to strengthen the 
countryside. In order to understand what influences landscape changes, this 
project started by investigating the changes in the landscape and the expect-
ed changes. It examined what has influenced these changes and what role 
[ 3 ]
institutions have played in this process. This will help to increase the under-
standing of the link between process and spatial quality, between plans and 
plan implementation, the importance of which has been stated by many au-
thors (e.g., Bengston et al., 2004; Brody et al., 2006; Koontz, 2003). Although 
some planning literature touches on this aspect (e.g., Brody et al., 2006; Rome-
ro, 2003), there is still much to be learned about this subject since many case 
studies describe projects that have only been partially successful, and since 
the institutional context changes continuously.
In order to get a good understanding of the complexity of institutions in 
practice, I chose to conduct case studies. Because institutions operate within a 
complex institutional system, I chose to examine one specific system, in this 
case the Dutch one. The Dutch landscape is metropolitan and densely populat-
ed. Behind the scenes, much effort and money is spent to protect and improve 
metropolitan green areas, supported by institutions such as laws and policy 
programs. Studying the Dutch institutional system provides the opportunity to 
examine a system that is considered successful but which is currently facing 
difficulties (Pols et al., 2005; Ministry VROM et al., 2006; MNP, 2007a).
Research questions and the 1.1 
structure of this book
This book addresses the question how do institutions for green landscapes 
in metropolitan areas become effective, what problems hamper the effective-
ness of these institutions, and how these institutions can be improved. Af-
ter addressing the following sub-questions, this section explains the various 
terms involved in this issue.
The following sub-questions were formulated as a response to the case 
studies:
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Figure 1.1 People enjoying the green area of Midden-Delfland
What are the major developments in green areas near cities, and how are 1. 
they related to institutional developments?
Based on the case studies, Chapter 2 introduces a model of the differ-
ent ways the protection and improvement of green areas near cities can be 
influenced. Chapter 3 provides a general picture of the contemporary prob-
lems facing the landscape and their relation to recent developments in the 
institutional framework, such as the restructuring of the welfare state.
To what extent can private parties play a role in green area preservation: 2. 
the market vs. government dilemma?
Chapter 4 discusses the limited applicability of Transaction Cost Theory 
as a tool for designing institutions for green landscapes in metropolitan 
areas. Chapter 5 discusses why cross-subsidizing green areas with built de-
velopments may in many cases not be a viable solution for financing green 
areas.
Are network-oriented institutions or hierarchical institutions more suitable 3. 
for the protection and improvement of green areas near cities?
Chapter 6 deals with the strengths and weaknesses of hierarchical and 
network-oriented approaches, discussing ideas about network theory in 
policy analysis. It elaborates further on decentralization as a policy devel-
opment and it explains why a combination of hierarchical and network-
oriented approaches can work in practice.
Why do tensions occur between (1) measures a planning agency takes to 4. 
influence spatial disposition and achieve a coherent distribution of land 
uses (refered to as spatial planning) and (2) the production of serviced 
plots for specific land uses (refered to as land development)? How does this 
affect institutions for green landscapes in metropolitan areas?
In order to be able to discuss the interaction between spatial planning 
and land development, in line with Needham (2000, p. 444), the concept of 
spatial planning is restricted to those cases in which a planning agency 
tries to influence many different aspects of the spatial disposition of a par-
ticular area to achieve a coherent distribution of land uses and activities. 
This can be done at either a strategic level, strategic spatial planning, or 
at an operational level (e.g., a land-use plan for a specific area). This dis-
sertation defines land development as the production of serviced plots for 
specific land uses. Land development often refers to the implementation 
of one of the specific aspects covered by spatial planning. An example of 
this would be the purchase of land to construct a bicycle path. Chapter 7 
investigates the tensions between the rationalities behind strategic spatial 
planning, operational spatial planning, and operational land development.
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Do the major developments in the landscape and their institutional con-5. 
text require more dynamic planning processes, and are radical institution-
al changes required?
Chapter 8 discusses institutional change in planning and explains how 
Slow Planning can help to preserve dynamic green areas near cities and 
why this requires incremental institutional change.
Institutions
This project looks at institutions for green landscapes in metropolitan areas. 
In this project, the term institution is used following North’s (1995) definition. 
Institutions are the constraints that human beings impose on human interac-
tion. They consist of formal rules such as laws and regulations and informal 
constraints such as conventions, norms, and traditions. In planning, there 
has been a debate about institutions (e.g., Healey, 1999; Koontz, 2003). Hea-
ley (1999) used the term institutionalism to refer to the embedding of specific 
practices in a wider context of social relations that cut across the landscape 
of formal organizations, and to the active processes by which individuals in 
social contexts construct their ways of thinking. This research project uses 
the term institution in the broader sense, including formal institutions be-
cause they have an important effect on the landscape and, unlike values and 
norms, leave more room for institutional design. This project examines insti-
tutions that have an effect on green areas near cities. These include land-use 
plans, collaborate visions of landscape change, green area funds, measures to 
support the activities of farmers (including new ones), compulsory purchase 
legislation, land banks, land subdivision permits, and measures requiring 
building developments to cross-subsidize green developments. In many cas-
es, there is a strong link between the use of institutions and financial means. 
Therefore, institutions and the cost and benefits associated with them are 
jointly examined.
Internalization
This research project focuses on institutions that internalize the values of 
green landscape. It uses an economic interpretation of the term internalize; 
this project is about the internalization of externalities. Externalities are costs 
or benefits that result from a decision, but are not borne by the decision mak-
er, for example the costs associated with the loss of a nice view of a green 
landscape due to the development of housing. When these externalities are 
taken into account, they are said to be internalized. Webster and Lai (2003) 
gave a number of examples of internalization. For example, a polluter can 
compensate by means of a buyout, buying up neighboring residual properties 
(Webster & Lai, 2003, p. 99). Private negotiations or a court dispute resolution 
can lead to a compensatory contract to internalize an externality (Webster & 
Lai, 2003, p. 103). Another way of internalizing an externality is to levy a tax 
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on a polluter (Webster & Lai, 2003, p.159). Various institutions can be used to 
internalize landscape values, including built developments that cross-sub-
sidize green developments, zoning, and land purchase by pro-green parties 
such as the government.
Internalizing can thus occur in many different forms. It is more complex 
than the simple idea that the polluter pays (e.g., Reinhard & Silvis, 2007), or 
the idea to fully integrate such things as attitudes, behavior and language in-
to the decision makers’ nature, through learning or unconscious assimilation 
(Winsemius, 1986), or the idea that the problem of steering would largely be 
resolved if other departments or societal stakeholders were to adopt a con-
cern for your preferred scenario (Hajer & Zonneveld, 2000). Using the term in-
ternalize in this way makes it possible to compare many different institutions 
that have an effect on the positive externalities associated with green areas 
near cities.
Green landscape values in metropolitan areas
Examining how landscape values can be internalized, it needs to be clear 
which values are being referred to. The basic idea is that city dwellers value 
green areas near cities (Koomen et al., 2005a; Savills & Evamy, 2005; Ministry 
LNV, 2006). This dissertation is about these green areas near cities that peo-
ple value. These can be nature conservation sites, recreational areas, and ag-
ricultural areas (Crommentuijn et al., 2007). Frequently, the public does not 
distinguish between such areas; citizens value nature, including forests, rural 
landscapes, and parks in this term (Groote et al., 2006). In this dissertation, I 
will use this popular interpretation of nature. For example, if I discuss institu-
tions to support habitats for endangered species, I will consider those habi-
tats not for the sake of biodiversity as such, but because people like to see 
special birds.
In order to internalize landscape values, we need to have an idea about 
their size. How many green areas should be protected and improved? Some 
ideas on institutions for internalizing landscape values are based on reduc-
ing transaction costs and creating a market for green areas. This is based on 
the idea that the amount of green area to be protected and improved should 
be determined by the market. Chapter 8 discusses why these ideas are not 
likely to be implemented. To apply other institutions, a decision needs to be 
made about the size of the landscape values to be internalized. Determining 
this amount is not in the scope of this project. This is done by other projects 
in the Gamon research program. The value of green metropolitan landscapes 
can help to dertermine this amount, and this value is the topic of another re-
search project in the same research program, conducted at the VU University 
Amsterdam (e.g., Koomen et al., 2005a). The decision whether or not to protect 
and improve green areas because they are valuable is also a political or plan-
ning decision, and this is covered by another project, conducted at Wagenin-
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gen University (e.g., Van Dijk & Van den Brink, 2006). I just accepted the idea 
that preservation of certain metropolitan green areas is beneficial.
This research project is about institutions for green landscapes in met-
ropolitan areas. The term metropolitan landscape is used for all areas that are 
under the influence of urbanities and urban spheres (Tress et al., 2004). This 
research is about metropolitan green areas, green areas between urban areas. 
Because the use of rural areas by city dwellers is the starting point of this 
project, I take the following Dutch planning principle as a guideline: In order 
to use the countryside for recreation, city dwellers should be able to reach 
the countryside using their common mode of transport. In the Netherlands, 
this would include bicycle or bus, as well as car. Since 1956, it has been an 
important principle of Dutch planning that agricultural land or a substantial 
recreation area should be accessible from each point in a town in a radius of 
less than four kilometers (Faludi & Van der Valk, 1994, p. 106). In order to get 
a rural experience, as opposed to a regular city-park, these areas should also 
have a diameter of at least four kilometers (see WWdL, 1958).
Improving
Looking for measures to improve institutions, one needs to specify what is 
meant by improvement. Different research disciplines work with different 
criteria. Economists aim at efficiency improvements, lawyers are basically 
concerned with legitimacy, and ecologists seek to increase biodiversity. Plan-
ning institutions can be considered effective if they have the effects on spa-
tial quality intended by the makers of these institutions. Efficiency depends 
on the time (effort) and money that is needed to accomplish these goals. In 
addition to these classic ways of evaluating, more goal-free evaluations exist 
(e.g., Scriven, 1972). Faludi (2000) stated that planners should be concerned 
with facilitating good decision making. This requires looking in detail at the 
decisions and actions of the people to whom the plan is addressed, and es-
tablishing whether they have adopted the message, and to what extent. Hea-
ley (2003) argued that planning institutions should be legitimate and called 
specifically for transparency and inclusiveness. Since this research project is 
multi-disciplinary, and in order to reach balanced conclusions, no one single 
criterion was used to discuss the improvement of institutions. Instead, based 
on the idea that complexity requires an analytic method using different 
points of view (De Bruijn & Van der Voort, 2000) and in line with the multi-
theory approach which is discussed later, various criteria, some of them for-
mulated during the interviews, were used, including effectiveness, efficiency, 
legitimacy and spatial quality.
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Research approach1.2 
The research approach is inspired by ideas from Grounded Theory, as de-
scribed by Glaser (1992). This is a research methodology that is based on gen-
erating theory from data in the process of conducting research. Instead of 
testing a predefined hypothesis, I started with some general themes and ideas 
derived from reading literature. On the basis of this literature and some pilot 
interviews, cases were selected. These case studies determined which institu-
tions were to be examined, how the research questions were formulated, and 
the theories selected. Theory and methodology were selected and developed 
on the basis of case study data.
Because context matters for institutions (e.g., Salet, 2002), case studies were 
chosen. This method enabled me to define the research topic broadly, to cover 
complex and multivariate conditions, and to rely on multiple sources of evi-
dence (Yin, 2003). Section 1.5 elaborates further on how the cases were selected.
Choosing an approach inspired by Grounded Theory, had consequences for 
the way data were collected during the case studies. Instead of working with 
a predefined hypothesis, a set of topics was selected, which would be studied 
in the case studies. The following topics were addressed in each study: What 
are the most important developments in the area affecting green areas: prob-
lems, threats, and opportunities? Which institutions are relevant? What is 
their impact? What are the costs associated with this approach? Issues stud-
ied included land prices, the land owners and their economic position, policy 
programs, and the interaction between different public and private parties. 
Each case study used a combination of data collecting techniques, including 
document analysis, web search, discourse analysis, visits to case study sites, 
juridical institution analysis, participant-observations, and semi-structured 
interviews.
The choice for semi-structured interviews had several reasons. First of all, 
this permitted respondents to tell their story, starting with their position and 
their point of view. This approach allows the interviewer to get detailed in-
formation about topics that are important to the interviewee and the process, 
but which the interviewer was previously unaware of (Emans, 2002). In this 
way, the case study material determined which topics would be examined 
further, and provided the basis for selecting theories to address the questions 
that emerged.
Interviews formed the central part of the research. Prior to the interviews 
other data collecting techniques, especially web search, were used to collect 
information about the link between the interviewee and developments in the 
landscape. This helped me to understand the interviewee’s story and prevent-
ed me from missing important topics. After the interviews, the topics raised 
by the interviewees were further examined, using other data-collecting tech-
niques and during other interviews.
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Because of the importance of the interviews, the interviewees were care-
fully selected. Following Guba and Lincoln (1989), the interviewees were se-
lected to provide a maximum variation in sampling. People were selected 
who were most likely to think differently about the issue at stake. In order 
to avoid elite-bias (Hutjes & Van Buuren, 1992), people were interviewed who 
came from all levels in the organizations. I also interviewed people who were 
active in different phases of a policy process. Interviewees were selected on 
the basis of the insight they could give into the working of the processes and 
institutions. Respondents represented various groups: (1) the public sector 
(different levels of government and different professions), (2) private parties 
(farmers, property developers, inhabitants), and (3) nongovernmental organi-
zations in the field of nature conservation, farmers’ interests, landscape pres-
ervation and recreation.
During the interviews, the following topics were discussed: What role has 
the interviewee had with respect to developments in the green metropolitan 
landscape? What are the strengths, weaknesses, threats, and challenges for 
the landscape and the institutions that affect the landscape? According to 
the interviewee, what are the most important actors and institutions? Which 
changes can make institutions more successful? What costs are associated 
with the different institutions? In general, broad and open questions were 
asked. Depending on the interviewee’s responses, questions were pursued in 
greater depth. Laymen sometimes ask how one can know that an interviewee 
is telling the truth. First, this is overcome by comparing with other interviews 
and the results of other data-collecting techniques. However, whether inter-
viewees tell the truth is hardly relevant, because the interviews are used to 
examine actors’ point of view, and to examine the roles of different actors in 
the actor-network (Enserink et al., 2002). My background in system engineer-
ing and policy analysis helped me to conduct the interviews in this way.
In addition to the interviews, I analyzed documents such as policy state-
ments and plans, annual reports, minutes of meetings, decrees, local and 
national newspaper articles, maps, cadastral data, statements of pressure 
groups, and written agreements. The accessibility of these documents has 
increased tremendously due to the almost universal use of internet. Parts of 
these documents was analyzed using ideas on discourse analysis discussed 
by Van den Brink and Metze (2006), by examining the usage of dominant 
terms and the reasons why they were used.
The case study areas were also visited, and the following aspects were in-
vestigated: What kinds of changes are taking place in the area? For example, 
are new barns or houses being built, or new recreational areas being devel-
oped? Have farmers started new activities such as campsites? How prosper-
ous is the region? What do the nature preservation sites, the recreational ar-
eas, the farms and houses look like? Are there any signs of public protest? 
Participant-observations were made; for example, a discussion evening about 
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a new policy statement was attended, as were meetings dealing with the es-
tablishment of a new land bank.
My background in law helped me to analyze the legal institutions behind 
the changes, and the manner in which these legal institutions become effec-
tive. This leads to the following question: how can parties be forced to take 
or to refrain from particular actions? By comparing interviewees’ statements 
about the experienced effects of the regulations with an analysis of the legal 
documents, a link was made between the law in the books and the de facto 
impact of legal institutions.
The application of different theories1.3 
When studying institutions for green landscapes in metropolitan areas, I 
faced the problem that there is no single theoretical and methodological tra-
dition in this field. I chose a multi-theory framework for a variety of reasons: 
(1) the limitations of using Transaction Cost Theory as an institutional design 
tool for benchmarking institutions for green landscapes in metropolitan ar-
eas and hence the need to consider other theories, (2) Williamson’s model on 
different institutions, theories and research disciplines (see Table 8.1), and (3) 
the various criteria society uses to judge these institutions. After discussing 
the need for a multi-theory framework, I will explain the method used to se-
lect the various theories.
Multi-theory1.3.1 
For some years, high expectations have been placed on Transaction Cost The-
ory in planning (Alexander, 2001a, 2001b; Webster & Lai, 2003; Buitelaar, 2003, 
2004). This theory assumes that different institutions have different effects on 
transaction costs and that these transaction costs should be reduced in order 
to increase efficiency. Alexander (2004) stated that Transaction Cost Theory is 
a very useful tool for designing institutions.
In view of this, an attempt was made to apply a transaction cost framework 
in this project (see Chapter 4). Unfortunately, as Chapter 4 explains, the use-
fulness of Transaction Cost Theory as an institutional design tool for bench-
marking institutions for green landscapes in metropolitan areas turned out 
to be limited. Therefore, support from other theories was needed. This is in 
line with Williamson’s (1998) statement that despite its broad reach, Transac-
tion Cost Theory does not tell us everything. It takes its place alongside other 
– sometimes competing, sometimes complementary – theories. (See Salet, 2002, 
for an introduction of various institutional theories.) Williamson (1998) catego-
rized institutions in four levels (see Table 8.1), with each level having its own 
theoretical framework. I used this categorization for the selection of theories.
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The first level of Williamson’s (1998) model consists of norms, customs, 
mores, traditions – all informal structures with a spontaneous origin. These 
informal institutions are the domain of social theory such as history and an-
thropology. The second level, the institutional environment, provides the for-
mal rules within which economic activity is organized. The definition and en-
forcement of property rights play an important role at this level. This level 
is the domain of disciplines such as the economics of property rights, legal 
studies, and political science. The third level involves institutions of govern-
ance; these institutions are the object of Transaction Cost Economics. At this 
level, we find alternative models of coordination which can be based on mar-
ket mechanisms or not. Choices for specific contracting strategies and make-
or-buy decisions are made at this level. The fourth level deals with resource 
allocation on the basis of price and output. Neo-classical economics is the 
most important discipline that deals with this level.
In practice, the division of institutional levels over research disciplines and 
theories is not as strict as this model would suggest. For example, legal stud-
ies are also concerned with basic principles of law such as the protection of 
property rights, stipulated in conventions (Alkema, 2000), which can be cat-
egorized as level-one institutions. Legal studies also often deal with choices 
concerning governance structures (which are level-three institutions). Simi-
larly, government and market are not the exclusive subjects of Transaction 
Cost Economics; other disciplines such as legal studies, policy analysis, and 
planning theory also address them.
What can Williamson’s model teach us when selecting a theoretical frame-
work to explain how institutions for green landscapes in metropolitan areas 
can be improved? Can a theoretical framework be selected by determining the 
level of these institutions and then choosing the theory Williamson associated 
with that level? At first sight, these institutions might appear to be level-three 
institutions. However, a closer look shows that institutions of all levels affect 
how metropolitan rural landscape values are internalized. The price of land 
and of agricultural products, level-four issues, influences the ability of farm-
ers to maintain metropolitan rural areas. Norms such as the wide acceptance 
of planning and zoning in the Netherlands, compared to the more property-
oriented system in Belgium, level-one issues, also have consequences for the 
way landscape values are internalized and for the possibilities of institutional 
change. Last but not least, things like land readjustment legislation and legis-
lation on developer’s payments to the government, level-two institutions, also 
play an important role. Because institutions for green landscapes in metropol-
itan areas can be found at all levels, it is necessary to take different theories 
into consideration.
The interaction between the different levels, the way institutions operate 
as a system with interwoven checks and balances (see Hart, 1994), is anoth-
er argument for using a multi-theory framework. The different levels of the 
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model suggest that the higher levels are influenced by input from the lower 
levels, starting with the first level. For example, many scholars studying gov-
ernance structure take the legal framework as a black box given and criticize 
its inflexibility. However, disciplines such as law deal with adjustments to 
second-level institutions. Because these lower levels influence the possibili-
ties for different governance structures, theories dealing with these levels are 
useful for improving institutions at other levels too. Interaction between the 
levels urged me to use various theories, complementing one another.
Besides, in a reaction to the current enthusiasm for Transaction Cost The-
ory, Pearce (2005) pointed out that despite the importance of efficiency, the 
planning system needs to be examined and assessed using a much broader 
set of criteria such as equity, redistribution, fairness and justice. Some econo-
mists have stated that by broadening the efficiency concept, Transaction Cost 
Economics can also take these other criteria into account. Alexander (2001b) 
illustrated this by stating that if the parties to a transaction are not limited to 
the actors who are directly involved, but include all the relevant stakeholders, 
then, minimizing overall net transaction costs may enhance democracy and 
participation. Alexander added that transaction cost analysis can help ag-
gregate efficiency and equity goals. Chapter 4 puts this in perspective. Other 
disciplines such as legal studies, policy analysis, and planning theory also ad-
dress these subjects, and they often take criteria other than efficiency such 
as justice, fairness, and spatial quality into account in a direct and clear way. 
As mentioned earlier, in order to get a balanced perspective, this project uses 
various criteria to discuss how institutions can be improved. This is anoth-
er reason to use more than Transaction Cost Theory, including theories from 
other disciplines such as planning, law, and policy analysis.
All in all, a multi-theory framework was chosen for various reasons: First, 
because an approach based solely on Transaction Cost Theory was not appli-
cable; second, because many different institutions interfere; and, finally be-
cause society judges institutions on many different criteria.
Combining complementing theories1.3.2 
Even with a multi-theory approach, a selection of theories still had to be 
made. Inspired by Grounded Theory (Glaser, 1992; see Section 1.2), I selected 
many theories on the basis of the case study data. In practice, theories were 
selected in two phases: first, before the data collection, and later, on the basis 
of the collected data.
Before the data collection, I started with a frame of reference. I studied law, 
as well as “System Engineering, Policy Analysis and Management.” The later 
study acquainted me with organization theory and ideas on network man-
agement. At the start of this research project Institutional Economic Theories, 
such as Transaction Cost Theory, seemed promising for studying institutions 
[ 13 ]
for internalizing landscape values. For this reason, these theories and their 
applications in planning (in particular Webster & Lai, 2003) were studied, and 
ideas were elaborated for a methodology for applying this theoretical frame-
work to case studies (Van Rij & Korthals Altes, 2005). In addition, case specific 
literature from the fields of planning, geography, and rural economics on the 
interaction between institutions and metropolitan rural landscapes was stud-
ied. This literature was both theoretical and practical, serving both as a theo-
retical framework and as an object of study. This framework influenced the 
first decisions about data collection.
During and after the data collection, a further selection of theories was 
made. The rest of this section explains how case study data was used to se-
lect theories, following Grounded Theory. This selection was based on the 
sub-questions presented in Section 1.1.
The first sub-question identified the major developments in the landscape 
and the associated institutional developments. Because planning theory, ge-
ography, and rural economics lack a comprehensive framework on this topic, 
taking a Grounded Theory approach, I developed a model of how the proc-
ess of green area protection and improvement works on the basis of the case 
studies. The model describes the ways in which a government can influence 
the protection and improvement of metropolitan green areas. This model has 
been validated by presenting it to interviewees and experts. This model also 
allows important institutional developments and physical developments in 
metropolitan green areas to be analyzed jointly.
As discussed in Chapter 4, the second question, the market or govern-
ment dilemma, can only be partially addressed by Transaction Cost Theo-
ry. In order to evaluate public, private, or combined approaches, the topic 
of Chapter 5, a number of theories were useful. Planning theory (e.g., Hea-
ley, 2003) was used to evaluate processes based on their inclusiveness and 
ability to stimulate learning. Policy analysis theory on Public Private Part-
nerships (e.g., Koppejan, 2005) was used to analyze the ability of processes 
to achieve actual cooperation and meet public demands for as little public 
expenditure as possible. Legal theory was used to address the legitimacy of 
these processes. Combining and comparing these various theories made it 
possible to conduct a nuanced multi-criteria analysis of market or govern-
ment oriented approaches.
To address the third question, the network or hierarchy dilemma, it was 
necessary to incorporate network theories into the research. Theory from the 
field of policy analysis (De Bruijn & Ten Heuvelhof, 2000) helps to explain the 
concepts of network and hierarchy as they are used in discussions about pol-
icy and management. In planning theory, the network concept has also been 
welcomed (Hajer & Zonneveld, 2000; Healey, 1999; Van Dijk, 2006). Moving 
towards a network approach even has consequences for the organization of 
government. In this light, decentralization is an important topic, which is dis-
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cussed using Organization Theory, following Mintzberg’s (1983) approach.
The fourth question dealt with tensions spatial between planning and land 
development. To discuss these tensions, I developed a matrix, with the strate-
gic and the operational level on one axis and spatial planning and land de-
velopment on the other. Chapter 7 uses planning theory to describe different 
forms and functions of planning (e.g., Faludi, 1989; Hajer & Zonneveld, 2000; 
Alexander, 2001a; 2001b; Korthals Altes, 1995; 2007). Theories from policy sci-
ence and administrative law explain why contemporary tensions are rooted 
in ideas about sector and facet planning (e.g., Dutch Lower Chamber, 1970-
1971; De Haan & Fernhout, 1981). Legal theory (e.g., Van Buuren et al., 2002; 
Van Wijk et al., 1997) was used to explain the tension between public interest 
and private rights. Van Eeten and Roe’s (2002) theory on coupling-decoupling-
recoupling and Davy’s (2007) ideas about poly-rationality inspired the discus-
sion on the improvement of the institutional system.
The fifth question was whether the major developments in the landscape 
and their institutional context require more dynamic planning processes and 
whether they might require radical institutional changes? To examine this 
question, planning theory advocating the acceleration of planning processes 
was used (e.g., Alexander, 2001b; Buitelaar, 2007; Gallent & Shaw, 2007). On the 
basis of case study data and the model I developed in Chapter 2, this idea was 
countered with the concept of Slow Planning. To determine the time it takes 
institutions to change, several theoretical approaches were used. Institutional 
change is a topic in planning theory (e.g., Healey, 1998; Salet, 2002; Webster, 
2005). In institutional economics, Williamson’s (1998) model (Table 8.1) dis-
cussed the different frequencies at which different institutions change. Con-
sidering legal certainty, law scholars have advocated incremental change (e.g., 
Raitio, 2003; Hart, 1994). To discuss the idea of continuity of an institutional 
setting and the importance of a good fit between new institutions and the 
existing institutional framework, theory on policy analysis and organizational 
change was also used (e.g., Van Bueren & Ten Heuvelhof, 2005; Scott-Morgan, 
1994).
Introducing the cases1.4 
Because success or failure of institutional arrangements depends on good-
ness-of-fit (Alexander, 2004) and national frameworks of institutions operate 
as coherent systems, the research project took one national institutional con-
text as a starting point. This made it possible to investigate trends, identify 
dilemmas, and make recommendations in a coherent way. Although condi-
tions will be different in other places, structuring dimensions, process char-
acteristics and lessons learned might be quite similar.
The Dutch context was chosen for a variety of reasons. In such a densely 
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populated country as the Netherlands, urban sprawl is an ever-present threat. 
According to Alterman (1997), Dutch planning and land management institu-
tions represent one of the world’s most successful systems to preserve farm-
land. Despite the successes of the Dutch system, at this moment the Dutch 
institutional framework is facing difficulties. As stated earlier, all this makes 
the Dutch institutional framework worth studying. In order to compare this 
framework with a similar institutional framework, but one based more on in-
dividual property rights than on the idea of public goods, a minor case study 
was also conducted in Belgium.
Cases were selected on the basis of their similarity with respect to some 
variables and their heterogeneity with respect to other variables. This made 
it possible to study the topic of metropolitan green area protection and im-
provement from a broad perspective (Miles & Huberman, 1994). The cases are 
all situated near big expanding cities in metropolitan areas. In these areas, 
land is scarce and needed for built developments, infrastructure, agriculture, 
recreation and nature. Except for the Flemish case, which was used primarily 
for comparison, all cases are located in the Netherlands, specifically in the 
most dense and industrialized area of the country, the Randstad (Faludi & Van 
der Valk, 1994). In addition, all cases represent areas larger than the regular 
city-park, and all of them are easily accessible from a city or town, so that 
they can be used for a stroll. Various types of land use, nature-conservation, 
agriculture, and recreation are apparent in most cases. The variety of institu-
tional settings was an important selection criterion. Cases in different phas-
es of development were also selected (Swanborn, 1994). Data collection took 
place before the summer of 2007. The different cases vary in their successful-
ness, in the involvement of private parties, and in the innovative nature of 
the institutions used. The Flemish case was only studied to examine the im-
pact of nationally developed institutional systems and to become more aware 
of the particularities of the Dutch institutional system. Because areas were 
selected partly on the basis of reflecting an interesting combination of insti-
tutions, areas where few special institutions are involved run the risk of being 
overlooked. Therefore, literature study was used to provide special attention 
to those areas which have not received much specific attention in policy pro-
grams.
The land consolidation project in Midden-Delfland was chosen as a case 
study area because the project used what are currently rather conventional 
institutions. Because the project is almost finished, it is also possible to ex-
amine its results. The land consolidation project in Midden-Delfland provides 
information on the way important institutions reach their goals. The recent 
situation in Midden-Delfland was studied to provide insight into the contem-
porary problems that metropolitan green areas face. Because Midden-Delfland 
is such a rich case, this case was studied in more depth than the other cas-
es. As the first case studied, this case also provided a general picture, which 
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was tested during the other case studies. The Bloemendalerpolder case was 
selected because it is an example of a public-private partnership in which 
private parties are contributing to the development of green areas. Laag Hol-
land was selected because recent institutions such as the National Landscape 
Concept are being put into practice in this area. The Park Forest Ghent project 
was selected because it is taking place in an institutional context that differs 
from the Dutch situation, though not too much, and because this project is in 
a more advanced state than other Flemish projects.
The following sections provide some area characteristics about the specific 
cases. Then, they discuss the reasons to use the examined institutions. This is 
followed by an introduction into the specific institutional arrangement used 
in the area. The last part of each section tells which research topics the case 
addressed.
Midden-Delfland, Land Consolidation1.4.1 
The land consolidation project in Midden-Delfland has already been studied 
by Kreukels (1980), Ritsema (1987), Van Rij (2006), Van Rij et al. (2008), and Van 
Rij and Korthals Altes (2008). The Midden-Delfland, a green area of 6,600 hec-
tares, is situated between the agglomerations of Rotterdam and The Hague 
(see Figure 1.2). The distance between the city centers of Rotterdam and The 
Hague is only 23 kilometers, in which not only urban neighborhoods and sub-
urbs are located, but also the city of Delft. Midden-Delfland is a typical Dutch 
landscape of peat polders with ditches, windmills and attractive cultural-his-
torical villages (Figures 1.3, 1.4). The land is used for agriculture – mainly dairy 
farming – recreation, and nature reserves.
Already in the middle of the twentieth century many reasons were put for-
ward for a specific institutional arrangement in Midden-Delfland. At that time, 
it was recognized as one of the most threatened metropolitan green areas in 
the Netherlands (WWdL, 1958, pp. 66-67, p. 104; see Figures 1.5 and 1.6). The 
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reasons for the land consolidation project were (1) the growing likelihood that 
the cities of Delft and Rotterdam would become one connected urban area, (2) 
the lack of recreational areas, and (3) the decreasing conditions for farming. 
Later, urban pressure was also felt from the Westland, a “city of glass” that 
comprises approximately 2,500 hectares of greenhouses, located just north-
west of Midden-Delfland; a large group of market gardeners here are looking 
for new sites on which to build greenhouses.
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Figure 1.3 Windmills in Midden-Delfland
Figure 1.4 Cows, greenhouses and a windmill in Midden-Delfland
Because of these threats, the national government decided to start apply-
ing a special policy for green areas between cities, the National Buffer Zone 
(Rijksbufferzone) policy, in Midden-Delfland first. In order to apply this policy, 
a special law was adopted in 1977 to implement a specific land consolida-
tion project. The Midden-Delfland Act aims (1) to contain city growth, (2) to 
develop recreational zones adjacent to the cities, and (3) to create good condi-
tions for farming in the rest of the area. To develop the recreational zones, the 
Act mapped out zones where compulsory purchase was permitted (Figure 1.7). 
The land consolidation project included physical measures to improve farm-
ing conditions and land reallocation within the 4,000 hectares that formed 
the heart of the Midden-Delfland area, to create an economically viable agri-
cultural zone.
Many parties were involved in this large project. The entire project was 
coordinated by a land consolidation committee, consisting of leading rep-
resentatives from the municipalities, the province, the Farmers’ Union, the 
Midden-Delfland Countryside Union, the district water board, and the ANWB 
(the Dutch Automobile Association). The central government provided most 
of the budget, about €200 million, and the necessary civil servants from the 
Government Service for Rural Areas (Dienst Landelijk Gebied/Bureau Beheer Land-
bouwgronden: DLG/BBL). A recreational board was established to coordinate 
maintenance of the recreational areas, consisting of representatives from the 
Figure 1.5 National planning agency: the develop-
ment of the west of the country
Source: WWdL, 1958
Figure 1.6 The same area as shown in Figure 1.2, 
showing open areas in 1950 (not colored) close to 
the Midden-Delfland area
Source: WWdL, 1958
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central and local governmental authorities 
that provide funds. In the recreational zone, 
the government owns the land and leases 
it to the district recreational board. The Na-
ture Conservation Union owns the land used 
for nature conservation. In the agricultural 
area, some land is owned by the government 
or other parties and leased out to farmers; 
however, much land is owned by the farmers 
themselves.
In 2008, after about thirty years, the project 
is nearly completed. Under the authority of 
the land consolidation committee, civil serv-
ants from DLG/BBL have developed recrea-
tional areas and carried out the land consoli-
dation project. Municipalities have changed 
their bestemmingsplannen (municipal land-use 
plans that, for a designated area, sets out the activities that may take place on 
the land) . Because no built areas have been developed, the openness of met-
ropolitan green areas has been preserved. This is not the case for compara-
ble areas not included in the Midden-Delfland Act, as a GIS-based comparison 
with other National Buffer Zones showed (Van Rij et al., 2008). A comparison 
of current maps (see Figure 1.2) to maps from 1950 (see Figure 1.6) shows that 
the Midden-Delfland area has less urban development than the surround-
ing areas. The area included in the Act can be visited for free and receives 
around 5.6 million visits per year. Ninety percent of the visitors stated that 
the recreation and agricultural areas were good or excellent (Recreatieschap 
& NIPO, 2005). Most people I interviewed stated that the Act had achieved its 
main goals, preserving metropolitan green area and creating recreational ca-
pacity (Van Rij, 2006). They stated that the preservation of the countryside in 
Midden-Delfland was a direct result of the Act. In addition, some respondents 
even said that the area needed a new Midden-Delfland Act.
Since the Midden-Delfland land consolidation project is a clear example of 
an established means of protecting and improving metropolitan green areas, 
data on this project has been used in almost every chapter of this book. The 
model for green area protection and improvement (Chapter 2) is based on this 
project. In Chapter 3, which looks at landscape change and the restructuring 
of the welfare state, the institutions used during the land consolidation project 
are compared to more recent institutions. Attempts to apply a Transaction 
Cost Theory model to the land consolidation project in Midden-Delfland are 
discussed in Chapter 4. Chapter 6, which discusses networks and hierarchies, 
looks at the combination of network-oriented and hierarchical approaches in 
the Midden-Delfland Act. Chapter 7 discusses the idea that the land consoli-
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dation in Midden-Delfland worked because it combined spatial planning with 
land development. In Chapter 8, the land consolidation project is presented as 
an example of Slow Planning and incremental institutional change.
Midden-Delfland, recent projects1.4.2 
Not only is the land consolidation project in Midden-Delfland an interesting 
case, but current problems in the area and recent attempts to deal with these 
problems are also worth studying. To study these current issues, the same ar-
ea was considered as the land consolidation project. More information about 
these recent projects can be found at the website of the Midden-Delfland mu-
nicipality, www.Midden-Delfland.nl, or at www.iods.nl (see also Van Rij, 2006; 
Van Rij & Korthals Altes, 2007a & 2007b, 2008).
At present, the major problem is the problematic economic situation of 
farmers. On the one hand, this is caused by high land prices due to the urban 
proximity, and on the other by difficult farming conditions associated with 
small-size parcels and farms, high water-levels and congested roads. At the 
same time, the profitability of new built developments such as houses and 
green-houses threatens the openness of the landscape and can cause land 
prices to increase.
Various policy initiatives have been introduced to deal with these prob-
lems. As in the rest of the Netherlands, central government sponsors farmers 
and nature conservation unions by means of subsidies. In addition to that, in 
Midden-Delfland, a so-called green fund was established. The villages in the 
Midden-Delfland area made a deal with two cities abutting the green area, in 
which the cities put about €8 million in a green fund in exchange for adjust-
ments to municipal boundaries which made developments next to the cities 
possible. The fund is designed to pay landowners to maintain landscape ele-
ments. Nevertheless, these payments are not sufficient to keep economical-
ly vital farmers in the area. To achieve this, a land bank has been discussed. 
However, the current fund was not considered large enough to establish a 
land bank.
In recent years, different planning processes have been started. Unlike the 
1970s, in the early 2000s, central government attempted to divest the respon-
sibility for the area to the province and the municipalities. The province and 
the newly formed municipality in the green zone, the municipality of Midden-
Delfland, started up communicative planning processes. The provincial project 
was initiated to overcome the deadlock in the process of building a major high-
way through the area; it started by making an inventory of all the interested 
parties in the area, such as leisure, agriculture, transport, and nature. The basic 
idea of this project was that if the highway is not constructed, no measures 
to support leisure, agriculture or nature conservation will be taken. At present, 
due to procedural hiccups, this process has not yet reached a final result. The 
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municipality held a conference 
in a barn, formulated a vision 
for the area (see Figure 1.8) and 
installed an area-coordinator. 
However, because of its limited 
means, budgets and number of 
skilled civil servants, the mu-
nicipality can not be expected 
to arrange and fund substan-
tial measures to protect and 
improve the Midden-Delfland area, such as a land bank, on its own. Besides, in 
order to acquire funding for the removal of greenhouses, in line with provin-
cial policy, the municipality of Midden-Delfland planned to build new houses 
at the Maaslandsedam in the land consolidation project area. Nevertheless, at 
present, due to the efforts of this municipality, Midden-Delfland has become 
part of central government’s plans in the framework of the Urgentieprogramma 
Randstad (Urgent policy program for the Randstad; see Figure 1.9) (Ministry V&W, 
2007). Because these developments are too recent, this could be examined in 
this dissertation only to a very limited extend.
Data on the recent situation in Midden-Delfland has been used in Chapter 
3 to discuss policy development and landscape change. Differences in trans-
action costs associated with recent measures to financially support farmers 
are discussed in Chapter 4. Some recent examples from the Midden-Delfland 
area are used to illustrate difficulties associated with cross-subsidy strategies 
in Chapter 5. Consequences of a shortage of hierarchical elements and a ne-
glect of the importance of land development institutions in recent planning 
processes are discussed in Chapters 6 and 7, respectively.
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Figure 1.8 Regional Vision Midden-Delfland®2025 
Source: Gemeente Midden-Delfland, 2005
Figure 1.9 Randstadurgent
Source: Ministry V&W, 2007
The National Landscape Laag Holland1.4.3 
The National Landscape, Laag Holland, is located north of Amsterdam (see 
Figure 1.10). More information on this can be found at www.laagholland.nl 
(see also Kloen & Guldemond, 2004; Didde, 2007). Laag Holland is a cultural 
historic green area (see Figure 1.11) of 51,400 hectares that consists of Water-
land, a small scale peat polder landscape like Midden-Delfland, and of polders 
reclaimed in the seventieth century one of which is a UNESCO monument. 
Parts of the area are also protected by the EU’s Bird and Habitat Directive. The 
land is used for agriculture, mainly dairy farming (see Figure 1.12), recreation, 
and nature conservation.
In general, landscape problems in Laag Holland are similar to those in Mid-
den-Delfland: urban pressure, difficult circumstances for farming, and prob-
lems maintaining nature conservation sites. The Living in Waterland (Water-
lands wonen) movement, an initiative to develop houses in various places in 
the area is an example of this urban pressure.
Different institutions have an effect on the Laag Holland area. Like Mid-
den-Delfland, Laag Holland is part of a National Buffer Zone. In 2004, the Nota 
Ruimte declared Laag Holland as National Landscape. Despite the name, im-
plementing the policy of National Landscapes has been decentralized to the 
province and the municipalities. They cooperate within a committee support-
ed by civil servants. The main activity of this committee is to coordinate and 
subsidize projects such as the building of four ecological barns, an education 
project for primary schools, and an excursion boat (Gebiedsbureau Laag Hol-
land, 2007). They advise on changes to land-use plans, but do not in general 
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purchase land or implement physical measures. An exception to this is the 
land bank for agricultural preservation. This small scale experiment aims at 
buying land at market prices and leasing it to farmers for a low price on the 
condition that the farmer works sustainably.
At present, the National Landscape policy has only been in place for a few 
years and therefore its effects cannot be measured as was possible in the 
Midden-Delfland land consolidation project. Nevertheless, because the meas-
ures taken within the framework of Laag Holland are modest, expectations of 
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Figure 1.11 A village on Marken in Laag Holland
Photo: Nico Langeveld
Figure 1.12 Farm in Laag Holland
Photo: Fabienne Jesse
the effect of the institutions are low. As Janssen et al. (2007, p. 15) found, prov-
inces are hardly able to convert policy into practice in National Landscapes, 
putting too much focus on process and the creation of public support.
The Laag Holland area was used to validate ideas developed on the basis of 
the Midden-Delfland case, and this is presented in Chapters 2 and 3. Chapter 
4 uses the example of the strategies to subsidize farmers on the boat-lands in 
Laag Holland to explain how efficient institutional arrangements can be made 
in terms of Transaction Cost Theory. In Chapter 5, the discourse used within 
the Living in Waterland movement is analyzed to explain how a cross-subsidy 
strategy can be used to clear the way for developments. Chapter 6 also dis-
cusses the Living in Waterland movement and the modest measures taken to 
implement the National Landscape policy to illustrate the effect a decentral-
ized approach can have on the protection and improvement of green areas. 
Chapter 8, which presents Slow Planning, discusses how a plea for more dy-
namics was used to permit new built developments in Laag Holland.
Cross-subsidy strategies in the 1.4.4 
Bloemendalerpolder
The Bloemendalerpolder is located directly to the east of Amsterdam (see 
Figure 1.13) and it covers an area of 500 hectares. The preparations for the 
project, in which new built developments are supposed to cross-subsidize 
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green areas, have been studied by Farjon et al. (2004) and Van Rij (2007). At 
present, the Bloemendalerpolder is used for large scale agriculture and some 
other land uses such as the storage of materials (see Figure 1.14). The area of-
fers hardly any opportunities for recreation.
There are a number of reasons for the decision to start a process to de-
velop the Bloemendalerpolder. First, the Amsterdam area is confronted with a 
housing shortage; in addition, the Bloemendalerpolder is hardly used for rec-
reation at present. Because the area is part of the protected Green Heart, as 
well as being a National Buffer Zone, developing houses on the entire area 
might cause much resistance. In order to solve this problem, the idea of de-
veloping houses on a third of the polder was proposed, and using the money 
raised in this way to make the rest of the area more suitable for nature con-
servation and recreation.
During the discussion on the Nota Ruimte (Ministry VROM et al., 2004) in 
2004, the decision was made to use the profits earned from developing a third 
of the polder on the remaining green area. In recent years, many farmers 
have sold their land to property developers. Earlier, the DLG/BBL had also ac-
quired land in the Bloemendalerpolder. During an interactive planning proc-
ess, public parties and private land owners, most of them property develop-
ers, worked together. This resulted in a new provincial structure plan for the 
area (see Figure 1.15). The province of North-Holland and the DLG/BBL played 
a key-role in this process.
Because the process is not finished, a full evaluation of the process and 
its outcomes cannot be made yet. An early estimation gives the following 
impression. The parties cooperated and reached a first “tentative agreement” 
(Lenkeek, 2007). These new plans are likely to make two thirds of this area 
more suitable for recreation and nature conservation, which could be consid-
ered an improvement of the spatial quality. However, to complete these plans, 
at present, additional financing still needs to be found.
In the first place, data from the Bloemendalerpolder case was used for the 
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Figure 1.14 Impression of the Bloemendalerpolder
discussion on cross-subsidy strategies in Chapter 5. This project is also an ex-
ample of a combined use of hierarchical and network-oriented elements, the 
topic of Chapter 6. Chapter 7 discusses how linking a new plan for the Bloe-
mendalerpolder with agreements on fi nancial contributions by property de-
velopers can lead to tensions between spatial planning and land development. 
In Chapter 8 on institutional change, the Bloemendalerpolder case illustrates 
how institutional innovations are possible when they are based on elaborated 
practice.
The Park Forest, Ghent Project1.4.5 
The Park Forest area is situated south west of the city of Ghent (see Figure 
1.16) in Flanders, the northern part of Belgium. More information on this case 
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can be found at www.parkbos.be (see also 
Van Herzele, 2006; Leinfelder, 2006; Leinfelder 
& VandenAbeele, 2007). In total, the project 
area consists of 1,200 hectares, of which only 
some parts are planned to be developed into 
a forest pole (see Figure 1.17). At present, the 
area where the Park Forest is planned is ba-
sically used for agriculture. As can be seen in 
Figure 1.18, there are also some estates in the 
area. The ribbon developments are a sign of 
the proximity of the city of Ghent.
Problems that led to the plan to develop a 
park forest were the general shortage of for-
ests in Flanders, a lack of green space for rec-
reation, and urban sprawl. The Flemish government included the plan to cre-
ate a Park Forest near Ghent in the Structure Plan for Flanders (Ministerie van 
de Vlaamse Gemeenschap, 1997). In order to create the Park Forest, a regional 
land use plan (Regionaal Uitvoeringsplan, RUP) (Ministerie van de Vlaamse Ge-
meenschap, 2005) was developed that delineated the various land uses per 
parcel of land and regulated the compulsory sale of properties.
At the time of the case study, funding for forestation had been designated 
by the forestry agency, and negotiations with estate owners were underway. 
In general, at that time, attempts to purchase farmland had not been success-
ful, and the compulsory sale process was facing obstacles. In addition, fund-
ing for most other parts of the area had not been designated yet. It is not sure 
whether funds will be made available in the future. All in all, the future of the 
Park Forest, Ghent project was uncertain.
The Park Forest, Ghent case was studied in less depth than the other cas-
es. The purpose of the comparison was to identify elements of Dutch prac-
tice that seemed self evident at first sight. The institutional framework of the 
Flemish case study is only explicitly discussed in the chapter on institutional 
change (Chapter 8).
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Figure 1.18 Impression of the Park Forest, Ghent area 
Source: Agentschap voor Natuur en Bos, Jean-Pierre Nicaise
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Model for green 2 
area protection and 
improvement
In the last decades the idea has become more popular that inspiring plan-
ning concepts and land-use plans are not sufficient to protect the green met-
ropolitan landscape (Alterman, 1997; Hajer & Zonneveld, 2000). In practice, 
many different measures are taken to protect and improve green areas. Many 
authors (e.g., Albrechts, 2006; Bengston et al., 2004; Brody et al., 2006; Koontz, 
2003) have stressed the need to increase the understanding of the link be-
tween process and spatial quality as well as between plans and plan imple-
mentation. Albrechts (2006) even pleaded for the formulation of a “practicing 
theory” that deals with implementation and evaluation of theoretical models 
in daily planning processes. Planning literature pays much attention to insti-
tutions that facilitate the decision about where to plan which type of land use. 
The democratization of these institutions was considered to solve the void 
between policy and practice (Boonstra, 2006).
However, in order to solve this void, little attention has been paid to in-
stitutions that can be used to influence the coming about of activities at the 
planned location. Often, planners consider this to be the task of sector de-
partments. Priemus (1996) and Korthals Altes (2007) explained that policy im-
plementation by sector department have a large impact on strategic planning 
(see Section 7.2). There is a lack of literature on the activities that are under-
taken in practice to influence metropolitan green areas. This gap is partially 
filled by studies of the link between spatial planning concepts and projects 
(Gallent & Shaw, 2007). However, in order to get sufficient insight into institu-
tions that influence the type of land use at a specific location, a joint frame-
work needs to be developed that includes both planning institutions and oth-
er ways to influence the protection and improvement of these areas.
Although Pols et al. (2005) wrote a report about changes in agriculture, land 
prices and consequences for the landscape, most of the research about eco-
nomic forces in rural areas and other factors that might influence the pro-
tection and improvement of metropolitan green areas, have been developed 
by distinct disciplines. Knowledge about developments in metropolitan green 
areas and the influence of policy on these developments is divided over many 
different people, such as geographers, planners, ecologists, agricultural econo-
mists, and not in the last place local stakeholders. As a consequence a coher-
ent framework for these developments is lacking. Van der Ploeg et al. (2000) 
stressed the need for scholars to develop an empirically Grounded Theory on 
rural development practices. Although a start to fill this gap has been made 
(e.g., Marsden, 2004), these theories still focus on some specific aspects, such 
as ecology and agriculture. These theories do not deal with recreational areas, 
which are important parts of metropolitan green areas. Besides, they do not 
give a comprehensive picture of factors that influence metropolitan green ar-
eas, such as land ownership, zoning and maintenance.
Therefore, this chapter explains which spatial planning and land develop-
ment measures are taken to protect and improve metropolitan green areas. 
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Because knowledge on the factors that influence this is divided over many 
sub-disciplines which all claim to be important, it is difficult to determine 
which factors should be included in such a framework. On the basis of the 
case studies, these factors have been selected. The case studies were also 
used to develop a model to explain how these factors are related, and which 
ways can be used to influence the protection and improvement of metro-
politan green areas. This model shows a mixed approach, based on changing 
zones, spatial quality and ownership situation. This model can be used to dis-
pute the idea that if no measures are taken to support metropolitan green 
areas, no changes will take place.
This chapter consists of two parts. The first part discusses the tactics used 
for the protection and improvement of the metropolitan green area in Mid-
den-Delfland. The second part shows the model, based of this case study, for 
the ways to influence the protection and improvement of metropolitan green 
areas.
Green area protection and 2.1 
improvement in practice
Spatial planners used spatial quality, zoning, as well as ownership to protect 
and improve the green area of Midden-Delfland. Improving spatial quality is 
not only an end it is also a mean. To make people feel attached to the area 
and in order to create support for the green area, government increased spa-
tial quality. The DLG/BBL developed large recreational zones for which con-
tract work was carried out (see Figure 2.1). For example, contractors planted 
trees, constructed bicycle tracks and excavated lakes for windsurfing. The 
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Figure 2.1 Construction works for the recreational area in Midden-Delfland
Photo: Kees van der Vaart
government also carried out works to support 
the agricultural land owners within the area. 
The idea behind this was that if farmers could 
not make a living in this area, this would be a 
threat to the quality and quantity of metro-
politan green area. Therefore, consolidation 
of land and improvements in infrastructure 
were meant to increase the quality of agricul-
tural area in order to support the economic 
position of the guardians of the landscape, in 
this case the farmers.
Furthermore, zoning measures were im-
portant tools. During the project the detailed 
Dutch municipal land-use plans, (bestem-
mingsplannen), and provincial structure plans 
(streekplannen), were adjusted. In addition, a 
special Act for the area was made which gave 
Midden-Delfland a particular status. Along 
with the Act, funds were made available for 
the area. In the Act, the boundaries of the ar-
ea were defined. Therefore, it was clear where the restrictive policy was to be 
applied. The Act also stated that a Land Consolidation Committee should be 
formed. One of the tasks of this committee was to decide which individual 
building projects could hamper the land readjustment process and in order to 
avoid that should not be permitted according to article 9 of the Midden-Delf-
land Act. In practice, the committee also tested whether the building projects 
were in line with the goals of the entire project which were open space pres-
ervation, improving farming conditions and creating recreational areas. This 
procedure, in addition to the normal municipal bestemmingsplan-procedure, 
was important as the attitude of Dutch communities to building activities dif-
fers from the attitude of British communities. Unlike municipalities in the UK 
(Webster, 2002), Dutch municipalities have a tendency to welcome develop-
ments (Needham & Faludi, 1999; Korthals Altes, 1995). The procedure before 
the Land Consolidation Committee formed an important extra barrier to de-
velopment. As a consequence of these measures, farming was one of the few 
types of land use allowed. The relatively low land prices show the effective-
ness of zoning in Midden-Delfland. According to the project’s land purchaser, 
plots were sold for prices ranging from €2 to €4 per square meter, whereas in 
other metropolitan rural areas land prices could reach €40 (DLG, 2006).
Another important part of the project concerned changing the ownership 
situation. The Act mapped out the zones where compulsory purchase for cre-
ating the recreational area would be allowed. These zones were planned in 
the area adjoining the cities most threatened by urban sprawl. This tactic fits 
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the idea that protected areas act as a buffer for sprawling (Brody et al., 2006). 
In parliament, during the debate on the Midden-Delfland Act, the tactical im-
portance of these recreational areas adjoining the cities was explicitly con-
sidered (Ritsema, 1987). These areas became state property to safeguard the 
open landscape in Midden-Delfland (see Figure 2.2). To protect the agricultural 
zone, the recreational zone adjoining the cities was situated in the areas most 
threatened by urban sprawl (Figure 1.7). Nowadays, the governmental organ-
ization for managing the natural heritage (Staatsbosbeheer) owns the recrea-
tional areas. These areas are being let out to the recreational board and a golf 
course operator on a long lease. The ownership situation had also changed in 
the agricultural zone. Agricultural plot sizes were increased by land realloca-
tion. The government also leased parcels of land to farmers in order to create 
larger farms that can produce more economically.
Besides that nowadays, the government is attempting to improve farm-
ers’ economic situation by giving farmers the opportunity to apply for nature 
management subsidies. For example, farmers can receive subsidies if they 
adapt their agricultural techniques and the timing of seasonal work to ac-
commodate meadow-nesting birds (Groote et al., 2006) (Figure 2.3 shows an 
example of supported farmland). Also, the government supports other guard-
ians of the landscape. The Nature Conservation Union receives these kinds 
of subsidies too. In addition, the nearby municipalities, the province and the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality pay for the recreational area.
In order to pay for these measures, governmental budgets have been made 
available. In the case of the Midden-Delfland land consolidation project the 
total expenditure for the project by central government through the DLG/BBL 
was roughly estimated at about €200 million of which €18 million was used 
for hiring civil servants, €100 million was used to acquire land and €82 mil-
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Figure 2.3 Board showing that the farmer is financially supported 
for his nature conservation activities: “In this polder farmers and 
sponsors work on the protection of birds together”
lion was spent to carry out the works. However, not only the cost of design 
and construction should be taken into account but also maintenance costs. 
The maintenance costs of the recreational areas, agricultural areas and na-
ture conservation sites in Midden-Delfland are discussed in Section 3.1.
From case study towards a model2.2 
There is evidence that stringent legal controls are not sufficient to successful-
ly preserve farmland, and that various means are needed to influence spatial 
developments (Alterman, 1997). In case studies in the United States, Bengston 
et al. (2004) found that multiple institutions, which strengthen and comple-
ment each other, are needed to increase effectiveness and avoid unintended 
outcomes. Based on findings in Germany, Gailing (2005) advocates for paral-
lel planning and implementation. This means that the interaction between 
zoning, spatial quality, and land ownership needs to be considered if develop-
ments in metropolitan green areas are to be understood.
Based on the Midden-Delfland case, I examined various means that a gov-
ernment can use to influence the protection and improvement of metropoli-
tan green areas, and I analysed how these means relate to each other (Van 
Rij, 2006; Van Rij & Korthals Altes, 2008). Using this example, I developed a 
model for green area protection and improvement which explains the interac-
tion between land ownership, zoning, and spatial quality (Figure 2.4). The aim 
of this model is to provide insight into developments in the landscape and 
the underlying driving forces behind these developments. Other case studies 
were used to validate the model and to make some minor improvements. The 
model was further validated by various experts.
In this model, spatial quality is defined as the attractiveness of the physical 
landscape. Spatial quality is high when a landscape is attractive and likely to 
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be enduring. This can be reflected by peoples’ appreciation of an area or the 
attention paid to it by the media and interest groups.
Zoning is the principle of assigning labels to a specific area. The term zone 
is used for all kinds of area-specific labels that have consequences for the use 
of that area and the policies to be applied on that area.
The term ownership is used to describe parties that are legal owners of piec-
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es of land or hold particular rights to them. 
Unlike zoning, ownership is ruled by private 
law. Government land ownership, especially 
by sector departments (see Figure 2.5), is an 
important tool to control developments.
Five other concepts revolve around these 
three central concepts. The landscape guard-
ians are the agents that own and manage 
the landscape. Obviously, owners are impor-
tant as the holders of the property rights to 
the land, but they may permit other actors to 
manage areas in varying degrees (Groote et 
al., 2006). The most important guardians are 
farmers, nature conservation unions, and gov-
ernmental bodies. In general, these guardians 
are responsible for the implementation of 
physical measures including maintenance. The 
term public support is used for the activities 
of people, often organised in interest groups 
(see Figure 2.6). These activities are intended 
to place the area on the political agenda, getting media attention and rais-
ing funds for the area. Physical measures can make the landscape more at-
tractive and can consequentially have a positive effect on public support (see 
Figure 2.7). Land prices refer to the prices for which the land is sold or rented. 
Finally, the term available (government) budgets refers to all the funds available 
for the area.
These concepts are linked in the following way: spatial quality can be in-
fluenced by physical measures, resulting in a positive or a negative change. 
If a government builds a new road, for example, this can be a direct threat 
to spatial quality and an indirect threat because the road might attract new 
development. Places with high spatial quality often receive considerable pub-
lic support. If the area is appealing and usable, it will be appreciated. In that 
case, people are often willing to spend time and money to help to protect and 
improve the area. Public participation in a communicative planning process 
can help to avoid place-blind approaches (Healey, 1999). Civil servants can 
promote a green area in order to gain public support for the area. This makes 
it more likely that green area preservation will be put on the political agenda. 
When there are large amounts of public support, with supporters lobbying to 
protect an area, it is more likely that government funds will be made avail-
able and that restrictive zoning decisions are made.
There is also a link between spatial quality and zoning. When a choice has 
to be made between metropolitan green areas for the site of a new housing 
development, the least attractive one is usually chosen. Various interviewees 
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Figure 2.6 Public support for farmland protesting 
the development of a nature conservation/
recreational area: “We want cows, no mosquitoes”
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Figure 2.7 Tree planting in the Park Forest Ghent; physical measures can increase public 
support
 Source: Agentschap voor Natuur en Bos, Jean-Pierre Nicaise
Figure 2.8 Decreased spatial quality
suggested that landowners applied this principle, by decreasing spatial qual-
ity (see Figure 2.8) of agricultural land before lobbying for a change of zoning. 
They may try to make the area look ugly, for example by storing recreational 
vehicles there, hoping that a municipal council will then decide to change 
the zoning, revitalising the area by building houses (e.g., Van Amersfoort et 
al., 2006). On the other hand, zoning can also contribute to spatial quality, by 
prohibiting undesirable land-use. Besides, land-use plans often need to be ad-
justed to permit physical measures to be carried out.
Zoning and the availability of government budgets are related. For example, 
the designation of a greenbelt can help to make government budgets avail-
able. In addition, money may be needed when land-use plans are adjusted. 
For example, when certain uses are limited and specific attributes, like the 
right to build, are no longer part of a private property, owners may need to be 
compensated.
Zoning and ownership are linked in various ways. First, if a government 
wants to implement physical changes and therefore want to purchase land, 
changes in zoning can be a basis for compulsory purchase (see also Røsnes, 
2005). Second, land prices play a crucial role in the link between zoning and 
the ownership of land (VROMraad, 2004b). Land in a zone where building is 
permitted (or expected in the future) is much more expensive than land in 
a green zone where the right to build is separate from the ownership of the 
land, and the land can only be used for farming (e.g., Cheshire & Sheppard, 
2004) (see for example Figure 2.9). Therefore, land-use plans are used to pro-
hibit unwanted forms of land use and to keep prices low, so that farmers can 
[ 39 ]
Figure 2.9 Land zoned for green houses for sale
afford land.
If the market is convinced that the zoning is relatively permanent, it is 
likely that farmers will buy the land, as opposed to other parties. A problem 
that arises, which was mentioned by many interviewees, is that if zoning is 
not considered to be relatively permanent, the value of the land determined 
by agricultural profit is lower than the price for which the land is sold (see 
Figure 3.8). This makes farm enlargement, needed for efficient production, 
prohibitively expensive (Figure 2.10 illustrates the problem of low agricul-
tural incomes). If a farmer cannot earn enough money, he cannot invest in 
more land, and it is unlikely that he will find someone willing to take over the 
farm. When a farmer stops farming, his property might be split up, causing 
the characteristic agricultural scenery to disappear (see Figure 3.1). Therefore, 
ownership has an effect on the landscape guardians, on the implementation 
of physical measures, as well as on spatial quality. The financial position of 
the landscape guardians is thus also an important aspect of spatial planning.
The financial situation of the landscape guardians and the ownership situ-
ation can also influence zoning. If owners face financial difficulties, they can 
decide to sell the land to property developers. In that case, it is more like-
ly that these property developers will exert pressure on the municipality to 
change the land-use plan.
Available funding plays an important role here, making it possible for the 
government to intervene. Government can improve the spatial quality of the 
landscape by implementing physical measures, making the area more suitable 
for recreation, nature conservation or agriculture. Various levels of government 
can create protective land-use plans for the area. They can support the land-
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Figure 2.10 Farmer advocating a good milk price for a healthy agricultural sector 
scape guardians financially, by subsidising farmers, district recreational boards, 
or Nature Conservation Unions. The ownership situation can be improved by 
reallocating land and leasing plots to farmers at a low price. In some cases, 
the government might decide to buy land outright, for example to develop a 
recreational area. Ownership does not only influence current land use, but can 
also influence future land use; the Nature Conservation Union (see Figure 2.11) 
is less likely to sell land to a property developer than a farmer.
It is important for the government to employ these various means to in-
fluence the protection and improvement of metropolitan green areas. These 
means do not only complement and strengthen each other; they also influ-
ence people’s trust in the success or failure of a policy program. As discussed 
in Chapter 8 on Slow Planning, these various means of influencing the protec-
tion and improvement of metropolitan green areas have different time frames. 
Spatial quality can change at any moment: if contract work is carried out or 
recreational vehicles are stored on a plot. Zoning has a longer time horizon 
because land-use plans are not easily changed. However, every four years a 
new municipal council is elected and can decide to change the land-use plans. 
Adjustments in the ownership situation can last longer. If land is owned by 
a pro-green agent, or given to a nature conservation union, it is less likely 
that constructions will be developed on this land. By changing the ownership 
situation, a governmental body can not only change current use, but also in-
fluence who the owner of the land will be in the future. In the Netherlands, 
ownership by farmers of plots right next to cities is seen as a threat to metro-
politan green areas. From this perspective, the time dimension is not part of 
the model, but does play an important role in the background. In line with the 
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Figure 2.11 Land owned by the Nature Conservation Union in Midden-Delfland
concept of Slow Planning, measures that reduce the dynamics in spatial qual-
ity, zoning and land ownership can help to protect and improve metropolitan 
green areas successfully.
Conclusion2.3 
In order to effectively influence spatial quality, instead of paying attention to 
the question what should be planned where, more attention should be paid to 
the question how we can influence the development of these activities there. 
In this light, based on the case studies, a model was developed on the ways to 
protect and improve metropolitan green areas. This model might function as 
a tool for practice.
These interventions can aim at changing zoning, supporting spatial qual-
ity and modifying land ownership. Zoning is a classical tool for planners to 
influence spatial developments. Zoning can be used to prohibit profitable, un-
wanted types of land use such as the construction of dwellings. If the market 
expects the zoning to be durable, zoning will also keep land prices low. With-
out these low land prices continuing, land can not be bought at low prices for 
agricultural purposes and continuation of agrarian-type land use is often not 
possible.
However, although in the Netherlands a binding zoning system is in place, 
other measures are considered to be needed to effectively protect metropoli-
tan green areas. This is not just because of problems concerning the enforce-
ment of these land-use plans. Even agricultural zoned plots can be split up 
and used for activities whit lower spatial quality such as allotment gardening. 
Besides that, farmers can decide to sell their land, and by decreasing spatial 
quality, land owners can put pressure on municipalities to change land-use 
plans. In order to protect and improve metropolitan green areas, a mixed ap-
proach, based on upgrading spatial quality as well as changing the ownership 
situation can be used. Improving spatial quality is not only an end in itself, it 
is also a mean to mobilize public support needed for the protection of metro-
politan green areas, especially at times when adjustments to land-use plans 
are being considered. Recreational areas and nature protection areas may 
strengthen public support.
Besides spatial quality, ownership is important for the protection and im-
provement of metropolitan green areas. The ownership situation does not on-
ly affect current land use, it also influences land use in the future. Once land 
is sold to property developers, they might exert pressure on a municipality to 
change land-use plans. Because of this, the financial position of the guardians 
of the landscape (in most cases the owners), in particular farmers, is impor-
tant for spatial planning. Government can support them by contributing to 
their financial position or by improving the ownership situation through land 
[ 42 ]
reallocation and leasing out plots to farmers for a low price. However, to pro-
tect and improve green areas adjoining the cities for recreation, the govern-
ment might need to buy land and change the ownership situation completely. 
This requires appropriate legislation for compulsory purchase and land real-
location.
The different means available to influence spatial developments discussed 
here not only increase people’s trust in the success of a policy program, they 
also contribute to a more durable outcome as the various ways of influencing 
the protection and improvement of metropolitan green areas have different 
time frames. In that way, this approach fits the idea of Slow Planning, the sub-
ject of Chapter 8. All in all, the model explains how a combination of institu-
tions that aim at changing spatial quality, zoning and the ownership situation, 
which go with substantial expenditure, can successfully protect and improve 
metropolitan green areas.
[ 43 ]
[ 44 ]
Landscape changes 3 
and the restructuring 
of the welfare state
In the Netherlands, changes to metropolitan green areas are cause for con-
cern (VROMraad, 2004b; MNP, 2007a; Boersma & Kuiper, 2006). The Dutch par-
liament passed a motion to force the Minister of Housing, Spatial Planning 
and the Environment to propose measures to stop messy types of land use 
(Dutch Lower Chamber, 2006-2007b). The Dutch Advisory Council on Hous-
ing, Spatial Planning and the Environment (VROMraad) (2004b) was concerned 
about the development of factory farms and non-agricultural types of land 
use and the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (Milieu- en Na-
tuurplanbureau, MNP) (2007a) was worried because of urban sprawl in its 2007 
report.
With the help of the model discussed in Chapter 2, the case studies illus-
trated why the picture provided by the studies mentioned above is incomplete. 
Built developments affect landscape values. However, if these developments 
are only studied at the moment they have become present in the landscape, it 
is too late to protect the green landscape. Therefore, insight is needed in the 
early signs of landscape changes, which are discussed in Section 3.1. Insuf-
ficient maintenance can result in a decrease of spatial quality: messy types 
of land use, unsafe areas and evanesce of specific species. By only paying at-
tention to the maintenance of small landscape elements, the major problem 
with respect to maintenance, the maintenance of the fields might be neglect-
ed. Therefore, Section 3.2 pays attention to the economic situation of those 
parties who are responsible for maintaining the fields. Since large parts of 
metropolitan green areas are owned by farmers and since maintenance by 
farmers involve relatively low costs for the government, special attention is 
paid to farmers in small scale metropolitan rural areas for who it is difficult 
to compete on a global market.
Neo-liberalism has had and still has much influence on policy and society 
(Peck & Tickell, 2002). Various authors have discussed how neo-liberalism with 
its ideas on free-market economy and globalization has led to restructuring of 
the welfare state with reducing the role of the state, austerity financing and 
enhancing the role of individual and other actors (e.g., Peck & Tickell, 2002; 
Taylor-Gooby, 2005). According to Korthals Altes (2002) and Jessop (1994), the 
restructuring of the welfare state has led to hollowing-out the nation-state 
and the rise of supranational regimes and regional and local governance.
In Dutch green metropolitan landscapes, globalization is felt through the 
influences of changes through reforms of Europe’s Common Agricultural Pol-
icy (CAP) (Dammers & Keiner, 2006) and European state aid regulation (Euro-
pean Commission, 2008), which urge farmers to compete on a global market. 
The restructuring of the welfare state, in particular deregulation, privatizing 
and decentralization, has had an effect on metropolitan green landscapes 
since it affected the way spatial planning could become effective by coordi-
nating sector departments (Korthals Altes, 2007). These developments also 
played a role in spatial planning directly (e.g., Van Buuren, 2005; Dutch Low-
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er Chamber, 2004-2005, p. 7, p. 45, p. 46). The effects of these developments 
have been a growing cause for concern. The Dutch Advisory Council for the 
Rural Area, Raad landelijk gebied, warned about the consequences of thought-
less privatization and deregulation (Raad landelijk gebied, 2006). Environmen-
tal interest groups discussed the risk of decentralizing tasks to municipalities 
which might be willing to favor property developers (e.g., Van Dusseldorp et 
al., 2007). Also parliament has adopted a more critical attitude towards decen-
tralization in this field (e.g., Dutch Lower Chamber, 2006-2007b; 2006-2007c). 
Elaborating on this discussion Section 3.3 investigates influences of the re-
structuring of the welfare state on landscape changes.
Signs of landscape changes3.1 
Landscape changes can become irreversible before they become visible. At the 
moment new developments occur, people start to express their concern about 
metropolitan green areas. After people experience these new developments, 
the topic is placed on the political agenda and examined. However, if the de-
cision to internalize landscape values is made after the new developments 
are finished, this might be too late. Therefore, this section uses the model, 
presented in Chapter 2, to examine early signs of landscape changes. Because 
most developments are expected in land maintained by farmers, they receive 
the most attention.
Signs concerning spatial quality3.1.1 
Signs of decreasing spatial quality express themselves differently in the dif-
ferent types of metropolitan green areas. For recreational areas, these difficul-
ties can be indicated by untidy and unsafe conditions; litter is not removed 
and due to a lack of supervision, criminal activities such as drug dealing and 
prostitution start to find their way to these accessible, quiet areas close to cit-
ies. Although nature conservation sites generally lay further away from the 
cities and are less accessible, these problems may also occur there. In addi-
tion to that, nature conservation sites face problems concerning the preser-
vation of species. For example in Laag-Holland’s so-called Boat-Lands (vaar-
landen), which are only accessible by boat, the consequences of insufficient 
maintenance could be experienced. The grass in these areas, which forms an 
important habitat for endangered meadow birds, had not been cut for a long 
time since farmers decided that leasing these lands was not profitable any 
more. As a result, the habitat has changed; the pH-level of the water has al-
tered and trees have grown. Because predators can hide in these trees, the 
area is no longer attractive for meadow birds.
Despite these problems in recreational areas and nature conservation sites, 
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the most important changes for the future metropolitan landscape have to do 
with the economic position of small-scale, metropolitan farms. A decrease of 
the economic position of small-scale metropolitan farmers might be visible in 
the landscape. One of the early signs of landscape alteration is changing veg-
etation (Van Rij, 2006); experts can see that the grass is not well maintained. 
This can be viewed as a sign that farmers cannot invest in their grass or that 
they do not consider it worthwhile to invest in their land. Another sign of 
changes in agricultural economics is the increase in horses (VNG & SRP, 2006). 
Although horses have always been part of agriculture, an unrestrained growth 
of facilities for horse riding, replacing the traditional picture of grazing cows, 
might detract from the picturesque view of the countryside and might cause 
land prices to rise. Another sign of urban proximity and a precursor of built 
development are messy types of land uses. Sometimes, landowners can try 
to force changes in the bestemmingsplan by allowing all kinds of messy land 
uses on their land, such as the storage of recreation vehicles and old tires and 
asking for a new bestemmingsplan to improve spatial quality through new built 
developments (Boersma & Kuiper, 2006).
Signs concerning zoning3.1.2 
Besides these visual signs, there are other signals of future changes to the 
landscape. Building houses in the countryside is discussed more often (e.g., 
Didde, 2007). An example of this is the study of the Netherlands Institute for 
Spatial Research (RPB) about houses in the countryside (Landelijk wonen) (Van 
Dam et al., 2003). Official policy documents, such as the study Developing for 
Waterland 2020 (Bouwen voor Waterland 2020) (Provincie Noord-Holland, 2004) 
and the regional Plan for Living in Waterland (Streekplanuitwerking Waterlands-
wonen) (Provincie Noord-Holland, 2006b), have been clearing the way for new 
bestemmingsplannen to allow additional houses to be built in the countryside. 
These documents indicate that bestemmingsplannen for metropolitan green ar-
eas might be changed in the future.
Signs concerning land ownership3.1.3 
Rising land prices show that people expect that building is going to be al-
lowed in these metropolitan green areas (e.g., DLG, 2006; Cheshire & Sheppard, 
2004). Since developments in the countryside are closely related to rising land 
prices, many signs of landscape change have something to do with owner-
ship. Because of high metropolitan land prices, it is often too expensive for 
farmers to buy a farm or to enlarge their farm. For example in Midden-Del-
fland, the average farm is relatively small (Koole et al., 2003). The economic 
situation and prospects are especially worrying for farms of this size (Van der 
Meulen et al., 2005; CBS, 2006). An aging farming population is also a sign that 
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young farmers cannot buy new land and that retiring farmers are waiting to 
sell their land for high urban prices (Pols et al., 2005). Despite changes in veg-
etation, the consequences of this changing landownership situation are often 
not visible. In some cases, this change can be visible, when farmers subdivide 
their land instead of selling it to other farmers, because they can get a higher 
price by subdividing it and selling the parcels individually. The cadastral map 
(Figure 3.1) shows an example of this. These subdivided parcels are often used 
for allotment gardening, and as a result, the traditional scenery disappears. 
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Unlike other countries, in the Netherlands, a parcelling subdivision permit, a 
possible institution to cope with this, does not exist.
Struggling landscape guardians3.2 
Chapter 2 explained why land-use plans are not a sufficient tool to protect 
and improve metropolitan green areas; zones can be changed especially if 
spatial quality declines. Difficulties concerning the economic position of 
guardians of the landscape and insufficient maintenance might catalyze this. 
According to various government departments, problems concerning mainte-
nance and maintenance costs have been underestimated (Ministry VROM et 
al., 2006). Not surprisingly the recurring costs for nature conservation have 
been investigated recently (MNP, 2007b). During the case studies, interviewees 
expressed their worries about the economic position of metropolitan farm-
ers in particular (Van Rij, 2005). This section explains how recurring costs and 
benefits especially concerned with maintenance and interests can have an ef-
fect on developments in metropolitan green areas. It also explains why the 
economic position of farmers is an important issue.
Subsidies, agricultural incomes and land prices are the crucial economic 
factors associated with the landscape. In terms of the model presented in 
Chapter 2, the availability of sufficient budgets can influence recurring costs 
and revenues that determine the economic position of the landscape guard-
ians. If the landscape guardians are unable to maintain the land, they cannot 
supply sufficient spatial quality. In such cases, public support for the green 
area may fade. In addition, interviewees expressed that landscape guardians 
might, because of their financial difficulties, be willing to sell their land to 
parties that would try to change the zoning.
Table 3.1 introduces the different guardians of metropolitan green areas in 
Midden-Delfland. Basically, in the Netherlands, as the Midden-Delfland exam-
ple illustrates (see Figure 3.2), there are three types of green land use: nature, 
Table 3.1
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Table 3.1 Different land use types in Midden-Delfland*
Land use type Land owner
Responsible for 
maintenance
Surface 
in ha Revenues
Contributions by the 
government €/ha/year
Agriculture Farmers -
State -
Others -
Farmers - 4.000 Subsidy per ha -
Nature subsidy -
Green fund -
Agrarian  -
production
420
133
100
Recreation State - Recreational board - 1.500 Contributions  -
various governments
2.200
Nature Nature conser- -
vation unit
State -
Nature conser- -
vation union
270 Subsidy -
Donations -
Lottery -
Investments -
85
* The amounts are indicative only.
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Figure 3.3 Example of extensive recreational area
Photo: Kees Van der Vaart
agriculture and recreation. The largest proportion of land is farmland, main-
tained by farmers who own their land or hold a long lease. In general, land for 
recreation and nature conservation has been acquired by the state or nature 
conservation unions. Nature conservation unions and recreational boards 
composed of various governments are responsible for maintaining these ar-
eas.
Recreational areas3.2.1 
In Midden-Delfland, maintaining the recreation areas, such as shown by 
Figures 3.3 and 3.4, costs about €2,200 per hectare per year. This funding is 
provided by both central and local governments. For the government, main-
taining recreational areas is the most expensive compared to the nature con-
servation sites and the agricultural areas. Some other recreational areas gen-
erate some income from festivals and catering facilities. Because, in general, 
these recreational areas do not generate any income, their maintenance is 
very costly for the government. Although these high expenditures might be 
considered a matter of inefficiency, this is not necessarily the case. Because 
recreational areas are located next to cities, they face many difficulties. Good 
maintenance and surveillance are needed in order to keep criminal activities 
out of the areas. In addition, these areas have the highest amount of visitors 
per hectare. This can justify the large amount of money spent on these areas. 
When interviewed, some civil servants, who are responsible for maintaining 
these areas, said that they find it hard to convince politicians to spend money 
on these areas. Although budgets for reconstructing these areas to meet new 
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Figure 3.4 Example of intensive recreational area
Photo: Kees Van der Vaart
demands were lacking, the general picture is that the maintenance of these 
areas and the budgets available for doing so are adequate.
Nature conservation sites3.2.2 
In the Netherlands, the state or special non-governmental nature conserva-
tion organisations are responsible for maintaining nature conservation ar-
eas. In Midden-Delfalnd, the nature conservation union, Natuurmonumenten, 
spends an estimated €920 on maintenance per hectare per year. Of this, €85 
is provided by the government and €835 is derived from private donations, 
returns on investments and sponsors such as the lottery (e.g., Natuurmonu-
menten, 2005) (see for other non governmental nature conservation organisa-
tions Milieu en Natuur Compendium (2008b) and Figure 3.5). The State For-
estry Organisation (Staadsbosbeheer) is mainly sponsored by the state, but it 
faces difficulties managing with the standard sums that are set for maintain-
ing their sites (Staatsbosbeheer, 2004). For the government, using non govern-
mental organisations to maintain nature areas is rather inexpensive because 
the government only has to provide subsidies.
People might not be aware that the maintenance of nature conservation 
areas is costly, and they might also not be unaware of the possible conse-
quences of a lack of maintenance on spatial quality. This lack of awareness 
can have important consequences for policy decisions. Maintenance is need-
ed to preserve specific species and to keep green areas attractive, accessible 
and safe for visitors. In the Netherlands, nature conservation is targeted to-
wards a specific habitat which often differs from the habitat resulting from 
non interference. Therefore, nature conservation involves maintaining the 
cultivated habitat. Maintenance costs differ depending on the vegetation and 
the choices with respect to the types of habitats to be conserved. For example, 
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it was estimated that the maintenance of one hectare of reed meadow costs 
€296 per year and the maintenance of one hectare of swampy meadows costs 
€1,608 per year (Staatsbosbeheer, 2004).
Traditionally, maintaining meadowland was relatively inexpensive, since 
these lands could be leased out to farmers. The changing economic situation 
of farmers could be seen in the nature conservation areas of Laag Holland 
earlier than in the agricultural areas. These signs might serve as a warning 
signal for agricultural areas in general. Because of the need to produce com-
petitively on a global market, in Laag Holland, it was no longer profitable for 
farmers to lease and maintain the Boat-Lands (see for an example of what 
these areas might look like Figure 3.6). As explained earlier a lack of main-
tenance resulted in a decrease of the conditions needed to preserve endan-
gered species. In order to counter this development in the Boat-Lands of Laag 
Holland, money has been made available to cut the trees, to change the pH-
level by scattering lime, and to pay for maintenance by farmers. If the state 
forestry organization had acted earlier, they would not have had to spend so 
much money to counter this development. This is an example of guardians of 
nature conservation sites struggling with maintenance costs and of the pos-
sible effects of the changing economic situation of farmers.
Agricultural areas
The largest part of the Dutch metropolitan landscape is maintained by farm-
ers (Vader & Leneman, 2006) (see for an example Figure 3.7). They derive their 
basic income from agricultural production. This part of their income is deter-
mined by world market prices. In addition to this, in 2006, every farmer re-
ceived a subsidy per hectare, of approximately €420 per hectare, designed to 
replace EU production subsidies. It is expected that this subsidy will be re-
duced in coming years (De Bont et al., 2003). Besides this, farmers can apply 
for nature conservation subsidies. For example, farmers can receive subsidies 
if they adapt their agricultural techniques and the timing of seasonal work to 
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Figure 3.6 Impression of a Boat-Land area
accommodate meadow-nesting birds (Groote et al., 2006). On average, farm-
ers in Midden-Delfland received €133 per hectare per year in this way. (In-
formation about the amounts of conservation subsides in other Dutch areas 
is available at Milieu en Natuur Compendium (2008a); the situation in Mid-
den-Delfland is typical). In Midden-Delfland, there is also a special local green 
fund, which can be used to pay landowners for “green and blue services”. For 
example, farmers can receive €50 per year for a historic outdoor toilet and €5 
per three years for a willow tree. On average, farmers receive €100 per hec-
tare per year in this way.
The economic position of farmers can be threatened by decreasing income 
and increasing costs (Pols et al., 2005). Van der Ploeg et al. (2000) spoke of a 
“squeeze on agriculture.” At least till 2007, farmers’ income had decreased. 
This problem was attributed to general changes in the market for farm prod-
ucts, the land market, and agricultural policy (Bervaes et al., 2001; Ellenkamp, 
2002; Koomen et al., 2005b). According to EU-policy, farmers need to compete 
in a global market. A net reduction in EU-subsidies for Dutch farmers and, at 
least till 2007, low global prices for agricultural products had reduced the in-
come of farmers. Although, for example in 2007, agricultural prices have in-
creased, the financial situation of small-scale farmers, making a living in the 
Dutch peat polders close to the cities, are still cause for concern (Kuiper & De 
Regt, 2007). Reasons for this are the small plot sizes, congestion on roads and 
high water levels. Raising water levels (Janssen et al., 2005) might contribute 
to this problem and some interviewees speculated that over time, farming in 
these areas will not be possible.
In order to produce more efficiently, farms need to be enlarged (Vader & 
Leneman, 2006). However, because of the proximity to the city, land prices are 
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Figure 3.7 A farm with the city Delft at the background
high in metropolitan agricultural areas (DLG, 2006; Cotteleer et al., 2007). This 
can have an important effect on the landscape (VROMraad, 2004b). Unlike 
most of the owners of recreational areas and nature conservation sites, who 
wrote off their land, farmers have to consider the money they have invested 
in their land and the interest they pay for the borrowed amounts. The price 
farmers have to pay for land is high because people believe development in 
these areas may be allowed in the future. As a result, farmers may pay more 
in annual interest than they earn from agricultural production. Because 
ground rents are based on land prices, the difference between annual inter-
est charges or rents and annual revenues is called the “rent-gap”. Figure 3.8 
illustrates this.
This rent-gap makes farm enlargement, which is needed for efficient pro-
duction, prohibitively expensive in metropolitan areas. If a farmer cannot 
earn enough, he cannot invest in more land. These farmers will probably not 
be able to find successors to take over their farms. This is especially a problem 
in the Dutch peat polders, where the soil conditions, which go with small plot 
sizes, make farming less profitable and where farm sizes have remained quite 
small. These small-scale farmers are facing economic problems and have a 
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gloomy perspective (Everdingen et al., 2005; Van der Meulen & Venema, 2005). 
Many interviewees mentioned the declining economic position of farmers as 
maintainers of the landscape as the most important threat to these small-
scale landscapes.
In recent years, attempts have been made to respond to this econom-
ic trend by creating new sorts of income for farmers and searching for new 
ways to use old farms. Although, especially in metropolitan areas, new activ-
ities such as farm-care, farm-recreation and the purchase of local products 
can contribute to agricultural incomes, in general, they have little economic 
impact (Vader & Leneman, 2006). Interviewees expressed concern about these 
new activities, giving examples of farmers who had started a sideline and 
soon neglected their agricultural activities. This phenomenon can be illustrat-
ed with a metaphor. As Figure 3.9 illustrates, a landscape can be thought of as 
a bundle of points, lines and planes. The points, the former farms or parts of 
them, can easily be used in another way, for example as restaurants, holiday 
houses, or shops for local products. This permits the farms to be maintained. 
The lines in the landscape, the roads, can be used for recreation. In general, 
they are owned by government, and their maintenance is an obvious task for 
local governments. Unlike the points and the lines, the maintenance and fi-
nancing of the planes, the fields, are cause for concern. There are hardly any 
activities other than farming that can both provide an income and maintain 
the open green landscape.
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Figure 3.9 The landscape seen as a bundle of points, lines and planes 
(here indicated in white)
The importance of farmers for 3.2.3 
metropolitan green areas
A comparison of the different types of land use shows the economic impor-
tance of farmers for metropolitan green areas. Because of the amount of met-
ropolitan green areas, which needs to be maintained, maintenance costs are 
a crucial factor in metropolitan landscape protection and improvement, form-
ing an important factor in planning. As we have seen, maintaining recreation-
al areas is the most expensive for the government. A report from the Neth-
erlands Environmental Assessment Agency (Milieu- en Natuurplanbureau, MNP), 
which also considered the costs for acquiring land, showed that if no distinc-
tion is made with respect to habitats, nature conservation by farmers is less 
expensive than nature conservation by the state or NGOs (MNP, 2007b). In the 
Midden-Delfland example, maintenance by non governmental organisations 
was the least expensive for the state. However, it is not likely that these or-
ganisations could increase their income (primarily from sponsors and dona-
tions) enough to allow them to maintain an area far larger than what they 
currently maintain. On the other hand, farmers do not need to be fully spon-
sored because they also receive income from their agricultural production. 
From a governmental point of view, having farmers maintain metropolitan 
green areas is an economical alternative. In addition, there are few alterna-
tives to having farmers maintain these areas, and visitors appreciate small-
scale agricultural landscapes (Frerichs & De Wijs, 2001; Crommentuijn et al., 
2007; Enting & Ziegelaar, 2001). Therefore, the economic position of farmers 
in small-scale metropolitan landscapes and the problems they face should re-
ceive attention.
Influences of the restructuring 3.3 
of the welfare state
To understand what influences the protection and improvement of metro-
politan green areas, in addition to the problems faced by farmers, the effects 
of the restructuring of the welfare state require attention too. As discussed 
in the introduction of this chapter, neo-liberalization and globalization have 
led to restructuring of the welfare state and a power shift from the nation-
state to supranational regimes and regional and local governance (e.g., Peck & 
Tickell, 2002; Taylor-Gooby, 2005; Jessop, 1994). In the Netherlands, deregula-
tion, privatization and decentralization are often placed within this perspec-
tive. This section first discusses the indirect effects of the restructuring of the 
welfare state on the way strategic spatial planning used to become effective 
through coordinating central government sector departments (see Chapter 7), 
such as the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality and the Ministry 
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of Transport, Public Works and Water Management. After that, it discusses its 
direct impact on spatial planning.
Impact on sector departments3.3.1 
The restructuring of the welfare state and globalization has had a consider-
able impact on the ways government departments operate. As Chapter 7 ex-
plains, strategic spatial planning often does not change the landscape directly 
but becomes effective by coordinating sector departments (Korthals Altes, 
2007; Priemus, 1996). In the Netherlands, as part of the restructuring of the 
welfare state, the way sector departments operate has changed and the tradi-
tional links between the ministry concerned with spatial planning and sector 
departments has weakened too. Recent changes in policy, especially of budg-
ets for implementing physical measures and changing landownership situa-
tions, have weakened these links considerably.
Budgets for the agricultural sector have decreased for various reasons. In 
general, agricultural issues are losing their place on political agendas and 
subsidies have decreased. In line with reforms to the CAP, EU-subsidies, origi-
nally meant to protect European agricultural production, are being reduced 
(Dammers & Keiner, 2006). Additionally, European state aid regulation prohib-
its individual states from hampering competition by subsidizing their own 
companies, which makes subsidizing farmers increasingly difficult (see for 
more information about this, European Commission (2008)). In Midden-Delft-
land, this hampered the set up of a local Green Fund (Groenfonds Midden-Delf-
land) to pay farmers for the maintenance of landscape elements (see also Sec-
tion 4.4.2). After three years were spent on the EU-state aid procedure, only 
some activities of farmers could be subsidized. At a national level, Dutch rural 
policy has been influenced by the ideas about a smaller role for the state. Fol-
lowing the idea of “from taking fully care to guaranteeing” (“Van zorgen voor 
naar zorgen dat”) (Ministry LNV, 2005), it is the official policy of the Dutch Min-
istry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality to place more responsibility in 
the hands of private parties (Raad landelijk gebied, 2006). In line with the pol-
icy of decentralization, the new Dutch land consolidation law decentralized 
budgets for land consolidation (Van Rij & Zevenbergen, 2005). Consequently, 
interviewees expressed their worries about the reduction of these budgets. 
Reduced budgets for agriculture means that planning departments have few-
er opportunities to coordinate changes in the landscape.
Ideas on reducing the role of the state, austerity financing and enhancing 
the role of individual and other actors have had an effect on policy aiming at 
changing the land ownership situation, which used to be an important task 
of the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality. This is affected by 
the Ministry of Finance’s aim to deal with the amount of land owned by the 
state more efficiently (Interdepartementaal beleidsonderzoek, 2006). Besides, 
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it is not expected that the government will decide to set up new land con-
solidation projects (Korthals Altes & Van Rij, 2005, p.35). In line with this, the 
creation of a modest land bank in Laag Holland was controversial, because 
especially at present, buying land is considered a too drastic and expensive 
instrument to preserve landscapes. Instead of buying land for nature conser-
vation, the government has decided to offer subsidies to landowners in order 
to persuade them to conserve the nature on their land (MNP, 2007b). Only very 
rarely, the purchase of land is part of new policy. All in all, because sector de-
partments leave more room for the market, budgets have been reduced, poli-
cies affecting land ownership have become unpopular and planning depart-
ments have fewer opportunities to influence spatial quality by coordinating 
sector departments.
Direct impact on spatial planning3.3.2 
Ideas about the restructuring of the welfare state have not only influenced 
sector departments’ policy, but have also influenced planning. This section 
first discusses whether decentralization or centralization has dominated spa-
tial planning. Then, it discusses how the retreat of the state and the enhance-
ment of the role of individual and other actors have had an effect on spatial 
planning policy.
Because, as discussed in Chapter 6 and illustrated by Figure 3.10, Dutch 
municipalities have a tendency to favor new developments (Korthals Al-
tes, 1995), decentralization of planning powers might lead to an increase in 
built developments in metropolitan green areas. Therefore, while discussing 
the improvement of institutions for protecting and improving metropolitan 
green areas, decentralization requires attention. Addressing spatial planning 
issues at the appropriate governmental level is an important issue in the new 
Memorandum on Spatial Planning (Nota Ruimte) (Ministry VROM et al., 2004). 
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Figure 3.10 Protesting decentralization: a property developer and a mayor carry away 
central government’s arrow towards green on a local policy arrow towards built area
Source: Van Dusseldorp et al., 2007, © Arend van Dam
The central adage is “local if possible, central if necessary” (“decentraal wat kan, 
centraal wat moet”) (Ministry VROM et al., 2004). Although, decentralization 
and deregulation have been policy aims of the Nota Ruimte and for the new 
Dutch Spatial Planning Act (Wet ruimtelijke ordening 2008) (Dutch Lower Cham-
ber, 2004-2005, p. 7, p. 45, p. 46), Galle (2008) stated that spatial planning has 
been centralized; the new act created new institutions, for example it allows 
central government and the provinces to make bestemmingsplannen. On the 
other hand, Van Buuren (2002; 2005) stressed that this act can have a negative 
effect on nature, the landscape and the environment, because, for example in 
line with decentralization and deregulation, provincial approval is no longer 
needed for new bestemmingsplannen, and he expected that the higher levels of 
government will not use the new institutions provided by the new act.
In recent projects, examined during the case studies, compared to the old-
er land consolidation project in Midden-Delfland, decentralization seemed to 
have been more dominant. The example of Living in Waterland (Waterlandswo-
nen) (discussed in Section 6.2), illustrates how increasing municipalities influ-
ence on changes to land-use plans might result in an increase in built devel-
opment. In an attempt to keep land prices low in Midden-Delfland by creating 
as much certainty as possible about the durability of restrictive policy (see 
Van Rij & Korthals Altes, 2007b), interviewees wondered whether provinc-
es and central government would use new institutions provided by the new 
Dutch Spatial Planning Act. In this way, decentralization and deregulation 
might give more room to forces with no interested in protecting metropolitan 
green areas that without government intervention are strong in urban-rural 
interplay processes.
In line with attempts to restructure the welfare state, in spatial planning, 
the idea of getting money from the market has gained popularity. Hajer and 
Zonneveld (2000) stated that as demands for developments increase, a pas-
sive zoning-oriented planning system becomes insufficient. Therefore, they 
argued for a more active spatial development system of planning. Spatial 
development planning starts from the premise that spatial quality requires 
new procedures that permit the government to be activiely involved in devel-
opments. The Fourth Report on Physical Planning (VINO), published in 1988 
(Ministry VROM, 1988), already mentioned that it was official Dutch national 
policy to encourage Public Private Partnerships, PPP. Chapter 5 discusses pos-
sible consequences of these PPP-approaches, such as an increased number of 
built developments in metropolitan green areas.
All in all, as the protection and improvement of metropolitan green areas 
used to be based on an influential central government, not in the last place 
on influential sector departments, the restructuring of the welfare state might 
have reduced and might still be reducing possibilities for protecting and im-
proving metropolitan green areas.
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Conclusion3.4 
This chapter shows that, today, there are reasons to be concerned with the 
improvement of institutions for green landscapes in metropolitan areas. On 
the basis of this picture of landscape changes and the impacts of the restruc-
turing of the welfare state, the sub-questions for this research, addressed in 
the following chapters, were formulated (see Section 1.1).
Because, in an early stage, developments in the landscape are often hidden 
under the surface, contemporary problems concerning metropolitan green ar-
eas might not be well understood. Basically, recurring costs and revenues of 
the guardians of the landscape might influence many changes in the land-
scape. In this light, subsidies, agricultural incomes and land prices are crucial 
factors. Although, sometimes, maintainers of recreational areas and nature 
conservation sites have problems to raise enough money to maintain the pre-
ferred spatial quality, most landscape problems have to do with the economic 
position of farmers. In agricultural areas, one of the major problems concerns 
the so called rent-gap. The price for which farmers can buy land is high be-
cause people believe development in these areas may be allowed in the future. 
As a result, annual interest charges for these lands are higher than the declin-
ing annual revenues by agricultural production.
The model for green area protection and improvement (Figure 2.4) can be 
used for discussing the following signs of landscape changes. With respect to 
spatial quality, newly built houses, vegetation changes, messy types of land-
use and facilities for horse riding might be signs of landscape changes. With 
respect to zoning, studies and policy documents about houses in the country 
side can be seen as a forerunner for changes in bestemmingsplannen. Raising 
land prices is a sign that people believe that built developments are going to 
be allowed. With respect to the landownership situation, the influence of ur-
banization shows itself in high land prices, the subdivision of parcels, an ag-
ing agricultural population and small farm sizes.
The model can also be used to discuss the consequences of the restructur-
ing of the welfare state. In order to cut back on governmental expenditure, 
government has decided more often not to implement physical changes or to 
use land purchase by the government as a steering mechanism. In the mean-
time, the government tried to reduce subsidies to the guardians of the land-
scape. Due to decentralization and deregulation, zoning institutions can be-
come less effective tools to preserve metropolitan green area. As a result of 
deregulation, decentralization and privatization, central government’s influ-
ence, especially strategic spatial planning’s influence through sector depart-
ments is losing strength.
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Market or government; 4 
the limitations of 
Transaction Cost Theory
At the beginning of my project, Transaction Cost Theory seemed a good ba-
sis for a methodology to study institutional arrangements for internalizing 
landscape values. Transaction Cost Theory is based on the idea that different 
institutions have different effects on transaction costs, which need to be re-
duced in order to increase efficiency. For some years, expectations have been 
high for Transaction Cost Theory in planning (Alexander 2001b; Webster & Lai, 
2003; Buitelaar 2003, 2004; for an overview see Lai, 2005). According to Alex-
ander (2004), this theory should make it possible to compare the efficiency of 
both planning and market institutions, no matter whether private or public 
parties are involved or whether private or public interests are at stake.
However, Adams (2005) discussed the practical limitations of Transaction 
Cost Theory. Buitelaar (2007) also found limitations; even for the relatively 
simple cases he investigated, small size housing sites, he found it more or 
less impossible to quantify transaction costs since the relation between in-
stitutions and transaction costs was too complex and these costs were di-
verse, and often hidden and indirect. The high expectations that have been 
expressed, combined with the skepticism about whether the theory can be 
applied in practice made it interesting to attempt to adopt this theory for the 
improvement of institutions for internalizing landscape values.
This chapter discusses whether Transaction Cost Theory is a useful institu-
tional design tool for improving institutions for internalizing green landscape 
values in metropolitan areas. This was examined by (1) investigating trans-
action attributes and their relation to specific institutional arrangements, 
(2) making models for specific institutions, such as bestemmingsplannen, in a 
transaction framework and trying to compare them, (3) indicating the trans-
action costs of a project using financial reports and estimates made during 
interviews.
This chapter starts with a brief introduction to Transaction Cost Theory 
and related theories. Then, it discusses their application in planning. The 
third section describes the attempts that were made to adopt Transaction 
Cost Theory in this research. The fourth section explains in which situations 
applying the theory descriptively can contribute to the design of institutions 
for internalizing landscape values. The subsequent section discusses why 
planning is not only a tool to lower transaction costs between private par-
ties and how this affects the application of Transaction Cost Theory on the 
institutions studied in this project. The sixth section explains why transac-
tion costs, specifically the organization costs made by government, only have 
a limited use as a criterion for improving institutions for internalizing land-
scape values in urban-rural interplay processes.
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Branches of Transaction Cost Theory4.1 
Transaction Cost Theory is closely related to Property Rights Theory. This dis-
sertation addresses them together as Transaction Cost Theory. This theoreti-
cal framework is based on the following assumptions (for a comprehensive 
overview of work on this theory, see Groenewegen, 2004 and Buitelaar, 2007). 
If property rights are properly assigned, goods will be allocated efficiently. Of-
ten, however, the costs that go with transacting property rights are too high. 
As a consequence, not all property rights are traded and the situation stays 
suboptimal. This can potentially be resolved by reducing transaction costs. 
Transaction costs are the costs involved in transferring goods.
Transaction costs influence the supply of public goods. According to Samu-
elson (1954), a public good is a good that all enjoy in common in the sense 
that each individual’s consumption leads to no subtraction from any other in-
dividual’s consumption of that good. These are the kind of goods that once 
they are provided all can consume but no one will wish to pay. This hinders 
their provision. The transaction costs for making a contract between all po-
tential consumers to enforce their financial contributions are high. As a con-
sequence, these contracts are seldom made, and the free market does not 
necessarily supply optimum amounts of these goods (Oxley, 2004).
When transaction costs are high, companies may decide to make goods 
themselves instead of purchasing them on the market. When goods are trans-
ferred within a firm instead of a market, the internal costs of planning with-
in a firm can also be seen as transaction costs. The same can be said when 
goods are transferred within a government. In this case, the cost of civil serv-
ants can also be seen as transaction costs. In order to avoid misunderstand-
ings, I use the term organization costs to address these costs within a firm or 
within government.
A large part of transaction costs literature describes a posteriori how an 
institutional system has evolved in a certain way in order to economize (for 
applications in planning, see Lai, 2005 and Needham & De Kam, 2004). Wil-
liamson’s (1998) discriminating alignment hypothesis assumes that the insti-
tutional arrangement chosen in the end is the one with the lowest costs. Ac-
cording to this theory, a number of critical transaction attributes influence the 
development of efficient institutions: asset specificity, uncertainty, frequency 
(Williamson, 1985), and the number of participating actors (North, 1991). The 
“make or buy decision,” the decision to use hierarchical, in-house structures, 
keeping the transaction within the firm or government, instead of using mar-
ket mechanisms, depends on these characteristics.
In line with Williamson (1998), the government is usually considered the 
organization of last resort: Try markets, try hybrids, try firms, try regulation, 
and resort to public bureaus only when all else fails. The underlying assump-
tion is that public actors have fewer incentives to economize (Moe, 1984). Be-
[ 64 ]
sides, it is more difficult to analyze and economize transactions in the public 
context; it is not easy to measure what is being exchanged, which also makes 
it difficult to enforce agreements (North, 1995). Based on this theory, following 
Moe (1984) and Coase (1960), the following questions can be asked: First, will 
the good at issue be transferred if the government only delineates property 
rights? Second, if this is not possible, can the government intervene directly 
to reduce private transaction costs, thereby facilitating the private reduction 
of market failures. Many government advisors seeking more efficient, privati-
zation based, policy approaches choose such solutions (Wolfson, 2005; Brusse 
et al., 2002). Third, if transaction costs facing private parties are prohibitively 
high, government may conduct the transaction. According to Club Theory, in 
some cases, clubs in economic terms, groups of parties, might fulfill this task 
more economically. Club goods can be jointly consumed but are rendered 
excludable (Buchanan, 1965; Webster, 2002), which might allow organization 
costs to be reduced.
Transaction Cost Theory is also used a priori, to design more efficient in-
stitutional arrangements. In doing so, the literature implicitly justifies the ne-
cessity of reducing transaction costs in two ways. However, considering these 
two justifications as one can easily result in too high expectations about the 
usefulness of the theory and thus in shortsighted policy decisions.
The first way of justifying reducing transaction costs is in line with North 
(1995). The argument is that transaction costs should be reduced because 
transferring as many goods as possible in a market results in more efficient 
allocation. In some cases, reducing transaction costs for private transacting 
parties could even lead to an increase in costs for the government. An exam-
ple of such a measure would be setting up a land registry in developing coun-
tries, or developing new types of administrative property documents (Kim, 
2004; Zevenbergen, 2000). Despite the increased governmental expenditure, 
an overall increase in welfare is possible because goods are transferred more 
often, and more economic activities are undertaken.
Webster and Lai (2003, p. 10) stated that when considering the costs of a 
policy program, there may be alternative organizational arrangements that 
could deliver greater benefits at lower costs. The second way of justifying re-
ducing transaction costs is based on this idea; transaction costs and organiza-
tion costs should be reduced because costs should be minimized in general. 
From that perspective, it is often argued that transaction costs must offset so-
cial benefits. If the transaction benefits are not taken into consideration, ap-
plying the second way of justifying reducing transaction costs and organiza-
tional costs can lead to a thoughtless reduction of governmental expenditure 
and public services, which could result in no transactions taking place. There-
fore, in line with Williamson’s (1998, p. 44) suggestion that a trade-off should 
be made between the benefits of added coordination/cooperation on the one 
hand and the costs of added bureaucracy, increased organization costs and 
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transaction costs on the other, the transaction benefits need to be considered 
(Van Rij & Korthals Altes, 2005; Pearce, 2005; Henneberry, 2005; Buitelaar, 2007). 
Since transactions form complex networks with many loops and interactions, 
the possible effects of a given transaction on other transactions should al-
so be examined. The basic idea of this way of justifying reducing transaction 
costs is that economizing requires a reduction of the total organization costs 
and transaction costs in order to optimize benefits and minimize costs.
Transaction Cost Theory in 4.2 
the field of planning
As stated earlier, Transaction Cost Theory has been considered a promising 
tool for institutional design in spatial planning and land development. Trans-
action Cost Theory has been mentioned in advisory documents for the Dutch 
government about the improvement of institutions (VROM-raad, 2004a; Seg-
eren et al., 2005; Wolfson, 2005; Brusse et al., 2002).
However, in planning research, the most extensive empirical attempt to 
improve institutions by analyzing transaction costs was made by Buitelaar 
(2007), but his results were discouraging. Even for the relatively simple cases 
he considered, small size housing sites, it was almost impossible to quantify 
transaction costs since these costs were diverse, and often hidden and indirect. 
Buitelaar also mentioned the complex relations between institutions and trans-
action costs, due to the many types of institutions at different levels and loops 
between them. Moulaert (2005) stated that unequal power relations between 
private and public interests and their struggle over space restrict the applica-
bility of Transaction Cost Theory in planning. In order to increase the under-
standing of the usability of Transaction Cost Theory for planning, this section 
discusses how this theory can be applied to institutions used to facilitate main-
tenance of the landscape, to facilitate the land market and to facilitate spatial 
disposition, for example by means of bestemmingsplannen.
Some theoretical concepts derived from Transaction Cost Theory can help 
to find more efficient institutions for maintaining the landscape. For example, 
Webster (2007) describes why based on the idea of clubs, assigning collective 
property rights over open spaces, for example to shop owners, will give these 
private parties incentives to invest in them and preserve them. This can re-
duce organizational costs.
The function of planning institutions, especially zoning plans, has been 
explained in terms of transaction costs in various ways. This section discuss-
es the explanations of Alexander (2001a; 2001b) and Lai (2007). Studying this 
helps to address the suggestion that the values of green landscapes can be 
internalized by lowering transaction costs.
Alexander (2001a; 2001b, p. 767) stated that the goals of any planning and 
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development control system are: “To provide information that will reduce the 
uncertainties of the processes involved in production and transformation of 
the built environment; to assure that the information provided is authori-
tative or reliable; and to maximize the contribution of the proposed system 
of planning and development control to net transaction cost reduction.” Al-
though Alexander (2001a; 2001b) mentioned only the production and trans-
formation of the built environment in his description of the goal of planning 
in terms of Transaction Cost Theory, testing whether his description can be 
applied to planning institutions which protect the non-built environment is 
interesting because this might help to formulate a more general theory. In his 
article, Alexander (2001b) mentioned various types of transactions, transac-
tion parties, and transacted goods on which his argument was based. A pre-
cise examination of this might provide insight into the goals of planning and 
the possibility of basing institutional arrangements on market mechanisms.
According to Alexander (2001b, p. 757), the goods and services transacted 
are land, capital, and professional/contractor services. He identified a number 
of transaction parties: landowners, developers and property buyers (Alexan-
der, 2001b, p. 757). Later, when he discussed a transaction with the “output/
product” statutory land-use plans, he distinguished the following transac-
tion parties: planning and building commissions, the office that manages 
the government owned-land, developers, and initiators (Alexander, 2001b, p. 
762). Comparing these two examples, it is unclear whether planning facili-
tates transactions between landowners, developers and property buyers, or 
whether planning is the output of a transaction between planning and build-
ing commissions and developers.
This group is even more divers when, in his analysis, he extends the group 
of transaction parties to all relevant stakeholders (Alexander, 2001b, p. 767). 
He states that, if the parties to a transaction are not limited to the actors 
who are directly involved, but include all the relevant stakeholders, minimiz-
ing overall transaction costs may enhance planning goals such as democracy 
and participation. He acknowledged that he only identified goals which allow 
transaction costs analysis.
This ambiguity about the goals of planning and the types of transactions 
that are analyzed raises difficulties, which are addressed in Section 4.5. This 
is an important issue, since it affects the type of transaction that is supported 
by planning: Can a given transaction take place in a market or not? Which 
way of justifying reducing transaction costs is applicable? Should transaction 
costs be reduced because transferring as many goods as possible in a market 
results in more efficient allocation, or should transaction costs and organiza-
tion costs be reduced because costs should be minimized in general?
With respect to this, Lai (2007) distinguished Coasian situations (based 
on Coase, 1960) and Pigovian ones (based on Pigou, 1932). In a Coasian situa-
tion, property rights can be rearranged through the market and output can be 
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maximalized. On the other hand, in Pigovian situations, transaction costs are 
prohibitively high and the market can not internalize externalities. Lai (2007) 
stated that the Coasian situation should be the starting point for planning, 
and that the Pigovian situation is inferior and should only be applied if trans-
action costs are prohibitively high.
Although he does not emphasize it, Lai (2007, p. 361) acknowledged two 
roles for a planning system. According to him, all externalities that are non-
tradable are legitimate candidates for land use planning controls. He uses 
the example of the national heritage. In addition, the planning system can 
be used to reform institutions, lowering transaction costs and making more 
transactions possible. He stated that a dependable planning system that is 
not subject to frequent and arbitrary changes would be conducive to the low-
ering the high transaction costs in markets.
Attempts to adopt Transaction Cost Theory4.3 
The attempts to adopt Transaction Cost Theory in this project were both prac-
tical and theoretical. The theoretical part consisted of making conceptual 
models (see Van Rij & Korthals Altes, 2005; and see Figure 4.1). In order to in-
crease the understanding of the relation between institutions and transac-
tions, I created models that specified which transaction a specific institution 
is used for. These models make the transaction parties explicit, the things 
that are exchanged, the type of transaction costs and benefits, and the effect 
this transaction has on other transactions.
The practical part, during the case studies, consisted of asking specific 
questions about transactions and transaction cost during the interviews, as 
well as studying financial reports. In order to examine transaction costs, or-
ganizational costs, transaction benefits and the effects on other transactions, 
the following questions were asked:
What was the institutional framework in which transactions to internalize  ■
landscape values took place?
How did this institutional framework affect these transactions? ■
Which transactions took place and which did not? ■
What was the transaction benefit? ■
Which costs, transaction costs, organizational costs, and other payments  ■
accompanied these transactions?
Which causal connections, which transaction attributes, influenced the ef- ■
ficiency and effectiveness of these transactions?
On the basis of the answers to these questions and the study of documents 
such as financial reports, an explanation could be made why, considering 
the transaction attributes, certain strategies to subsidize farmers, might be 
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more efficient. During the case studies, attempts were also made to indicate 
the size of the transaction costs including the organizational costs of certain 
projects, as well as the costs of specific transactions within these projects. 
This experiment was set up to compare institutions on the basis of the trans-
action costs involved. This allowed me to examine whether transaction costs 
are a usable criterion for improving institutions for internalizing landscape 
values.
As a spin-off, this focus on transaction costs during the case studies 
brought unexpected topics to my attention. For example, the need to employ 
land purchasers for many years on the Midden-Delfland land consolidation 
project led to the idea that, instead of the time needed to make planning de-
cisions, the time needed to assemble land determined the duration of the 
project to a large extent (see Section 8.2). The focus on transaction cost also 
brought to light costs that have received very little attention in the debate 
on institutions for metropolitan green areas, such as maintenance costs (see 
Section 3.1).
Institutional design based on 4.4 
explanatory Transaction Cost Theory
I use the term explanatory Transaction Cost Theory to refer to those branches 
of the theory that use a posteriori analysis to explain why certain institutions 
are more likely to be efficient than others. First, this section discusses the 
contribution to the institutional design process of theories that start by exam-
ining whether goods can be transferred in the market, and which only resort 
to public bureaus if the market and other hybrid alternatives fail. Explana-
tory Transaction Cost Theory will also be used in Section 7.4.1 to discuss the 
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dilemma between serving public interests by providing spatial quality on the 
one hand and protecting private property rights for the sake of the economy 
on the other. The last part of this section discusses how efficient institutions 
can be developed by analyzing transaction attributes, such as asset specificity, 
uncertainty, frequency, and the number of participating actors.
Public bureaus as a last resort4.4.1 
As discussed earlier, various scholars (e.g., Moe, 1984; North, 1995; Coase, 1960) 
have proposed taking the transfer of goods in a market as a starting point, on-
ly resorting to public bureaus if this and other hybrid alternatives fail. These 
theories can help to explain why governmental interference in spatial dispo-
sition systems might be efficient, for example by means of bestemmingsplan-
nen, as well as to explain why having farmers maintain green areas might be 
efficient. These two topics will be discussed in the next sections.
What role might be economical for the government in a spatial disposition 
system? The first question is whether the green amenities of rural metropoli-
tan areas can be transferred in a market if the government only delineates 
property rights. In general, land is transferred through the market when prop-
erty rights are properly assigned. The land that is transferred in this way is so 
valuable for a specific user that he is willing to pay the price of the land and 
the transaction costs. This is definitely the case when land is used to build 
houses. However, this is rarely the case for green aminities, which are enjoyed 
by many people. In the Netherlands, there are examples where homeowners 
have insured their free view of the countryside (e.g., Wing, 2008; Havermans, 
2008). Nevertheless, in most cases green amenities are consumed by a large 
number of people and this makes transacting them more difficult. Theoreti-
cally, many people are willing to pay a small amount to enjoy the view over 
these green areas. However, making and enforcing a contract between the 
landowner and all these people is not likely because of the high transaction 
costs related to the large number of people. Green aminities are public goods. 
A government could try to reduce these transaction costs, for example by 
subsidizing the cost for making a contract between millions of people. How-
ever, because of the large number of people involved, it will be very expensive 
to accomplish this in a market. All in all, the single assignment of property 
rights is not likely to result in the provision of metropolitan green areas.
Another suggestion for reducing transaction costs to permit the supply of 
green areas to be regulated through the market is introducing a tax-based 
spatial order (this will be discussed in Section 8.2.6). In that case, if somebody 
wants to develop an area, he must pay for the value of the green area that will 
be lost. This tax is supposed to make builders take the public value of open 
space into consideration. Since so many people enjoy green areas, this trans-
action cannot take place directly through the market; however, the govern-
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ment could reduce transaction costs by enforcing this transaction. Some peo-
ple have proposed that such a system could replace the Dutch zoning system.
However, as will be discussed in Section 8.2.6, this is not likely to be an 
adequate solution in practice. First, operating and enforcing such a system 
will be expensive. The transaction costs for effectively and legitimately valu-
ing the amount that needs to be internalized are high. In practice, it is not 
possible to determine the value of a specific green area to be compensated 
in such a way that it effectively restricts built developments. Recently con-
ducted studies were unable to provide such data (Koomen, 2008; Brander & 
Koetse, 2007; Nicholls & Crompton; 2005a & 2005b). Besides, a tax-based spa-
tial order system does not fit the existing system. Considering this, it is not 
likely that transaction costs can be reduced enough for landscape values to 
be sufficiently internalized within a market.
In addition, the large number of transaction parties involved makes it un-
likely that the transaction of green amenities will take place in a market on 
an efficient scale. This explains why there may be a role for governmental 
regulation by means of bestemmingsplannen.
This line of reasoning can also help to analyze which parties can maintain 
green areas most efficiently. As discussed in Chapter 3, maintaining the land-
scape is expensive (for example, mowing in areas such as shown by Figure 
4.2). As agricultural entrepreneurs, farmers have a private incentive to main-
tain the land. If measures are taken that enable city dwellers to cycle or walk 
alongside the land and enjoy it, this can be an efficient way of providing met-
ropolitan green areas. The same can be said about other partners in green ar-
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Figure 4.2 A cultural historic landscape in Laag Holland which requires expensive 
maintenance
Photo: Nico Langeveld
ea development like nature conservation unions and landscape organizations, 
composed of people with a specific interest in maintaining the green area, 
such as local home owners. According to Club Theory, organizational costs 
might be lower than in the case of governmental provision because there is 
a more direct relation between the supply of the club good and the consump-
tion. Following this reasoning, there is only a need for the government to take 
care of those green amenities that are not taken care of by other parties, such 
as recreational areas which are intensively used.
Different subsidizing strategies4.4.2 
Transaction Cost Theory can be applied to compare different approaches to 
subsidizing farmers for their nature conservation work. In his dissertation, 
Van Ark (2005, p. 56) discusses an example of this as it has been described 
by Groenevelt (2004) (see also Polman et al., 2005). Reducing transaction costs 
for subsidizing nature conservation by farmers was an important aim of the 
Dutch minister Veerman (e.g., Dienst Regelingen, 2006). Although it was said 
that he had stated that only 10% of the budget for these subsidies should be 
spent on transaction costs, including monitoring costs, the problem of high 
transaction cost is still on the political agenda (e.g., Dutch Lower Chamber, 
2007-2008).
An example of a new subsidizing strategy that entails lower transaction 
costs is the experiment with the boat-lands in Laag Holland (see also Section 
3.1). Transaction Cost Theory can help to analyze this strategy. In this case, 
farmers were made responsible for the maintenance of land owned by the 
State Forestry Organization. A contract was set up between the local agricul-
tural nature conservation union and the government. The union was respon-
sible for the daily supervision of the farmers. After six years, the project will 
be evaluated by measuring the number of rare birds, at which point renewal 
of the contract can be negotiated.
Transaction Cost Theory can explain some of the advantages of this form 
of contracting over traditional subsidies. First, one of the attributes of this 
transaction is asset specificity; the rare birds can only be preserved in these 
specific habitats, and there are only a few farmers nearby who can maintain 
these areas for a relatively low price. This permits the farmers to wait for the 
government to come up with a good price, since the number of potential con-
tract partners for the government is limited. On the other hand, if a farmer 
signs such a contract with the government, he might need to make long term 
investments, whose returns will depend on government policy. Due to policy 
changes, nature conservation has always been an uncertain source of income. 
Added to that, this type of transaction does not take place often; the transac-
tion frequency is low.
These transaction attributes require special contracts; the contract must 
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be written so that it increases the confidence of the involved parties. This was 
accomplished by making six-year contracts; the farmers can be sure that the 
government will not change the contract suddenly. The role of the local agri-
cultural nature conservation union also reduces transaction costs, by reduc-
ing the number of contracting parties and monitoring costs (see also Oerle-
mans et al., 2007). Because the overall situation will be monitored after six 
years and the union does not want to lose its good name, the union is not 
likely to behave opportunistically. Because the farmers and the controllers of 
the conservation union live close to each other in a small community, moni-
toring is not expensive, and opportunistic behavior on the part of the farm-
ers is unlikely. Despite the asset specificity, the uncertainty, the low frequency, 
and the number of contracting partners, a contract with relatively low trans-
action costs could be made.
Another example of using transaction cost theories to compare approaches 
to subsidize farmers for their nature conservation work is the study of the in-
crease of ground rents in Midden-Delfland. As part of the land consolidation 
project, in order to support farm enlargement, the government had previously 
leased out pieces of land to farmers. Recently, central government decided 
to make the ground rent market based. This has resulted in an increase in 
ground rents, because land prices are high in Midden-Delfland. The govern-
ment defended this decision in the following way. An increase in ground rents 
can threaten the economic position of farmers. However, in order to avoid un-
fair competition, EU regulations on state aid force the government to base the 
ground rent on market prices. If farmers need to be supported for the sake of 
the landscape or nature conservation, this support should be accomplished 
by introducing subsidies for this purpose. These statements on EU regula-
tions can be questioned. First, it is hard to prove that the former ground rents 
were not market based. Besides, due to the poor relation between agricultural 
revenues and land prices in these areas compared to other areas, the former 
ground rents were not likely to cause unfair competition.
Separate from the decision to increase ground rents, the Green Fund 
(Groenfonds Midden-Delfland), a system for “green and blue services,” was set up 
locally in Midden-Delfland (for an example of the application form for these 
subsidies, see Figure 4.3). For example, farmers can receive €50 per year to 
maintain a historic out-door toilet and €5 per three years for a willow tree. 
The expected extra annual income contributed by this system is expected to 
be about €3,000 per farm. In an area with 80 farms, this sums up to a total of 
€240,000. A transaction cost analysis shows that €81,750 was invested to en-
able the local agricultural nature conservation union to operate the system, 
and €99,844 was spent testing the system and developing a nature conserva-
tion plan for each farm. Besides these costs, money was also spent on civil 
servants. Only after nine years of policymaking, three of them spent on the 
EU state aid procedure, could the money in the green fund actually be used 
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to pay landowners for “green and blue services.” The transaction cost-benefit 
ratio suggests that the same effect might have been achieved more economi-
cally. For most farmers, these subsidies cannot compensate for the increase 
in ground rents. Besides, this institutional change has resulted in a strong in-
crease in transaction costs. Not changing the ground rents, would have been 
an implicitly more efficient way to subsidize the preservation of the metro-
politan green landscape.
Usability of explanatory Transaction Cost Theory4.4.3 
All in all, explanatory Transaction Cost Theory could serve as a basis for in-
stitutional design in some cases. Such theory could help to analyze existing 
and new institutional approaches. It is especially useful for analyzing con-
tract strategies, such as the contracts for subsidizing farmers for their nature 
conservation work. However, in general, the improvement of institutions to 
internalize landscape values requires an approach that allows more different 
institutions to be compared and that provides more specific statements about 
the institutions’ effects.
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Natuur/biodiversiteit bedrag per jaar eenheid aantal 
 
1.  Toepassen van mozaïekplanning in 
het graslandgebruik t.b.v. 
weidevogels (minimaal één 
maaitrap in mei, maaien met een 
tussentijd van 7 dagen,  langzamer 
rijden, per keer minimaal 25% van 
het te maaien land, op basis van 
een graslandgebruiksplan dat met 
Vockestaert wordt opgesteld) 
 
 
€ 440,-  
+  
€ 35,- (eigen 
mechanisatie) 
of 
€ 50,- 
(loonwerk) 
of 
€ 220,- 
(weghalen gras 
in loonwerk) 
 
bedrijf 
 
ha maailand 
 
 
 
 
 
maaitrap 
 
 
 
……. ha 
maailand 
 
…… maai-
trappen 
 
2.  Gebruik van een wildredder bij het 
maaien 
 
€     5,- 
 
ha maailand 
 
………. ha 
 
3.  Instandhouden oud grasland (> 10 
jaar); 
     in begrensde probleemgebieden kan 
 
€     60,-  
 
 
 
ha 
 
 
 
……… ha 
 
 
Aanmeldingsformulier puntensysteem 
Groenfonds Midden-Delfland met ingang van 2006 
1. Gegevens aanvrager 
 
Naam: …………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Adres: …………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Postcode en plaats:………………………………………………………………………. 
 
Telefoonnummer: ………………………………………………………………………… 
 
E-mail adres: ………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Bankrekeningnummer: ……………………………………………………………….. 
 
Hebt u een actief boerenbedrijf?   �  ja  �  nee 
 
 
2. Basisvoorwaarden 
 
Is uw grond gelegen in het Reconstructiegebied  
Midden-Delfland of in de Groeneveldse Polder?   � ja  �  nee 
 
Planning, more than a tool to lower 4.5 
transaction cost between private parties
Making a conceptual model for transactions which are influenced by bestem-
mingsplannen forced me to specify the transaction, the transaction parties and 
the goods being exchanged. It became clear that the literature is ambiguous 
about the transaction, the transaction parties and the goods being exchanged. 
More clarity however can help us understand the aim of planning, how plan-
ning influences spatial quality, and whether extra attention needs to be paid 
to protecting private property rights. Therefore, this section first discusses 
how the information provided by planning influences spatial quality. After 
that, it distinguishes two roles of planning and it explains why this distinc-
tion is relevant.
According to Alexander (2001b), planning becomes effective by providing 
information to reduce uncertainty. This might give the impression that, be-
cause this information can provide useful knowledge on future possibilities, 
just providing good information will make people voluntarily act in accord-
ance with plans, in the absence of binding regulations. Although this can be 
the case, there may be other reasons why parties act in accordance with the 
information provided by the plan. Chapter 7 will discuss this on the basis of 
a distinction between strategic spatial planning and operational spatial plan-
ning. In the case of strategic spatial planning, non-regulatory types of coor-
dination can be used to coordinate different parts of the government by pro-
viding information. One of the reasons for this, provided by Transaction Cost 
Theory, is that both parties belong to the same entity (Webster & Lai, 2003, p. 
45) (see Chapter 7 for further reasons). In the case of operational spatial plan-
ning, coordinating private parties works differently. The government can pro-
vide certainty by providing clear information on its own course of action. This 
might guide investments of private parties. However, especially when a plan-
ning system aims to protect green areas, regulations such as bestemmingsplan-
nen might be needed to make parties act in accordance with the information 
provided by the plan.
When discussing transactions which are influenced by land-use plans, Al-
exander (2001b) was imprecise about the type of transaction parties and the 
transacted goods. Are these parties land owners, the planning authority, or 
people in general? Is the transacted good the land or the obligation not to 
build on the land? This distinction is crucial if Transaction Cost Theory is to 
be applied in planning, because it determines whether a transaction can take 
place in a market or not. To use Lai’s (2007) terms, the question is whether the 
Coasian line of reasoning or the Pigovian line of reasoning is applicable. Since 
land is traded in the market, this first line of reasoning applies when land 
owners transfer land with the help of planning as a transaction cost reducing 
measure. The second line of reasoning, which explains why government may 
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take action to internalize non-tradable externalities, applies when govern-
ment internalizes green metropolitan landscape values.
As discussed in Section 4.4, the number of involved parties means that the 
second line of reasoning needs to be applied when considering the amenities 
of metropolitan green areas. Since they are enjoyed in common in the sense 
that each individual’s consumption leads to no subtraction from any other 
individual’s consumption, the amenities of metropolitan green areas can be 
seen as public goods. Even if attempts are made to lower transaction costs, in 
almost all cases, green amenities are not traded, which makes them a can-
didate for planning control. All in all, planning is more than a tool to lower 
transaction cost between landowners in a market; the aim of planning is also 
to internalize non-traded externalities.
Distinguishing these two roles of planning is important because if plan-
ning institutions are only seen as tools to reduce transaction cost in a mar-
ket, they are considered to benefit land owners. However, if their aim is also 
to provide non-traded goods to the public (see for example Figure 4.1), they 
do not necessarily benefit land owners. In order to have an effect on spatial 
quality, binding regulations and budgets for compensation are required. In 
addition, more attention is needed for stipulations that protect the property 
rights of those who are forced to provide these goods.
This distinction is also relevant when discussing reducing the costs borne 
by the government. If planning institutions are used to reduce transac-
tion costs between private parties in a market, it might be efficient to spend 
governmental money to reduce these transaction costs, thus allowing more 
transactions to take place and goods to be allocated more efficiently. This 
might be different when the aim of planning is also to provide non-traded 
goods to the public and the transaction is performed by the government. The 
reduction of the costs that go with such transactions is one of the topics of 
the next section.
Low organization costs as a criterion?4.6 
When planning is used to provide non-traded goods to the public, then, just 
as a firm takes a “make or buy decision,” the government can decide wheth-
er to provide goods by itself. The costs of coordination within a firm or gov-
ernment are called organization costs. Organization costs can be seen as a 
specific type of transaction costs. It has been implicitly presumed that just 
as transaction costs in a market should be reduced, these organization costs 
within the government should also be reduced (e.g., Buitelaar, 2007). Lowering 
organization costs, however, can lead to downsizing the government, which 
in turn means that fewer transactions will take place. To balance this, it has 
been proposed that transaction benefits also be considered (Van Rij & Kort-
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hals Altes, 2005; Pearce, 2005; Henneberry, 2005; Buitelaar, 2007). Applying 
such an analysis on a project level can take the form of a cost benefit analysis 
that includes organization costs.
In the case studies, I have tried to investigate organization costs and 
transaction benefits. However, because numerous civil servants, administra-
tors and representatives of non governmental organizations spend time on 
a given project, it is practically impossible to accurately estimate the costs of 
these actions. For example, in the case of Midden-Delfland, it was only possi-
ble to estimate the expenditure the central government made for the project 
through the DLG/BBL, the Government service for rural land management. 
These estimations were based on financial statements and rough estimations 
by civil servants from DLG/BBL. It is hard to determine which part of this sum 
represents transaction costs and which organization costs, because a sub-
stantial part of the costs of implementing works were transaction costs as 
well. Besides, some organization costs are shared over many transactions, for 
example the costs of tax and elections. Besides, in practice in the cases, many 
transactions in theory consisted of a large number of different transactions.
During my case studies, it became clear that, in practice, the transactions 
being investigated were very complex. They interfered with each other in a 
network of transactions. Given this network of transactions, it was impossi-
ble to specify the transaction costs, organization costs, transaction benefits, 
and the effects on other transactions: too many actors were involved and 
there were too many links between the transactions. Despite the examples 
discussed in Section 4.4, as in Buitelaar’s (2007) research, it was not possible 
in my case studies to specify or identify the many different transaction costs 
and benefits in such a way that this could be used as an institutional design 
tool. Despite Lai’s (2005) statement that the greatest limitation of neo-institu-
tional economics for empirical planning analysis is largely a matter of the in-
fancy of paradigms in planning study, Dawkins (2000) statement that no con-
sensus has been developed on the appropriate way to measure transaction 
costs would still appear to stand.
Conclusion4.7 
This chapter has discussed why Transaction Cost Theory is only of limited use 
as a tool to improve institutions for internalizing green landscape values in 
metropolitan areas. This made it necessary to use other theories, in order to 
provide a more thorough view of ways to improve planning and land develop-
ment institutions.
Explanatory Transaction Cost Theory helps to explain that, due to the large 
number of transaction parties involved, it is not likely that internalizing green 
metropolitan landscape values will take place in a market on an efficient scale. 
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Consequently, there might be a role for governmental regulation, in particu-
lar by means of bestemmingsplannen. Explanatory Transaction Cost Theory also 
helps to explain why the majority of metropolitan green areas might be more 
efficiently maintained by farmers than by other parties, since farmers have a 
private interest as agricultural entrepreneurs. Finally, Transaction Cost Theory 
is a useful tool for examining institutional efficiency when comparing similar 
transactions, such as the government paying farmers for their nature conser-
vation work. However, in general, the improvement of institutions to internal-
ize landscape values requires an approach that makes it possible to compare 
more different institutions and that provides more specific statements.
Studying the application of Transaction Cost Theory in planning contrib-
uted to understanding what the aim of planning is, how planning becomes 
effective, and whether extra attention should be paid to protecting private 
property rights. When applying transaction cost research in planning, it is im-
portant to remember that planning is not only a tool to lower transaction cost 
between private parties who transact land in a market; it is also a tool to in-
ternalize non-traded externalities. Since in almost all cases, green amenities 
are not traded in a market, the second goal is especially relevant for research 
on improving institutions for metropolitan green areas.
Recognizing that planning can also be used to provide non-traded goods to 
the public can help to understand why binding regulations might be needed 
to make private parties act in accordance with the information provided by 
the plans, and why budgets for compensation might be needed to implement 
the plans. If, instead of reducing transaction costs in a market to the benefit 
of all land owners, planning is also used to provide public goods, more atten-
tion needs to be paid to protecting the property rights of those who are forced 
to provide these goods.
In order to use Transaction Cost Theory to make planning institutions 
more efficient, it is important to consider the two different goals for which 
planning institutions can be used. If planning institutions are used to reduce 
transaction costs between private parties in a market, spending government 
money to reduce these transaction costs might be an efficient use of resourc-
es: if more transactions take place, goods will be allocated more efficiently.
However, if planning is used to provide non-traded goods, lowering or-
ganization costs may have the opposite effect. Lowering transaction costs 
for coordination within an organization will lead to downsizing the govern-
ment, resulting in fewer transactions. To avoid this, transaction benefits and 
the effects on other transactions also need to be considered. Applying such 
an analysis on a project level can take the form of a cost benefit analysis that 
includes organization costs. During my case studies, however, it became clear 
that, in practice, the network of transactions being studied was too complex 
to permit transaction costs, organization costs, transaction benefits, and the 
effects on other transactions to be used as an institutional design tool.
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Market or government; 5 
the debate about cross-
subsidy strategies
At times when the welfare state is being restructured and the government is 
making major cutbacks (see Section 3.3), the funding of green areas may face 
serious problems. In the most recent Dutch memorandum on physical plan-
ning, the Nota Ruimte (Ministry VROM et al., 2004), cross-subsidizing green ar-
eas by built developments is often mentioned as the way to finance them. The 
national government, decentralizing its responsibility for green area develop-
ment and maintenance, has simply stated that it expects private parties to 
contribute financially (Ministry LNV & VROM, 2006). Using profits from prop-
erty developments is proposed as the way to do this. Many Dutch planners 
have high expectations of the possibility of using property profits for regional 
green areas. The new Land Servicing Act (Grondexploitatiewet), which is part of 
the new Spatial Planning Act, and became effective in 2008, has strengthened 
these expectations (e.g., Ministry LNV & VROM, 2006, pp. 36-37).
Because of these high expectations, much effort has been put into examin-
ing ways of claiming profits from property developments for regional green 
(De Graaff & Kurstjens, 2002; NVB, 2005; Evers et al., 2003; Nationaal Groen-
fonds & Bouwfonds Woningbouw, 1999; PPS-Bureau Landelijk Gebied, 2002; 
Ecorus, 2005). Publications have thus far been limited to discussing the con-
cept, suggesting the direction that should be taken, and analyzing some in-
spiring cases (Priemus, 2002a; 2002b; Van der Veen & Janssen-Jansen, 2006; De 
Wollf et al., 2006; De Zeeuw, 2007). Nevertheless, these studies have not re-
sulted in a wide application of the concept yet (De Zeeuw, 2007).
The Bloemendalerpolder has often been put forward as an example of a suc-
cessful project using property profits for regional green. I therefore studied this 
project to examine to what extent the project has actually worked and whether 
the approach could be applied elsewhere. A closer look at the Bloemendalerpol-
der project gives some lessons which can be used in other projects. Neverthe-
less, the unique circumstances of this project and the disadvantages which go 
with cross-subsidy strategies in general mean that expectations about cross-
subsidy strategies being widely applied soon should be tempered.
The Bloemendalerpolder, directly to the east of Amsterdam, covers an area 
of 500 hectares. Because it was originally a part of the protected Green Heart 
and a National Buffer Zone, development was, for a long time, not expected. 
Recently, an interactive planning process was started, with public parties and 
private land owners, most of them property developers, working together in 
a “design and calculate” process to create new dwellings on one third of the 
area and to make the other two thirds more suitable for recreation and eco-
logical restoration. Because the parties cooperated and reached an anticipa-
tion agreement about developing houses and the green area, this project can 
be seen as an example of a working cross-subsidy approach.
The first part of this chapter discusses why using property profits for re-
gional green has become a popular idea. Section 5.2 asks whether the Bloe-
mendalerpolder process has lived up to these expectations. Then, Section 5.3 
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examines the lessons about designing a cross subsidy planning process that 
can be learned from the Bloemendalerpolder project. Section 5.4 elaborates 
on the reasons that can be used by people who decide not to use a cross-sub-
sidy approach. The final section discusses why the Bloemendalerpolder ap-
proach is not easily applicable on a large scale.
Motivations for a cross-subsidy approach5.1 
Since the 1990s, cross-subsidizing green areas with built developments, the 
so-called “Red for Green” approach (“Rood voor Groen,” where red, the built de-
velopments on a map, supports the green areas) has become an important 
concept in the planning debate in the Netherlands (e.g., De Zeeuw, 2007; Van 
Rij, 2005; Evers et al., 2003). The basic idea is that money can be generated 
by building and selling houses, and that this money can then be invested to 
develop nature conservation sites or recreational areas. The idea behind this 
is that the “polluter,” should pay. The “polluter” is in this case the built devel-
opments. This is seen as a fair way to compensate for the loss of green due 
to the construction of houses. Besides that, a cross-subsidy approach is often 
considered as more than just a financial approach (Evers et al., 2003). The ap-
proach implies that government has decided to actively cooperate with prop-
erty developers and other parties to develop an area as a whole.
The growing attention for such a cross-subsidy approach is part of a wider 
trend in Dutch planning and land development. Up to the end of the 1980s, 
active land development by municipalities was the standard approach in the 
Netherlands (Groetelaers, 2005). Municipalities bought land, developed it, and 
sold it to builders. If they made a profit, they often chose to use this profit 
to finance public facilities such as local green areas. The Ministry of Agricul-
ture, Nature and Food Quality took care of larger, regional, green areas. How-
ever, the last decades of the twentieth century brought some changes to this 
situation. With the restructuring of the welfare state, an increasing demand 
for cross-subsidy strategies has emerged. There are several motives for cross-
subsidy strategies: (1) a cross-subsidy approach fits the idea that public and 
private parties should develop a region collaboratively and (2) a cross-subsidy 
approach fits the idea that, in order to improve spatial quality, a passive, zon-
ing-oriented system should be replaced by an active, implementation-orient-
ed system. (3) A cross-subsidy approach is seen as a way to make property 
developers cover the costs of green area developments.
Collaboration5.1.1 
One of the reasons for a cross-subsidy approach is that it fits the idea that 
public and private parties should develop a region collaboratively. The goal of 
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collaborative planning is to break out of traditional hierarchical and bureau-
cratic processes and to involve new groups and networks (Healey, 1997; 2003). 
In this light, planning is a process by which societies and social groups in-
teractively manage their collective affairs. According to Healey (2003), such a 
collaborative planning process should be as inclusive as possible. One of the 
advantages of collaborative processes is that they can create the possibility 
for learning (Healey, 2003). By using a collaborative approach, the available 
knowledge can be used better and new developments will address local de-
mands better.
Spatial quality5.1.2 
Another reason for a cross-subsidy approach is that it fits the idea that a 
passive, zoning-oriented system needs to be changed to a more active, im-
plementation-oriented system in order to improve spatial quality. Although 
ideas about such a change are not new (e.g., Faludi & Van der Valk, 1994), also 
recently calls for such a change have dominated the Dutch planning debate 
(Hajer & Zonneveld, 2000). This is based on the premise that spatial quality re-
quires new procedures that allow for a more active involvement with chang-
ing socio-spatial processes. The network society is considered to require a 
more direct coupling of the conceptual technologies (plans, maps, visual 
documents) that have always characterized strategic planning with the im-
plementation strategies and financial instruments. A cross-subsidy approach 
fits the idea that active development instead of passive zoning is needed to 
develop spatial quality.
Finances5.1.3 
An important reason for the cross-subsidy approach is that is allows private 
money to be invested in green areas. Financial considerations often play an 
important role in Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) (Koppejan, 2005; Priemus, 
2002a). Koppejan (2005) defines a PPP as a structured cooperation between 
public and private parties in the planning, construction and/or exploitation 
of facilities in which they share or reallocate risks, costs, benefits, resourc-
es and responsibilities. In general, private parties are expected to contribute 
financially to a PPP project. In the mean time, participating in a PPP can be 
financially attractive for private parties too. For example, in case of govern-
ment guaranteed loans, the Bank for Dutch Municipalities (Bank Nederlandse 
Gemeenten, BNG) offers a lower interest to public parties and PPPs. Usually, 
before parties formally agree to cooperate, a so-called PPP formation process 
takes place. This is an interactive negotiation process in which actors define 
the content of the project, investigate possibilities and risks, and negotiate 
the distribution of costs, benefits, risks and responsibilities (Koppejan, 2005). 
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When PPP is used for spatial developments, the PPP formation process often 
coincides with the planning process.
PPP has gained increasing attention in the last decades for various reasons. 
Since the late 1980s, instead of municipalities actively developing land, PPP 
approaches have been used more often (Groetelaers, 2004; 2005; Groetelaers & 
Korthals Altes, 2004; Leväinen & Korthals Altes, 2005). Since the Fourth Report 
on Physical Planning Extra (VINEX) (Ministry VROM, 1990) had stated that it 
was official national policy to encourage PPPs, developers and investors have 
made extensive purchases of land. This makes the traditional method of fi-
nancing, by selling land to property developers, more difficult. Because the 
Dutch government can often not recover the costs of public facilities in the 
traditional way, they are looking for new ways to recover these costs. This is 
one of the reasons why PPP cross-subsidy approaches are receiving increased 
attention.
Cross-subsidy strategies have also received attention because of changes 
with respect to sectoral departments with an aligning interest (Korthals Al-
tes, 2007). Sectoral departments with an aligning interest are departments 
that are not responsible for spatial planning but that are important for the 
implementation of these plans by implementing their policy. These depart-
ments needed to cut expenditures and chose to leave more room for the mar-
ket, thereby threatening the work of planners. For example, there is now less 
guarantee that new housing projects will be built in the locations (and at den-
sities) that are favored by the planning agency (Hajer & Zonneveld, 2000). The 
same holds for the development of regional green areas, which used to be 
done by the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality. Because nation-
al funding for public services is no longer self-evident, the idea that planning 
can and should generate its own financing – “money from the market” (Van 
der Veen & Janssen-Jansen, 2006) – has become more popular.
The provinces, in particular, have welcomed an implementation-oriented 
cross-subsidy approach since deregulation and the new Spatial Planning Act 
have changed their role in planning (De Zeeuw, 2007; Korthals Altes, 2007). 
Until 2008, the role of the province was to make regional plans and to ap-
prove or disapprove municipal bestemmingsplannen. Under the new planning 
act, they will no longer be able to approve bestemmingsplannen. To fill this gap, 
provinces consider becoming more active. For example, the province of North-
Holland became the project manager of the interactive planning pro cess for 
the Bloemendalerpolder. Such an active, implementation-oriented approach 
takes money. In line with the idea of decentralization, the Ministry of Agri-
culture, Nature and Food Quality had handled over the responsibility and 
budgets for regional green areas, to the provinces. Responsibilities might be 
decentralized without decentralization of budgets, and decentralized budgets 
might easily be reduced (Van Rij & Zevenbergen, 2005). Considering the lim-
ited budgets available, a cross-subsidy approach appears a logical choice.
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Different terms and different motivations5.1.4 
Different terms for interactive processes go with different motivations for 
choosing a cross-subsidy approach. The terms collaborative planning, spatial 
development planning and PPP are all used to address planning processes in 
which public and private parties collaboratively develop space. However, the 
meanings of these terms vary because of the different backgrounds of the 
people who use them and their different objectives for using the terms. Col-
laborative planning is primarily used by planning theorists when referring to 
the advantages of public participation. They are interested in legitimacy and 
a process’ capacity to stimulate learning. The term spatial development has 
its origin in Dutch land development practice. The main objective for using 
this term is to advocate for an active development of spatial quality. Econo-
mists and policy analysts use PPP in an attempt to avoid the presumed inef-
ficiencies of the public sector (Miraftab, 2004). In practice, the terms collabora-
tive planning, spatial development planning, and PPP are all used in a broader 
sense, addressing the same processes, combining different motivations and 
frequently overlapping.
Evaluating the Bloemendalerpolder 5.2 
process
In order to examine whether the Bloemendalerpolder approach can be ap-
plied elsewhere, more insight is needed into the process. Because the pro-
cess is not finished, the process and its outcomes can not be fully evaluated. 
Nevertheless, on the basis of the developments to date, some estimations can 
be made. This section first discusses the main developments in the Bloemen-
dalerpolder process, and then makes an early attempt to evaluate the process.
The planning process5.2.1 
Because the Bloemendalerpolder was part of the Green Heart and a Nation-
al Buffer Zone, built development was impossible for a long time. Since 1958 
(WWdL, 1958), the Green Heart concept and the idea of National Buffer Zones 
have been important elements of Dutch planning policy. The Green Heart is 
the protected metropolitan green area that is surrounded by the ring of the 
most important Dutch cities (Van der Valk & Faludi, 1997). A National Buffer 
Zone is the term given to a green corridor between major agglomerations (Fa-
ludi & Van der Valk, 1994).
In an attempt to safeguard more valuable green areas around Amsterdam, 
and given the housing shortage in the Amsterdam region, the idea about re-
strictive policy for the Bloemendalerpolder changed (see for an impression of 
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the spatial quality of the Bloemendalerpolder Figures 1.14 and 5.1). This had 
two consequences. First, property developers started to acquire land in the 
polder, because they saw opportunities to build (Farjon et al., 2004). At the 
same time, a wide debate started on red (built developments) and green (na-
ture areas and recreational developments).
To make it possible to build in the Bloemendalerpolder, the National Buffer 
Zone and the Green Heart had to be adjusted. According to Dutch rules, de-
cisions about the borders of the Green Heart and the National Buffer Zones 
must be made in parliament. A lively debate took place in the Lower Chamber, 
but in the end, using the right of amendment (Dutch Lower Chamber, 2005-
2006d), parliament reached an agreement with the Minister of Housing, Spa-
tial Planning and the Environment on condition that only one third of the 
polder was zoned for housing and two thirds was developed as a green area 
(Ministry VROM et al., 2004). The idea was that the development of the green 
area would be financed through the development of the houses. The province 
then included these agreements in its plan for the area (Provincie Noord-Hol-
land, 2006c and Figure 5.2).
This “deal” posed a challenge for various layers of government. First, the 
polder lies in two relatively small municipalities, Muiden and Weesp. Because 
of the large scale of the project, it was unlikely that these communities would 
be able to carry out the project on their own, as was indicated by their in-
ability to use their public pre-emption right in time. At the same time, the 
provincial role in planning is changing, following changes in spatial develop-
ment planning policy and the new planning law. The province now needs to 
consider acquiring land, negotiating with private parties and signing develop-
ment contracts. The province of Noord-Holland decided to take on this task 
and became the project manager of the interactive planning process for the 
Bloemendalerpolder.
[ 84 ]
Figure 5.1 Spatial quality of the Bloemendalerpolder
Still, the province was not the only pub-
lic party that faced changes. Up to then, the 
DLG/BBL, which had acquired the land in the 
Bloemendalerpolder for the National Buffer 
Zone, had mainly been involved in land con-
solidation projects and developing nature and 
recreation areas. Recently, in line with spatial 
development planning and PPP, cross-sub-
sidizing “green” development through “red” 
development has risen on their policy agen-
da. For DLG/BBL, this entailed that to finance 
their green projects, it needed to be involved 
in built projects too. A special new division, 
PPP Agency for Rural Areas (PPS-bureau lan-
delijk gebied) was set up to address this. In ad-
dition, experts in land development calcula-
tions for building projects were hired.
Another new governmental agency that 
was just able to play a role in the Bloemen-
dalerpolder project was the joint ministerial 
development authority, the GOB (Gemeenschap-
pelijk Ontwikkelings Bedrijf). Especially in the case of property, past experience 
has shown that ministries with different interests can act at odds. Because 
due to the popularity of spatial development planning, the strategic use of 
land ownership has become important, this authority was set up to coordi-
nate between different ministries that own land or have a specific interest in 
a project area (Dutch Lower Chamber, 2005-2006c). In practice, the most im-
portant task of the GOB is to organize meetings of high-ranking officials from 
each ministry and to stress the importance of cooperation.
To avoid delaying the PPP process and weakening the position of public 
parties with internal disputes, in the case of the Bloemendalerpolder, a pub-
lic party meeting preceded every meeting between public and private parties. 
The private parties, five property developers, did the same. Furthermore, in 
line with the concept of democratic control, all plans, whether made interac-
tively or not, need to follow official approval procedures. So, all plans needed 
to be presented to democratically elected authorities for approval. In order to 
prevent carefully made plans being defeated in the politic arena, both politi-
cians and civil servants participated in the PPP process.
To guarantee that plans were based on available funding, the pubic-pri-
vate meetings were arranged according to the “design and calculate” princi-
ple (tekenen en rekenen). One working group was established to draw various 
plans for the entire area while a parallel working group calculated the costs 
and revenues of the different alternatives. For these calculations, the basic 
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Figure 5.2 Provincial plan for the Bloemendaler-
polder
Source: Provincie Noord-Holland, 2006c
assumption was that the entire project (including the green developments) 
should break even after providing a normal profit to the property developers 
for their building activities. The major costs were associated with civil engi-
neering, land acquisition, development of the green area, infrastructure, and 
interest. The income would come from the purchase of houses and profit from 
storing dredged sludge. Specialists in planning and calculations supported 
this process. Combining design and calculations meant that the plan could be 
optimized simultaneously, thus increasing the likelihood that the plans could 
be implemented.
Besides the “design and calculate” principle, the process proceeded “from 
rough to detailed.” This is based on the notion that trust between public and 
private parties needs time to grow and that a successful contract can be made 
after a process of joint step-by-step concept building (Koppejan, 2005). To ac-
complish this, the process was split-up in different rounds. The first round 
defined the broad outlines, and every subsequent round added more detail to 
the plans. Every round is supposed to end with the signing of an agreement 
about the content of the plans, financial matters, and the division of respon-
sibilities. The condition that the content of the plans needed to be approved 
during normal public hearings and following political procedures should al-
ways be included in these agreements. After the first agreement was signed, it 
was incorporated in an official provincial structure plan. In this way, a change 
of regulations was linked to agreements under private law (Needham, 2006).
While the PPP process was taking place, citizens expressed the desire to 
participate more in the planning process. In response to this, a so-called “de-
sign studio” was set up. For six months, people could visit a location near the 
development area and discuss their ideas and interests with spatial plan-
ners (Gemeente Muiden, 2005). Introducing this “design studio” meant that 
inclusiveness was increased, that information from local people and interest 
groups could be used and that less resistance could be expected at the time of 
official planning approval.
Public and private parties signed their first “anticipation agreement” (Len-
keek, 2007) and a provincial structure plan for the area had been approved 
(Provincie Noord-Holland, 2006c). The planning process is not finished at 
present. During the “design and calculate” process it became clear that it 
would be nearly impossible to make a plan of such proportions, and with 
these ambitions, pay for itself. Therefore, at this moment, possibilities for ad-
ditional financing are being investigated. Representatives of the parties in-
volved in the “design and calculate” process have stated that they are gener-
ally satisfied with the way things are going. Although it is not certain that the 
entire green area, including the special bridge to enable species to cross the 
water (in Dutch: ecoduct) can be financed by the development of houses, a pri-
vate party stated that the contributions to public facilities including the green 
area are much higher than in other projects.
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Evaluating the process5.2.2 
Because it is not finished, a full evaluation of the process and its outcomes 
cannot be made yet. An early estimation gives the following impression: the 
project might make a positive change in spatial quality. Still, the plans have 
attracted some critical comments, because of the construction of housing on 
one third of the fields and the changes to the remaining green area. Neverthe-
less, the new plans will make this area more suitable for recreation and na-
ture conservation, which could be considered an improvement of the spatial 
quality.
Since there are different motivations for choosing a cross-subsidy ap-
proach, I needed to use different criteria to evaluate the approach. Planners 
who are interested in collaborative planning evaluate processes on their legit-
imacy and their capacity to stimulate learning. This is based on a normative 
assumption that a planning process should be transparent and as inclusive as 
possible (Healey, 2003). Considering the aim of spatial development planning, 
it can be examined whether an active development of spatial quality has tak-
en place. In the light of PPP, the question can be asked whether certain fa-
cilities have been developed while spending as little governmental money as 
possible. All in all, in order to get a nuanced idea of the usefulness of a cross-
subsidy approach, I used the following criteria: the effect on spatial quality, 
the amount of public and private money invested, legitimacy, inclusiveness, 
and the learning that results.
As far as the amount of public and private money invested is concerned, 
both public and private parties consider more contributions from the other 
side possible and reasonable. All in all, my knowledge of other contracts be-
tween public parties and property developers for various projects gives me 
the impression that the contribution to the green area being made by private 
parties is quite high.
With respect to inclusiveness and transparency, the process shows a ten-
sion between optimizing the effects on spatial quality and the amount of pri-
vate money invested versus optimizing inclusiveness and transparency. In 
the Bloemendalerpolder case, the “design and calculate” process reduced in-
clusion and transparency. The reason for this is that shared image building, 
developing trust, and negotiating financial matters could hardly be achieved 
without a certain degree of privacy. These conditions are needed for success-
ful cooperation, which in turn increases the chance that the plans will be im-
plemented in a way that does not place too heavy a burden on governmental 
budgets. The problem of exclusion and reduced transparency was partially 
addressed by the introduction of the “design studio.” In addition, plans made 
during the “design and calculate” process still have to follow normal plan ap-
proval procedures, including public hearings, decisions made by democratical-
ly chosen representatives, and the possibility for lodging objections. It would 
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seem that this allows a balance between inclusiveness and transparency on 
the one hand and implementability on the other hand.
The interactive planning process in the Bloemendalerpolder shows how 
learning can take place. First, public and private parties involved in the “de-
sign and calculate” process learned from their interaction. Since property de-
velopers automatically consider costs and benefits, public parties could learn 
how to meet the new inhabitants’ wishes more efficiently. Second, learning 
took place because public and private parties needed information about each 
others’ finances position, opinions, and core values to conclude their nego-
tiations successfully. To gain this information, public parties hired experts in 
land development calculations for building projects, and private parties hired 
people who had previously worked in the public sector. This mutual learning 
allowed cultural differences to be bridged. Public parties also learned about 
PPP thanks to the PPP Agency for Rural Areas (PPS-bureau landelijk gebied) and 
the PPP Knowledge Center (Kenniscentrum PPS), set up by the Ministry of Fi-
nance. The information exchanged between public parties and private parties 
during the early stages of the process helped the subsequent decision-making 
process. Another type of learning was the knowledge exchange between pro-
fessionals from different backgrounds, such as spatial planners and experts 
in land development calculations. In this way, the Bloemendalerpolder case 
shows how an interactive planning process with cross-subsidy strategies cre-
ates possibilities for learning.
Before the Bloemendalerpolder case can be used as a model for future 
projects, the success of this case needed to be evaluated. Although questions 
about the private investments and the increase in spatial quality have been 
expressed, and some concessions have been made with respect to inclusive-
ness and transparency, in general the achievements are promising enough to 
analyze the case. In this way, lessons can be learned for the design of other 
PPP processes and we can consider whether the approach could be construc-
tively applied on a wider scale.
Lessons that can be applied from 5.3 
the Bloemendalerpolder case
Studying the Bloemendalerpolder case can help the process design of other 
similar projects. Lessons learned concern the collaboration between different 
public parties, the combination of design and cost calculation, and the set up 
of the process.
Considering earlier PPP projects (Priemus, 2002a), the first concern for the 
public parties involved in designing a process structure was to organize them-
selves. Earlier PPP experience had shown that private parties withdrew from 
the PPP process because they considered the public parties to be fragmented 
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and unreliable (Koppejan, 2005). The large number of public and private par-
ties involved, and conflicting interests between the provinces in their role as 
developers of green areas and the municipalities in their traditional role as 
land developers for built area can make cross-subsidy projects complex. To 
avoid delaying the PPP process and weakening the position of public parties 
by airing internal disputes, in the case of the Bloemendalerpolder, a public 
party meeting preceded every meeting between public and private parties. For 
the same reasons, the private parties, five property developers, did the same. 
This kind of meetings can be helpful in other projects too.
Democratic plan approval procedures are another reason why public par-
ties are sometimes regarded as unpredictable. Although a governmental body 
may bind itself to the results of negotiations, to respect the rights of others, it 
must make reservation that plans are still subject to the normal approval pro-
cedures. A planning decision made during an interactive process always runs 
the risk of being revised during the official approval procedure. In the Neth-
erlands, all plans, whether they are made interactively or not, need to follow 
official approval procedures. The Bloemendalerpolder process shows that it 
might be helpful to have both civil servants and politicians participate in the 
PPP process, in order to prevent carefully made plans from being dismantled 
in the political arena.
The Bloemendalerpolder process also teaches the importance of combin-
ing design and cost calculations. To avoid a misfit between plans and funding, 
according to the “design and calculate” principle, the planning process was 
combined with the calculation of the costs. This made it possible to optimize 
plans during the process and to learn during the process. Besides, combining 
the design and the cost calculations increased the likelihood that the plans 
would be implemented.
Organizing the different rounds according to the “from rough to detailed” 
principle can also be helpful in other projects. In this way, planning permis-
sion can be linked to the agreements resulting from a PPP process. During the 
process, learning can take place and plans can be elaborated. In addition, or-
ganizing the design process in rounds allows trust to develop gradually.
The constraints of a 5.4 
cross-subsidy approach
In order to examine whether a cross-subsidy approach is worth applying on 
a large scale, this section looks at some of the reasons why such approach-
es have not always the intended outcome. These reasons include legal con-
straints, financial constraints, or opposition to such an approach due to sup-
posed disadvantages. During the discussion about cross-subsidy strategies 
and the evaluation of the Bloemendalerpolder process the following ques-
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tions emerged: What are the legal constraints and to what extent can they be 
dealt with? Can investments in green areas counterbalance the loss of green 
area caused by building? What is the impact of cross-subsidy approaches on 
land prices, and how does it affect open space preservation by farmers? Are 
there any conflicts between transparency and inclusiveness and the planning 
process needed for a cross-subsidy approach?
Legal constraints5.4.1 
In practice, cross-subsidy strategies are limited by legal constraints. For exam-
ple, Priemus (1996) complained that it is hard to achieve regional land price 
equalization. This section describes the legal problems which public parties 
face when they want to make an effective cross-subsidy contract. In the Neth-
erlands, this had been the topic of many discussions (e.g., Ministry VROM & 
Ministry of Finance, 2001), and as a result, the new Land Servicing Act was in-
troduced in 2008. De Wolff (2007) discussed the difference between the old and 
the new legislation. Because there has been little experience with this new leg-
islation and since the new legislation builds on the old, the previous situation 
will be described first, and after that, the situation under the new act.
In the Netherlands, as explained earlier, active land development by mu-
nicipalities has been, and often continues to be, common practice. Munici-
palities can earn money by selling land to property developers, which they 
can then spend on all kinds of facilities like green areas. If municipalities do 
not own the land, or if property developers do not want to sell their land in 
exchange for a right to buy serviced land later, municipalities need to enter 
into agreements with them in order to obtain money for public facilities. In 
the Netherlands, as in many countries (e.g., Korthals Altes, 2006b), it has been 
common practice for municipalities and landowners to enter into such agree-
ments. Of course, this did not mean that municipalities could recover unlim-
ited funds. On the contrary, these amounts were generally limited to costs 
directly related to the development of buildings, such as the costs of local in-
frastructure, and they did generally not include financing for regional green 
areas (e.g. Kistenkas, 2005; Priemus & Louw, 2002; for the Norwegian case see 
Røsnes, 2005).
In order to provide legal certainty, agreements about the recovery of costs 
should fit the conditions stipulated in the municipal land servicing account 
ordinance (Van Buuren et al., 2002). Although municipalities were allowed 
to make ordinances that are less restrictive on the costs that can be recov-
ered, many municipalities used the ordinance of the Dutch Association of 
Municipalities which limited the type of costs which could be recovered to 
costs directly related to the built development. Besides, although a munici-
pality could decide not to adjust a bestemmingsplan, municipalities could not 
force property developers to enter into an agreement about their payment for 
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public facilities. Because municipalities often felt uncertain about the costs 
that could be recovered, contracts about this were preferably made with large 
and well-known property developers (De Wolff et al., 2006). These developers 
stuck to these agreements, not because they feared that a municipality would 
enforce them in court, but because they did not want to lose their good name 
and opportunities to develop new projects in other cities.
In order to deal with property developers who do not want to enter into 
such an agreement, the Spatial Planning Act was changed. The new act dis-
tinguishes various ways of achieving cross-subsidization. As with the old act, 
active land development is still possible. A reason why municipalities might 
prefer to use this approach is that they can use the money they have earned 
for any purpose they chose. However, municipalities cannot always acquire 
land and they do not always want to take the risk involved in investing in 
land.
In order to strengthen the position of public parties, the new Land Serv-
icing Act introduced some new institutions (De Wolff, 2007). Under the new 
Land Servicing Act, developers of housing can be required to contribute to the 
development of green areas. However, if a property developer does not want 
to enter into an agreement with the municipality voluntarily, these contribu-
tions can only be made obligatory when three criteria are met: (1) profit, (2) 
causality, and (3) proportionality (De Wolff, 2007). (1) The costs for the green 
area can only be recovered if the dwellings benefit from the green area. (2) 
The development of the green area needs to have a causal connection to 
the development of the dwellings. In other words, the green area would not 
have been developed if the dwellings had not been developed. (3) The costs 
can only be recovered proportionally to the profits of the other parts of the 
project. Because there is little experience with the new act, it is too early to 
tell whether these conditions will make it possible to recover enough money 
to develop large, regional, green areas. However, considering the three criteria, 
the amount of money recovered will be limited.
While these contributions are obligatory, property developers can also de-
cide to enter into an agreement with public parties voluntarily. When agree-
ments are voluntary, it may be difficult to include all private property devel-
opers. Since private parties will most likely only enter into such an agreement 
when building opportunities are scarce, this approach will only be effective 
when land-use plans are very restrictive. Because there is little experience 
with the new system, it is difficult to tell whether property developers will 
enter into such agreements. Although the Minister of Housing, Spatial Plan-
ning and the Environment had stated that the criteria of profit, causality and 
proportionality do not have to be applied on these agreements (Dutch Upper 
Chamber, 2006-2007, pp. 1-4), it is still difficult to tell whether these stipula-
tions will influence these voluntary agreements. According to De Wolff (2007), 
the new act has extended the possibilities for cross-subsidy approaches.
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Although, the new act might have extended and restricted the possibilities 
for cross-subsidy approaches, the act does not imply a complete change, ac-
tive land development is still possible and other possibilities for cross-subsi-
dization are still uncertain and limited. Because of this, Schipper et al. (2006) 
stated that, in practice, there are still too few possibilities for legally imple-
menting cross-subsidy strategies, even with the new act.
Financial constraints5.4.2 
To make a cross-subsidy approach work, property developments must be prof-
itable enough to make sufficient money available for the effective improve-
ment of spatial quality in metropolitan green areas. For various reasons, this 
is often hard to accomplish.
First of all, property development profits can vary. Ideas about cross-subsi-
dies have become popular in times that house prices have risen sharply (De 
Wolff, 2007). However, in some periods, such as the 1980s, the Dutch govern-
ment has needed to subsidize built developments (Groetelaers, 2004; Golland 
& Boelhouwer, 2002). In such cases, cross-subsidization was out of the ques-
tion. Even in times of rising house prices, as during the first decade of the 
twenty-first century, the amount of the “plus value” can significantly limit 
cross-subsidy opportunities. The word “plus value” refers to every increase in 
property prices due to (expected) planning decisions (Alterman, 2005). If this 
“plus value” is not large enough, a cross-subsidy strategy can not be applied.
Another problem is the different time frames associated with profitable 
building projects and projects to protect and improve metropolitan green 
areas. When interviewed, civil servants involved in green area preservation 
explained that, in general, incidental cross-subsidy budgets are not large 
enough to cover recurring costs of maintaining large green areas. As ex-
plained in Chapter 3.2, these recurring costs are considered to be the main 
problem associated with metropolitan landscape preservation. For example, 
in the case of the Midden-Delfland, a so-called green fund was set up. The 
villages in the Midden-Delfland area made a deal with two cities neighboring 
the green area, in which the cities put about €8 million in a green fund in ex-
change for adjustments to municipal boundaries which made developments 
next to the cities possible. The fund is used to pay landowners for “green and 
blue services,” as is explained in Section 3.2.3. However, these payments are 
not sufficient to keep economically vital farmers in the area. To achieve this, 
a land bank would be needed. However, when the “green and blue services” 
system was established, the fund was not considered large enough to invest 
in a land bank. Therefore, even in this case – which is often mentioned as a 
successful example of a cross-subsidy project – the captured “plus value” was 
not enough to solve the problem of maintenance and to create a sustainable 
solution for the future of the green area.
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In the Bloemendalerpolder, extra money will most likely be needed to im-
plement all plans beyond the money derived from the built up developments. 
Because, built developments are often not able to finance regional green de-
velopments, the overall advantages of a cross-subsidy approach are disputed. 
This makes the application of cross-subsidy approaches less attractive.
Skepticism about the improvement 5.4.3 
of spatial quality
Deciding whether or not a cross-subsidy approach is attractive depends on 
whether the project will lead to an improvement in spatial quality. Do the in-
vestments in green area counterbalance the loss of green area caused by the 
built up developments? First of all, in almost every cross-subsidy project, the 
total amount of green area is reduced because of the new developments. The 
money that is invested in green areas is used to change existing agricultur-
al green areas into nature conservation sites or recreational areas, as in the 
Bloemendalerpolder, or for example to build ecoducts – viaducts for animals 
– as in the “Hart van de Heuvelrug” project (De Wolff et al., 2004). Changing ex-
isting agricultural areas into nature conservation sites or recreational areas is 
not always considered positive because it can change and, according to some, 
“damage” the landscape (e.g., Van Tets, 2007). Because of this disputable effect 
on the landscape and the fact that the total amount of green area is generally 
reduced, investments in metropolitan green areas often cannot counterbal-
ance the loss of green due to built up developments. This makes it less likely 
that people will support such a cross-subsidy approach.
Another issue is that the debate about cross-subsidization can open the 
door for built developments. The example of “Living in Waterland”, an attempt 
to clear the way for new bestemmingsplannen to allow additional dwellings to 
be built in the National Landscape Laag Holland, illustrates this. To prepare 
for changes in the bestemmingsplannen, which were necessary to permit con-
struction, many policy documents were produced. These documents discussed 
the need to revitalize the countryside stating that the cross-subsidy approach 
should be adopted (Provincie Noord-Holland, 2003, 2006a, 2006b, 2007). Howev-
er, in practice, when changes to bestemmingsplannen were discussed, the cross-
subsidy approach hardly seemed to play a role any more. For example, while 
changing bestemmingsplannen, instead of investing in a green fund or develop-
ing a large green area, only small investments like planting hedgerows were 
discussed. In other cases, interviewees stated that a contribution to green ar-
eas was not possible, because of the small scale of the developments and the 
high building costs. Besides, referring to some totally different projects, they 
stated, investments in recreational facilities were already made. In this way, 
the opportunities to build, which were given by the province with a cross-sub-
sidy approach in mind, were only used for built developments without cross-
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subsidizing green areas. In this light, it needs to be considered that Dutch 
municipalities, like property developers, have a tendency to favor new devel-
opments (Korthals Altes, 1995). Figure 5.3 illustrates the opinion about this of 
people advocating against new built developments in Laag Holland. In general, 
municipalities are willing to use any building opportunities the province al-
lows them. This demonstrates the risk of a cross-subsidy approach for spatial 
quality: it can create opportunities for building, without providing improve-
ments to green areas. These possible effects on spatial quality make the appli-
cation of the cross-subsidy approach less attractive.
Not only the debate about cross-subsidization can open the door for built 
developments, the debate on public participation in general can open the door 
for built developments or for governmental cutbacks based on the idea that 
private parties who participate in a planning process will have an interest in 
metropolitan green areas and will take care of the protection and improve-
ment of these areas. Involving private parties in a planning process in order 
to make plans that are supported by the public has often been advocated. For 
example, the Netherlands Institute for Spatial Research (Ruimtelijk Planbureau, 
RPB) stated that the commitment of private parties is essential for successful 
landscape protection and improvement (Janssen et al., 2007, p. 10) and that in 
practice policy attempts are made to apply a cross-subsidy approach in order 
to supplement rather limited governmental budgets and to involve private 
parties in the project (Janssen et al., 2007, p. 14). However, for the outcome of 
a policy development process it is important to consider which private par-
ties are involved (Van Rij & Van Eeten, 2003). A distinction of private parties 
into parties that are expected to contribute financially to metropolitan green 
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Figure 5.3 Dutch municipalities are criticized for granting building permits out of 
financial interest 
Source: Van Dusseldorp et al., 2007, © Arend van Dam
areas and people who value these areas, can explain why mixing up ideas 
about collaborative processes and PPP, in particular cross-subsidy approach-
es, might result in insufficient protection and improvement of metropolitan 
green areas. If ordinary people who value metropolitan green areas are in-
volved in a collaborative planning process, it is likely that a planning deci-
sion will be made to protect and improve green areas. However, it is not likely 
that financial contribution by these ordinary people will be large enough to 
replace former governmental budgets for green area protection and improve-
ment. On the other hand, if only parties that are expected to contribute finan-
cially, such as property developers, participate in the planning process, they 
might not be willing to sufficiently protect and improve metropolitan green 
areas. Therefore, unclearness about the type of private parties that participate 
in an interactive planning process and their expected contributions might re-
sult in insufficient metropolitan green area protection and improvement. This 
might be a reason not to support policy documents that rely on PPP-processes 
without specifying the type of the involved private parties. In stead, regula-
tion might be needed to make property developers contribute to plans that 
are valued by ordinary people.
Opposition because of rising land prices, 5.4.4 
limited transparency and inclusiveness
Another disadvantage of a cross-subsidy approach is its potential effect on 
land prices. Den Drijver-Van Rijckevorsel et al. (2007) discussed why in case 
of cross-subsidy projects, land prices are influenced by land prices for built 
and green area developments. Besides, rising land prices were seen as an im-
portant issue when strategies to support affordable land prices for farmers 
in Midden-Delfland with the municipality, farmers and the landscape union 
were discussed (Van Rij & Korthals Altes, 2007b). Cross-subsidy approaches 
create building opportunities. In turn, when people expect that built develop-
ment will be allowed, land prices tend to rise. High land prices make it dif-
ficult for farmers to buy new land to begin farming or to enlarge a farm. In 
time, this can be an important threat to metropolitan green areas. This can be 
a reason to reject the cross-subsidy approach in specific areas.
As discussed earlier, in order to create the opportunity for shared image 
building, developing trust and negotiating about finances, it can be helpful to 
reduce the number of participating parties in a planning process and to re-
duce the openness of the discussion. However, in this way, the process can 
become less transparent and less inclusive. Since collaborative planning is 
considered an important concept in contemporary planning, the reduction 
of transparency and inclusiveness can be seen as an unwanted development. 
As a consequence, people in favor of transparent and inclusive planning pro-
cesses might advocate against cross-subsidy process.
[ 95 ]
The uniqueness of the 5.5 
Bloemendalerpolder case
Though a great many documents have been written about cross-subsidy 
projects, the number of projects that come up to expectations is limited. This 
raises questions about whether such approaches can be applied in the way 
proposed by these documents. Interviewees often mentioned the Bloemen-
dalerpolder as an example to show that it is possible to finance large-scale 
green areas using the profits from property development. In order to deter-
mine whether the approach used in the Bloemendalerpolder can be used else-
where, the project and the conditions that made the process likely to become 
successful have been examined. A number of unique circumstances appear 
to have contributed to the process. This section discusses the landownership 
situation, the prior restrictive policy, the powerful parliamentary resolution 
on the hectares to be cross-subsidized, the willingness of powerful parties to 
play key roles, and their eagerness to make the project a showcase. Because 
of these unique conditions, it cannot be expected that the same approach 
could often be applied elsewhere with the same results.
The first condition is landownership. Interviewees involved in the Bloe-
mendalerpolder PPP process stated how important it was that the DLG/BBL 
had acquired land in the Bloemendalerpolder for the National Buffer Zone 
policy. As a result, this agency was able to participate in negotiations with 
the private parties from the very start. Because the government had acquired 
land at an early stage for a low price, there was a considerable “plus value.” 
The existence of “plus value” also matters for private parties, and financial 
incentives are often an important motivation behind getting involved in a PPP 
process (Koppejan, 2005). In the Bloemendalerpolder, the high price for hous-
es in the region contributed to this “plus value.”
When asked what mattered during the PPP negotiations, interviewees 
mentioned the parliamentary decision to allow built developments on one 
third of the polder on condition that the other two thirds of the polder be de-
veloped as green area. Therefore, this starting point was unquestionable. This 
is a clear example of the importance of a prior strong restrictive policy com-
bined with a powerful resolution on the cross-subsidy strategy. These unique 
factors, combined with its former special status as part of the Green Heart 
and as a National Buffer Zone and the involvement of parliament, all contrib-
uted to the success of the cross-subsidy approach in the Bloemendalerpolder. 
Unfortunately, these unique conditions are not likely to be present in many 
other cases.
To serve public interest, public parties participating in negotiations with 
property developers require sufficient skills and authority (Figure 5.4 address-
es the weakness of some municipalities). Because applying a cross-subsidy 
approach on this scale was relatively new and since the approach had often 
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been promoted in policy documents, the government wanted to make this 
project a success. As a result, various governmental parties were involved in 
the project: the province, the DLG/BBL and the GOB. For all of them, it was im-
portant to make this project a showcase. Consequentially, the public parties 
involved were represented by specially trained servants.
The involvement of the province, the DLG/BBL and the GOB helped to over-
come the fact that the project lies in two municipalities. Applying a cross-
subsidy approach is difficult if green areas and new built areas lie in differ-
ent municipalities, since municipalities are seldom willing to spend money 
on public facilities in other municipalities (Figure 5.5 illustrates this problem). 
In the case of the Green Fund in Midden-Delfland, cross border cross-subsidi-
zation was possible because the agreement on this issue was part of a more 
general deal which included adjusting administrative boundaries and creat-
ing building opportunities. In the Bloemendalerpolder, this problem could be 
dealt with because the province and central government took over many of 
the municipalities’ tasks. This shows that cross-subsidization between differ-
ent municipalities is possible under special conditions.
The involvement of the new established GOB was also unique for this 
project. This was important for the project because it facilitated the coordina-
tion between different ministries. This central government agency has close 
ties to the cabinet and strengthened the position of the public parties, making 
private contributions for developing green areas more likely. This challenges 
the idea that decreasing the power of central government should contribute 
to spatial quality (Van den Hof, 2006) and that PPP should involve a shift from 
national to regional and local government (Hajer & Zonneveld, 2000), which is 
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Figure 5.4 Municipalities are sometimes considered to be too weak to negotiate with 
property developers 
Source: Van Dusseldorp et al., 2007, © Arend van Dam
the topic of Chapter 6. To increase spatial quality, not only knowledge about 
the area is required, which is often in the heads of local authorities, but the 
power to implement decisions is also a sine qua non.
Because the Bloemendalerpolder case is unique, it is not likely that the ap-
proach can be applied on a wide scale. Quite frequently, interviewees asked 
ironically for examples of successful regional cross subsidy-projects. While I 
was conducting interviews for a study on land development policy and land 
development institutions related to the Nota Ruimte (Groetelaers et al., 2005), 
a number of public parties mentioned that they had considered cross-subsi-
dy approaches, but that they had not implemented such strategies, for the 
reasons mentioned in this chapter. The limited number of successful cross-
subsidy projects contrasts sharply with the number of policy documents and 
initiatives that mention cross subsidy approaches as development strategy 
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Figure 5.5 Cartoon criticizes different earnings by municipalities which can build and 
green municipalities which cannot build 
Source: Van Dusseldorp et al., 2007, © Arend van Dam
for specific areas or the Dutch landscape in general. This is supported by De 
Zeeuw (2007, p. 43), who stated that despite numerous cross-subsidy initia-
tives, the number of successful projects was very small.
The most important conditions that made the Bloemendalerpolder case 
work were its former status as National Buffer Zone and part of the Green 
Heart, the parliamentary decision about the balance between green and built 
developments, the “plus value,” the land ownership by the DLG/BBL, and the 
involvement of higher layers of government, who considered the Bloemen-
dalerpolder a showcase. Most of these conditions are unique for the Bloemen-
dalerpolder, which makes it considerably less likely that cross-subsidy ap-
proaches will work equally well in other cases.
Conclusion5.6 
In the Netherlands, using profits from property development has been pro-
posed as the way to finance the development and maintenance of green areas 
at a time when government expenditures are being severely reduced. This fits 
ideas about the restructuring of the welfare state and modern planning con-
cepts such as collaborative planning, PPP, and spatial development planning. 
In the Dutch planning community, the expectations associated with cross-
subsidy approaches have been high. The general call for deregulation, priva-
tization, and cutbacks in government expenditure has increased the need for 
cross-subsidy strategies.
A cross-subsidy approach can be analyzed in terms of the green area protec-
tion and improvement model presented in Chapter 2. In relation with a change 
of zoning, a cross-subsidy approach makes private budgets available that can 
replace governmental budgets. These budgets are used to change the owner-
ship situation, to acquire land and to carry out works, for example the plant-
ing of trees. These physical measures are supposed to increase spatial quality. 
This increase of spatial quality can be disputed by stating that the traditional 
landscape disappears and the total number of green areas is decreased.
The model can also help to explain some weak elements of a cross-subsidy 
approach. The possible changes in zoning, more precisely changes to bestem-
mingsplannen, affect the entire system described by the model. If property 
developers expect that constructions will be allowed in the future, they can 
decide to buy land. It is not in their interest to maintain the land in a land-
scape friendly way, and spatial quality may decrease. If property developers 
decide to buy land, land prices might increase and farmers can not take over 
farms or enlarge their farms. In time, this can affect spatial quality. In this 
way through the land prices, new possibilities for cross-subsidy projects in 
land-use plans might have an effect on the ownership situation. Because this 
ownership situation has an effect on the financial position of the guardians of 
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the landscape, this might decrease spatial quality. Additionally, as will be dis-
cussed in Section 6.2, policy statements that cross-subsidy approaches should 
be applied might go with a reduction of budgets for metropolitan green areas 
since it might be unfoundedly expected that these budgets will be provided 
through cross-subsidy strategies.
In contrast with high expectations associated with cross-subsidy ap-
proaches, study of the Dutch case in general, and the Bloemendalerpolder 
case in particular, suggests that the possibility that built developments can 
cross-subsidize green area developments is limited. The approach is more 
likely to be successful when there is a “plus value”, when public parties own 
land in the area, when construction in the area has long not been allowed, 
and when authoritative and experienced public parties are involved. If these 
conditions are not met, a cross-subsidy approach is less likely to work. In ad-
dition, the case material showed reasons not to choose for a cross-subsidy 
approach. For example, investments in green area cannot counterbalance the 
loss of green area imposed by the built up developments. Cross-subsidy policy 
might also result in rising agricultural land prices, and it might be difficult to 
use incidental cross-subsidy budgets to pay for the major expense associated 
with metropolitan green areas, including the recurring costs of maintaining 
large green areas.
Interactive planning approaches can also come into conflict with the ide-
als of collaborative planning, such as inclusiveness and transparency, since 
a degree of closedness might be needed to reach agreement with private par-
ties about their contribution to the green area. Another factor that can make 
cross-subsidy projects complex is the large number of public and private par-
ties involved, not least the conflicting interests between the developers of re-
gional green areas, the provinces, and the traditional land developers for built 
areas, the municipalities. Finally, there is a risk that the debate about cross-
subsidy approaches could be misused to make the public enthusiastic about 
a combination of new built and green developments, whereas ultimately on-
ly the built developments are implemented. For all of these reasons, people 
might hesitate about applying cross-subsidy approaches.
The Bloemendalerpolder case shows how a cross-subsidy approach can be 
used for the development of green area. However, the uniqueness of the Bloe-
mendalerpolder case and the arguments against cross-subsidy approaches do 
not lead to high expectations that cross subsidy approaches will be widely 
applied.
The study of cross-subsidy approaches is not only interesting for prac-
tice and for the discussion about market or government; it is also an exam-
ple that fits the discussions on other research questions. A cross-subsidy ap-
proach combines spatial planning with land development (see Chapter 7) by 
linking the decision about the land uses, a combination of houses and green 
area, with financial agreements on the use of profits from the development of 
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the houses for the development of green areas. The study of cross-subsidy ap-
proaches shows why this coupling can be problematic. A planning decision to 
allow cross-subsidy approaches can have an effect on land prices, which can 
affect the land ownership by farmers and which in turn can have an effect on 
spatial quality. This demonstrates why it might be useful to take land devel-
opment topics such as land prices into consideration when a spatial planning 
decision is made.
The study of cross subsidy approaches also demonstrates one of the major 
reasons why spatial planning and land development are decoupled. In an at-
tempt to protect private property rights, Dutch legislation limited the type of 
costs which can be recovered. One of the underlying principles is that plan-
ning decisions should be made based on criteria such as spatial quality or in 
the case of a collaborative decision, inclusiveness, whereas land development 
should implement democratically made plans while spending as little of the 
tax payer’s money as possible. Therefore, cross-subsidy approaches might 
demonstrate classic tensions between spatial planning and land development. 
Considering these tensions, it is no surprise that a profound legal framework 
is needed to deal with these tensions and that this framework is the object of 
constant fine-tuning.
The cross-subsidy example also demonstrates the possible effects of the 
restructuring of the welfare state. An unlimited combination of privatiza-
tion, deregulation and decentralization can threaten the green metropolitan 
landscape. Basically, private parties act in their own interest. Although some 
investments in green areas might be in the interest of property developers 
because they might increase house prices, in general, they are not likely to 
invest sufficiently in regional green area by themselves. Without regulation to 
enforce contributions to green areas, sufficient contributions by private par-
ties will not likely be made. Decentralization can have an effect on the way a 
cross-subsidy approach is applied. Since Dutch municipalities have a tenden-
cy to welcome the development of new houses, their decision to use cross-
subsidy approaches to open the door for built developments might threaten 
metropolitan green areas.
The cross-subsidy case also demonstrates how a combination of hierarchi-
cal and network influences, such as will be discussed in Chapter 6, can con-
tribute to a cross-subsidy approach. Hierarchical influences, such as strict 
preconditions and the involvement of public parties with authority can help 
to make a deal with private parties. On the other hand the knowledge and 
support of the property developers and other private parties within the net-
work are also a sine qua non to make a cross-subsidy approach a success.
This discussion on cross-subsidy strategies illustrates why instead of a dy-
namic cross-subsidy approach in some areas a Slow Planning approach, as 
will be discussed in Chapter 8, might be chosen. Because a cross-subsidy ap-
proach goes with the construction of houses, it is not applicable to preserve 
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cultural historic green areas. For some areas, where because of the land-
scape’s uniqueness and value, the decision has been made to preserve the 
landscape without new built developments, a Slow Planning approach, which 
reduces landscape dynamics, might fit better.
Because a cross-subsidy approach is a new concept in planning, the debate 
on cross-subsidy institutions also fits the debate on radical or incremental 
institutional change (see Chapter 8). Institutional change is associated with 
uncertainties; the larger the change, the larger are the uncertainties. To deal 
with these uncertainties, the new Land Servicing Act builds on existing legis-
lation. Still, with this new Act the possibilities for cross-subsidy approaches 
are uncertain. This can impose a risk for metropolitan green areas; if, while 
relying on new and uncertain institutions, governmental budgets are de-
creased. Then, budgets for the protection and improvement of metropolitan 
green areas might be insufficient.
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Network or hierarchy6 
As discussed in Section 3.3., the restructuring of the welfare state was consid-
ered to require decentralization of the government, and, in order to avoid place-
blind and “undemocratic” planning, network-oriented-planning approaches 
have been widely advocated in the planning debate (e.g., Hajer & Zonneveld, 
2000; Healey, 1999; Van Dijk, 2006). On the other hand, during interviews, peo-
ple working on the protection and improvement of metropolitan green areas 
complained that, due to the absence of powerful hierarchical institutions, it 
was not likely that sufficiently thorough measures would be implemented. In 
line with this, Van Egmond (2007) director of The Netherlands Environmental 
Assessment Agency (Milieu- en Natuurplanbureau, MNP) warned of the risk of 
over-decentralization. This illustrated a basic dilemma in metropolitan green 
area preservation: whether to use network-oriented or hierarchical approaches. 
The aim of this chapter is to use theories and case study material to discuss 
whether and under what circumstances a shift from a hierarchical towards a 
network-oriented approach is preferable.
This chapter is structured in the following way. First, theories on networks 
in the field of policy analysis, planning and organization theory are explained. 
Then, in Section 6.2, practical examples are provided of hierarchical and net-
work-oriented approaches. After that, Section 6.3 discusses the reasons for 
combining network-oriented and hierarchical elements.
Theories on networks and hierarchies6.1 
Different research disciplines have discussed the concepts of network and hi-
erarchy. This chapter starts by explaining the use of these concepts in policy 
analysis on the basis of the work of De Bruijn and Ten Heuvelhof (2000) (see 
Figure 6.1). Then, it discusses how these concepts have influenced planning 
theory. These theories use the concept of networks to study the interaction 
between government and society. Changes towards a network approach also 
have consequences for the organization of the government itself. In this light, 
decentralization is an important topic. Following Mintzberg’s (1983) approach, 
organization theory will be used to discuss this.
In a hierarchy, one central actor can make a plan, and by doing so, he can 
determine what his subordinates have to do. The basic idea is that the context 
remains stable between plan making and implementation, and the superior 
has the information and the power to effectively steer in a top-down manner. 
Hierarchical coordination mechanisms are associated with top-down steering 
and centralization.
A network, on the other hand, is a more horizontal structure with impor-
tant bottom up forces. The various actors forming the network have their 
own resources to influence the results of the processes in the network. These 
actors interact and form clubs, which shape the network. In general, these 
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networks and their contexts are dynamic and complex. The basic idea about 
governmental steering in networks is that the government influences the rest 
of the network, but is also influenced by the network. Besides, there is the 
idea that governmental steering should be organized in such a way that it 
can cope with uncertainties, insecurities and changes. Network-oriented ap-
proaches are associated with bottom-up forces, decentralization, the involve-
ment of local actors, and collaborative planning.
In the planning debate, much attention has been paid to network-oriented 
institutions as opposed to outdated hierarchical coordination mechanisms. 
The old, hierarchical, concept of blueprint planning, well-known and much 
criticized (Faludi, 1973), is based on the idea that a development plan can 
cover all relevant aspects and that later developments have to comply with 
this plan. In this approach, government controls developments hierarchically, 
often neglecting local forces. Due to various factors, local knowledge is often 
superior to the knowledge available centrally at the time the plan is made. 
As a consequence, plans and subsequent decisions may not correspond (Fa-
ludi, 2000). Traditional research led planning made by professional planners 
has been considered unable to cope with changes in space and society. As a 
reaction to hierarchical approaches, enthusiasm for network forms of plan-
ning has grown. Critics such as Van Dijk (2006), as well as Hajer and Zonne-
veld (2000), stated that consequently, planning practices need to move to-
wards network-oriented coordinating mechanisms, which demands a drastic 
change in approach.
In the planning debate, various arguments have been used to advocate for 
network-oriented approaches. These approaches are considered (1) to be more 
effective at coordination, (2) to be more effective due to the use of local knowl-
edge and ongoing learning, (3) to be more democratic, and (4) to create oppor-
tunities for financial contributions by private parties, such as with PPP (dis-
cussed in Chapter 5). These aspects will be discussed in the following sections.
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First of all, network-oriented approaches are considered to be a more effec-
tive coordination mechanism than the apparently ineffective classical vertical 
approach (Van Dijk, 2006, p. 1463). Central decision making often fails because 
there is no central agency that is able to control all relevant dimensions of the 
planning process (Van Gunsteren, 1976). Instead, policy outcomes are the re-
sult of a dynamic process in which interdependent agents exchange resources 
and need to cooperate (Healey, 1997; Hajer & Zonneveld, 2000; De Bruijn & Ten 
Heuvelhof, 2000). Boonstra (2006) discussed the gap between rural policy and 
practice. He stated that when policy makers lack public support, their poli-
cies become dysfunctional and ineffective. Behind this is the assumption that 
planning is a process by which societies and social groups interactively man-
age their collective affairs; planning coordinates among actors, and if actors 
agree with the plans, they will implement those plans and planning can be 
effective. These ideas will be put into perspective in the next chapter using 
ideas about coordination in the case of strategic spatial planning, operational 
spatial planning, and land development.
Another pro-network argument is that network approaches are more ef-
fective due to the use of local knowledge and ongoing learning. For example, 
Korthals Altes (2006a) stated that implemented planning processes corre-
sponding to the plan can be suboptimal solutions if they are not able to ad-
dress new challenges. Ongoing learning, defined as the ability to change and 
manage social relations (Healey, 2003), is needed to cope with this. Healey in-
troduced the concept of collaborative planning to avoid place-blind approach-
es, to break out of traditional hierarchical and “bureaucratic” processes and 
to involve new groups and networks, new “partnerships” (Healey, 1997; 2003). 
In line with concepts from the field of network theory, collaborative planning 
is considered to enable learning and to cope with dynamic and complex con-
texts better, because of the input of bottom-up forces.
Despite arguments based on effectiveness, the main argument for choos-
ing network-oriented approaches is that they are considered to be more dem-
ocratic. For example, Healey (1999) advocated the introduction of new and 
more interactive relationships among governance, citizens and businesses in 
order to cope with the democratic deficit. Since planning decisions often fail 
to be in line with what “the people” want, involving “the people” in a collabo-
rative planning process should be an answer to this. The more inclusive the 
process, the more democratic and transparent it is considered to be.
It is often stated that governmental tasks need to be decentralized to 
achieve such an interactive process (e.g., Selnes & Kuindersma, 2006). Mint-
zberg (1983) explained which organization structures suited specific contexts. 
He distinguished organization structures which are hierarchical and those 
which are network-oriented. Partially in line with network theory, network-
oriented organization structures are needed for complex and dynamic situa-
tions. Hierarchical structures are more adequate for organizations in a hostile 
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environment, where standardization is possible and stability is preferred. Ac-
cording to Mintzberg, decentralization can be useful since in a large organiza-
tion, no one central person can have all the information needed for decision 
making. Decentralization transfers the power to make decisions to the place 
of impact. In other words, decentralization can avoid place-blind approaches. 
This permits an organization to react to changes more adequately.
Decentralization of the government and network-oriented steering mecha-
nisms used by the government, are often analyzed jointly. The reason for this 
is that decentralization is considered to enable the government to use net-
work-oriented steering mechanisms involving local parties. This project uses 
Mintzberg’s theories in addition to planning and network theories, because 
the government’s decision to use hierarchical or network-oriented approach-
es to make and implement its plans is related to decentralization within the 
government.
Hierarchical and network-oriented 6.2 
approaches in practice
Before describing examples of hierarchical and network-oriented approaches, 
this section discusses the often heard claim that the long-established Dutch 
institutions in the field of spatial planning and land development are hierar-
chical (e.g., Van Dijk, 2006). A closer look at the Dutch legal system gives the 
impression that this idea needs to be revised. First, the Dutch state has nev-
er been organized in a fully hierarchical way. The organization of the Dutch 
state, constituted in 1848, was set up as a “decentralized unitary state,” com-
bining local autonomy and centralism (e.g., Faludi, 2005; Kickert, 1996, p. 92). 
Municipalities, provinces and central government each have their own tasks 
connected with diverse checks and balances.
The organizational characteristics of the Dutch administration can also be 
found in the Dutch system of planning institutions. The Dutch spatial plan-
ning system has essentially been organized locally (Van Buuren et al., 2002, 
p. 8). The power to make plans which are binding on citizens, the bestem-
mingsplannen, has always been primarily in the hands of the municipalities. 
Provinces and central government can make planning statements. However, 
in order to change binding bestemmingsplannen, in most cases, they needed to 
convince the municipalities. To do this, in addition to good arguments, fund-
ing decisions, called “golden cords” (Needham & Faludi, 1999) and coordi-
nation between political parties are used. Since the beginning of the twen-
tieth century, more hierarchical, centralized elements have gradually been 
introduced into the planning system (Van Buuren et al., 2002). Examples of 
these are the rarely used NIMBY proceedings to locate facilities of national 
importance that are unwanted by municipalities, and the more frequently 
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used central government procedures to bypass the bestemmingsplan to locate 
roads and railways of national importance. The new Dutch Spatial Planning 
Act can be seen as both an example of centralization as well as decentraliza-
tion. The new act gave the provinces and national government the power to 
make bestemmingsplannen in specific cases. This can be seen as an example of 
centralization (see also Galle, 2008). However, the fact that provincial approval 
for new local bestemmingsplannen is no longer needed is an example of decen-
tralization.
Although decentralization has always been one of the core characteristics 
of the organization of the Dutch state (Van der Pot et al., 1995, p. 583), the 
actual idea that in order to bring citizens and the government closer to each 
other, tasks should be transferred from central government to local govern-
ment dates back to the late 1970s and early 1980s. In 1980, the Decentralisa-
tienota (Decentralization Memorandum) saw light (Dutch Lower Chamber, 
1980-1981), and decentralization has never left the policy agenda since then 
(e.g., Ministry VROM et al., 2004).
As discussed in Section 3.3.2, decentralization is one of the policy aims 
of the Nota Ruimte. This memorandum also stated that for many green area 
projects no special budgets will be reserved because they should be financed 
by cross-subsidy strategies. As discussed in Chapter 5, such strategies are 
hard to accomplish. Since most tasks concerning green area protection and 
improvement have been decentralized, the difficult task of implementing 
“Rood voor Groen” cross-subsidy strategies has been left to local parties.
Decentralization is one of the main themes of the new Dutch act on land 
consolidation and budgets for green areas (Wet inrichting landelijk gebied, Wilg). 
This act introduces an investment budget for rural areas (Investeringsbudget 
Landelijk Gebied, ILG). Whereas national government traditionally played a 
central role in land consolidation, the aim of the new act is to reinforce the 
role of the provinces for planning, including implementing plans in rural ar-
eas. An important change is the far-reaching decompartmentalization of cen-
tral government contributions for implementing area-specific policy for rural 
areas (Van Rij & Zevenbergen, 2005). During interviews, provincial civil serv-
ants expressed their worries about reductions to these budgets. At the time 
the new act became effective, some signs of changes could already be per-
ceived. For example, no large scale land consolidation projects have been set 
up. This picture fits findings from the Netherlands Court of Audit (De Algemene 
Rekenkamer), which stated that the decentralized implementation of nature 
conservation policy involves risks (Dutch Lower Chamber, 2006-2007d)
In line with this decentralization movement from national government 
towards the provinces, examples can also be found of provinces decentraliz-
ing tasks to municipalities. For example, the province of Zuid-Holland stated 
that their policy was “to do what the province is obliged to do” (“de provincie 
doet wat moet”) (Provincie Zuid-Holland, 2006). In a decree, the province de-
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cided that it could therefore leave most subjects that used to be regulated in 
its nature preservation decree, in the hands of the municipalities (Provincie 
Zuid-Holland, 2006). Besides, like the Nota Ruimte’s statement on cross-sub-
sidies, the province of Zuid-Holland suggested that budgets for improving 
spatial quality, for example by removing green houses, should be arranged lo-
cally by means of cross-subsidy strategies. In line with this, the municipality 
of Midden-Delfland planned to build new houses at the Maaslandsedam to 
finance the removal of old greenhouses. This project has been severely criti-
cized since it would allow houses to be built in the land consolidation project 
area (e.g., Midden-Delfland Vereniging, 2006).
Although older planning institutions are often considered hierarchical, a 
closer study of the cases showed that some network-oriented elements could 
also be found. In the case of land consolidation in Midden-Delfland, munici-
pal zoning-rights were unaffected. Despite the problem being formulated in 
the central government’s memoranda (WWdL, 1958), the basic ideas for the 
land consolidation project were elaborated locally. Organized in the Midden-
Delfland Study Foundation, local authorities such as municipalities and the 
province determined the outlines of the project and the methods of interven-
tion (see Figure 6.2). Later, the Midden-Delfland Act, made by central govern-
ment, was based on these ideas. During the debate in parliament, the role of 
the public was an important issue (Kreukels, 1980). In the Seventies, the draw-
ing up of plans was influenced by spontaneous “people’s congresses.” Later, 
public participation became more formal during the program phase, with 
public hearings on the separate detailed plans, and appeal procedures. The 
act only laid down broad outlines and procedures; substantial room was left 
for subsequent decision-making at the local level with a central role for the 
Land Consolidation Committee. The Act stated that this committee should be 
formed. This committee, responsible for the entire project was composed of 
representatives from all the parties involved: the municipalities, the province, 
the Farmers Union, the Midden-Delfland Countryside Union, the district wa-
ter board, and the ANWB (the Dutch Automobile Association). This committee 
meant that the process incorporated characteristics of a collaborative plan-
ning process. At the same time, central government arranged for civil serv-
ants, instruments provided by the Act, and most of the budgets. The National 
Buffer Zones were also designated by the central government. In fact, accord-
ing to Kreukels (1980), in an early stage of the process, national resources 
were a reason that local parties involved central government.
A combination of a hierarchical and network-oriented approach can also 
be found in the Bloemendalerpolder project. In that case, the following hier-
archical influences, explained in Section 5.2, were present. Central govern-
ment was involved in the decision to build houses in the polder, and most 
interviewees were convinced that the parliamentary decision on the balance 
between built developments and green area development was the most im-
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portant reason why this balance was not changed during the process. More 
top-down influences were experienced because many non-local public parties 
were involved such as the DLG/BBL, the PPP agency for rural areas, and the 
GOB.
In addition to these hierarchical elements, the Bloemendalerpolder plan-
ning process also contained some network-oriented elements. First of all, the 
involvement of private property developers can be seen as an example of a 
network approach. As discussed in Chapter 5, this involvement had impor-
tant effects on developing the green area on a value-for-money basis. How-
ever, this type of network approach has also been criticized because not all 
parties were equally involved. Therefore, as explained in Section 5.2, the “de-
sign-atelier” was set up to enable people to discuss their ideas and interests 
with spatial planners. In addition to the reasons of increasing legitimacy and 
transparency, an advantage of the introduction of this “design-atelier” was 
that information from local people and interest groups could be used and that 
less resistance was expected during the official planning approval procedures.
The effects of recent decentralization attempts can also be seen in Mid-
den-Delfland. At the time the land consolidation project came to an end, a 
new collaborative planning process was set up. The newly formed municipal-
ity in the green zone, the municipality of Midden-Delfland held a conference 
in a barn attended by representatives from all kind of parties. After the con-
ference, a vision was presented for future physical planning for the area (see 
Figures 1.8 and 5.3). The main theme of this vision was the preservation of 
“grazing cows” for the future. Some of the interviewees complained that the 
ministry had only sent low level bureaucrats. Therefore, they did not expect 
that adequate measures could be taken to implement the vision. They said 
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Figure 6.2 Interim report Midden-Delfland Study Foundation
Source: Stichting onderzoek Midden-Delfland, 1967
that because of limited means, budgets and number of skilled civil servants, 
it cannot be expected that the municipality of Midden-Delfland can take care 
of the green area by itself.
At the same time, the province did not appear to be very eager to take 
measures to preserve Midden-Delfland’s green area (Van Rij, 2006). For ex-
ample, the province stated that because of EU-state-aid regulations, it would 
make no sense to try to preserve the presence of farmers in the area. Al-
though EU-state-aid regulation makes it more difficult to preserve rural land-
scape, the province seemed to underestimate the possibilities. As a con-
sequence, people in the area got the impression that the province was not 
trying hard enough to find solutions.
In the mean time, due to active lobbying by the municipality of Midden-
Delfland, the ideas presented in the vision document found their way to cen-
tral government’s political agenda and became part of the Urgentie programma 
Randstad (Urgency Program for the Randstad) (Ministry V&W, 2007). This docu-
ment stated that Midden-Delfland had been pre-selected for the Nota Ruimte 
budget. Although the consequences of this are not yet clear, it gives the im-
pression that the central government will make financial contributions to the 
green area in Midden-Delfland, which increases the chances that measures 
will be implemented successfully.
Decentralization also characterized the approach to the National Land-
scape Laag Holland. In line with the Nota Ruimte, central government decided 
to organize the National Landscapes in a decentralized way. The local organ-
izing committee (gebiedsbureau), was proud to follow a network-oriented ap-
proach and stated that their plans faced hardly any resistance. During inter-
views, civil servants from the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality, 
who worked as account managers for the National Landscape Laag Holland, 
explained their involvement. In practice, since the policy for the area had 
been determined, these civil servants were not been involved in any meetings 
about Laag Holland for a number of months. Most of their involvement had 
consisted of checking whether the measures to be taken by the province fitted 
the characteristics of the National Landscape as indicated in the Nota Ruimte, 
and preparing the visit of the Minister of Agriculture, Nature and Food Qual-
ity to Laag Holland. Before this visit, they had had to make arrangements to 
make the investment of a small amount of central governments money in a 
controversial land bank possible. This land bank was controversial, because it 
flew in the face of the contemporary idea that governmental land purchase is 
a too drastic and expensive instrument to preserve landscapes. Nevertheless, 
the minister chose to support the land bank because this was an important 
pilot project; the land bank was one of the few institutions that could possi-
bly solve the major problem in Laag Holland, the gap between land prices and 
agricultural incomes and its effect on landscape maintenance (as discussed 
in Chapter 3).
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Differences between the financial contributions made by central govern-
ment to the National Landscape Laag Holland and the land consolidation 
project in Midden-Delfland might illustrate differences in hierarchical influ-
ences. For the period between 2007 and 2013, DLG calculated that €160 mil-
lion will be required to reach the policy goals for the National Landscape Laag 
Holland (Mulder, 2006, p. 16; Provincie Noord-Holland, 2006d, p. 5). However, 
in addition to the investment budget for rural areas which is spent in many 
rural areas, central government only contributed €3.79 million to the Nation-
al Landscape Laag Holland to reach the specific policy goals for the National 
Landscape. Per hectare, per year, central government contributes €10.50 
(€3,790,000 / 7 year / 51,400 ha).
Because some of the national budget for rural areas is also spent in Laag 
Holland, it is more difficult to compare the National Landscape policy in Laag 
Holland with the land consolidation project in Midden-Delfland. Nevertheless, 
a comparison of the amounts spent by central government in both projects il-
lustrates their different character. Unlike the €10.50 spent per year per hectare 
in Laag Holland, in Midden-Delfland €1,010.00 per year per hectare was spent 
(€200,000,000 / 30 year / 6,600 ha). This illustrates the different character of cen-
tral government’s involvement in the land consolidation in Midden-Delfland 
and Laag Holland. Compared to the measures taken in Midden-Delfland, such 
as the purchase of land (sometimes compulsory), land readjustment, and the 
implementation of physical changes, the measures that are being taken in Laag 
Holland are very modest. These include subsidies for the building of four ecolog-
ical cowsheds, an education project for primary schools, and an excursion boat 
(Gebiedsbureau Laag Holland, 2007). Civil servants from the Ministry of Agricul-
ture, Nature and Food Quality were surprised by the small number of projects, 
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Figure 6.3 Vision statement Midden-Delfland®2025
Source: Gemeente Midden-Delfland, 2005
but understood this considering the limited amount of money available.
An example of the possible consequences of decentralizing zoning pow-
ers is the “Living in Waterland” movement (Waterlands wonen) (see also Sec-
tion 8.1.1). This is a discussion on changing bestemmingsplannen within Laag 
Holland in order to make the development of new dwellings possible. The 
board of the National Landscape has no special power and is only allowed 
to give advice. Besides, the municipalities, which often welcome new built 
developments, dominate this board. When the province wanted to make a 
new provincial structure plan, they decided to follow a bottom-up approach. 
They asked the municipalities about their preferences for the new plan. After 
a long period during which no new built developments had been allowed in 
Waterland, the municipalities, like most Dutch municipalities, were eager to 
create new building opportunities. In line with their preferences, the province 
started to calculate the number of houses that could be built. The Nota Ruimte 
stated that in the National Landscapes only built developments were allowed 
that were needed in order to respond to local demographic changes. Based 
on these calculations, the province stated that 6,000 new dwellings could 
be allowed, of which 3,000 could be built on green fields. The province then 
made a study about the places suitable for these developments and, for ex-
ample, selected the very attractive peninsula of Marken (see Figures 1.11, 8.2, 
8.3). Shocked by these plans, public interests groups started to protest and 
wrote a pamphlet called “Green or Cash,” (“Groen of Poen”) (Van Dusseldorp et 
al., 2007, see Figure 6.4). According to them, local governments can not and 
should not decide about plans leading to irreversible damage to the Dutch 
landscape because their vision is limited to municipal borders, local budgets 
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Figure 6.4 Green or Cash, Waterland sacrificed to short-sightedness
Source: Van Dusseldorp et al., 2007; photo: Hans Jansen
and their four-year term. Therefore, the writers of the pamphlet pleaded for 
more central government steering (Van Dusseldorp et al., 2007, p. 5) Members 
of parliament questioned the Minister of Housing, Spatial Planning and the 
Environment (Dutch Lower Chamber, 2005-2006e). It became clear that the old 
status of the area as a National Buffer Zone would most likely be more pro-
tective than the status of National Landscape. No decision has been made on 
the number of new houses to be allowed.
Worries about the likeliness that local parties, especially municipalities, 
will protect and improve metropolitan green area are widespread. A civil serv-
ant from the municipality of Amsterdam stated that the Greater Amsterdam 
Authority is one of the few authorities keen on preserving the countryside 
near Amsterdam in order to make Amsterdam, compared to other large in-
ternational cities, an attractive place for living and business. He was worried 
about the pro-building attitude of the municipalities surrounding Amsterdam 
and the boroughs that together form greater Amsterdam.
Compared to other municipalities, Midden-Delfland’s active open-space 
policy is exceptional. During interviews, people explained that the municipal-
ity’s profile as guardian of open space is more or less the reason that it exists. 
During the process of merging different municipalities in the area into a large 
one, it was decided not to combine the municipalities with large green areas 
with the municipalities with large numbers of greenhouses, in order to avoid 
extension of the greenhouse areas (Figure 6.5 shows an example of a green-
house). If this had not been the case, it is quite likely the municipality would 
also have proposed development for the Midden-Delfland area. The earlier 
mentioned example of the Maaslandsedam points in this direction.
Reasons to combine hierarchical 6.3 
and network-oriented approaches
Despite complaints that planning institutions are outdated and hierarchical, 
a closer look at institutions in the field of spatial planning and land devel-
[ 113 ]
Figure 6.5 Example of a greenhouse in Midden-Delfland
opment shows that, in practice, a combination of hierarchical and network-
oriented elements has often been used. Besides, case studies show that both 
elements have advantages and disadvantages. An analysis of the reasons 
for using or not using hierarchical and network-oriented approaches might 
help to improve institutions for metropolitan green areas. This section first 
describes the reasons for applying network-oriented institutions in general. 
Then, it discusses the effects of hierarchical and network-oriented elements 
on attempts to strengthen green area protection. After that, it examines the 
effects of both elements on the decision whether or not to adjust bestemmings-
plannen for the development of houses in the countryside.
Like other studies discussed at the beginning of this chapter, the cases 
studied in this project showed reasons for applying network-oriented insti-
tutions. Beyond the normative statement that transparent and inclusive net-
work-oriented processes are more democratic (Healey, 1999), applying these 
network-oriented processes might create possibilities for ongoing learning 
(Healey, 2003). In large complex projects, it is often impossible to lay down 
all plans at once. For example during the Midden-Delfland land consolidation 
project, the involvement of many different parties during various phases of 
the process, first in the Midden-Delfland Study Foundation and later in the 
Land Consolidation Committee and the public hearings, made learning pos-
sible. The same can be said of the recent collaborative planning process in 
Midden-Delfland. Despite central government’s policy with their attention to 
nature conservation, the most important issue in Midden-Delfland turned out 
to be the “grazing cows.” In the Bloemendalerpolder, the interactive planning 
processes led to a better trade-off between the costs of specific green area de-
velopments and spatial quality for the new inhabitants. In terms of the model 
described in Chapter 2, network-oriented planning institutions help to devel-
op the type of spatial quality that is preferred by metropolitan inhabitants.
In line with findings from De Bruijn and Ten Heuvelhof (2000), another ad-
vantage of network-oriented processes, often mentioned by civil servants, is 
that the more parties are involved, the more likely they will support the plans. 
During the preparations for the land consolidation in Midden-Delfland, the lo-
cal ideas about combining measures for recreation and agriculture helped the 
subsequent planning and implementation process. Similarly, in the Bloemen-
dalerpolder, it is not likely that property developers would have supported the 
green developments if they had not have been involved in the planning pro-
cess.
Still, it can be questioned whether all parties or only a selected group 
should participate in all stages of a planning process, and whether no hierar-
chical elements are required. Boonstra (2006) stated that closeness and a lack 
of public support makes policy dysfunctional and ineffective. He assumed 
that if actors are involved in the making of plans, and if they agree with them, 
they will implement them, making the planning effective. However, although 
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this might be the case for strategic spatial planning, as will be discussed in 
Chapter 7, this might be different in the case of operational spatial planning 
and land development. In most cases, people who have an interest in an area 
and want to express their wishes in a collaborative process are not the same 
people as those who are likely to invest in the area. It is not likely that private 
parties will voluntarily implement planned activities that are primarily in the 
general interest.
For example in the Bloemendalerpolder, as discussed in Chapter 5, to get 
property developers to contribute to the green area, more was needed than 
an inclusive network-oriented process. In order to make private property de-
velopers contribute to green areas, only land owners were invited to the “de-
sign and calculate process” (see Chapter 5), reducing inclusiveness. This was 
done in order to reduce complexity and build trust. According to network 
management theory, to increase effectiveness, only those stakeholders that 
one needs to be able to implement a certain strategy should be allowed in 
the policy network (Koppejan et al., 1993). Shared image building, developing 
of trust and negotiating financial matters would hardly be possible without 
closeness. Since hierarchical elements were needed to make property devel-
opers contribute financially, the idea that a more network-oriented approach 
and more public support will necessarily make institutions for the protection 
and improvement of metropolitan green areas more effective needs to be put 
into perspective. In the case study areas, implementing plans required not 
only spatial planning institutions but also land development institutions (see 
Chapter 7). Especially with the latter institutions, it seems that hierarchical 
elements play an important role in their effectiveness (see also Røsnes, 2005).
This also gives some perspective on the idea that decentralization is al-
ways required. As discussed in Chapter 5, in the Bloemendalerpolder case hi-
erarchical elements were needed, such as the GOB, to coordinate among the 
various public parties. In order to address private parties who accuse their 
public partners of being a multi-headed monster (Koppejan, 2005), some au-
thority is needed to smoothen the interaction between public parties. The in-
volvement of the province, the DLG/BBL and the GOB and the parliamentary 
decision on the amount of green area, played a crucial role in empowering 
the public parties during their negotiations with the private parties.
Another argument against decentralization is that central government’s 
resources are often needed to implement plans. For example, in Midden-Delf-
land, it was crucial that the central government provided funding and had 
a substantial number of civil servants available. In this light, for example in 
the case of the new Land Consolidation Act, decentralization might hamper 
implementation. Although decentralizing powers to the province might result 
in a policy that is more suitable for local circumstances, the question remains 
whether the provinces will have enough means to translate policy objectives 
into a workable implementation (Van Rij & Zevenbergen, 2005). Decompart-
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mentalization and decentralization of money might be positive, but it could 
also mean that the ministers and civil servants concerned lose attention for 
the policy field, and could mean that the financial resources they pass on to 
the provinces decrease too.
A practical example of decentralization going hand in hand with reduced 
government budgets can be found in Midden-Delfland. During the land con-
solidation, after the plan-making phase, the involvement of central govern-
ment and the province was reduced. After that, they tried to decrease their 
financial contributions as well. Later, during the collaborative process in the 
barn, the lack of involvement of high ranking civil servants made people 
skeptical about the availability of money to implement the plans. Only after 
the area was put on central government’s Urgency Program for the Randstad 
did it seem more likely that resources would be made available.
The measures taken in the National Landscape Laag Holland also fit this 
picture. Despite the name National Landscape, the implementation of this 
policy is decentralized to the province and the municipalities. As in other de-
centralized, network-oriented settings, the measures implemented as part of 
the National Landscape policy were very modest. Not surprisingly, when some 
hierarchical influences were felt during the visit to the area by the Minister of 
Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality, the chance for some more far-reaching 
measures occurred.
Decentralization combined with the statements about the cross-subsidy 
approach in the Nota Ruimte also show some of the risks involved. Difficult 
tasks, like executing a cross-subsidy approach, can be decentralized. In such 
cases, on paper, these policy goals still seem to be important. However, decen-
tralization combined with decentralized financing might reduce the chance 
that these policies will be implemented. One of the risks involved in decen-
tralization is that tasks are delegated to local authorities without providing 
them with appropriate funds and institutions to implement them.
Another problem of over-decentralization is that it might be difficult for lo-
cal authorities to implement decisions that have negative consequences for 
the region. This problem occurs especially when the general interest is not 
the same as the local interest. For example, according to De Vries and De Regt 
(2004), the Rotterdam region lacks recreational areas. However, measures to 
safeguard and increase the amount of green area suitable for recreation can 
be against the interests of local farmers. In the Midden-Delfland Land Consol-
idation Project, hierarchical elements were necessary to break through stale-
mates, such as moving individual farmers from an area designated for nature 
and recreation to another area, as they were not all willing to cooperate vol-
untarily. Only central government was able to create specific new legislation 
on compulsory purchase and land reallocation. In such cases, without deci-
sions from a higher authority, measures to protect and improve large scale 
recreational areas might not have had much effect.
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Decentralization might also have an effect on changes to bestemmingsplan-
nen that make new built developments possible. In contrast with the enthusi-
asm in the planning literature for decentralized network-oriented approaches, 
Dutch legal experts have expressed their concern about leaving the preser-
vation of nature conservation sites and precious landscapes in the hands of 
municipalities since Dutch municipalities have a tendency to welcome new 
built development (Van Buuren, 2002). The “Living in Waterland” movement 
illustrates this. As long as the decision on building in Laag Holland was left in 
the hands of the municipalities and indirectly with the province, it was likely 
that houses would be built in the countryside of Laag Holland. This was only 
countered by central government due to parliamentary interference. In the 
Bloemendalerpolder case as well, parliamentary decisions limited the number 
of new houses. Attempts by the municipality of Midden-Delfland to strength-
en the green countryside have often been mentioned to show that local gov-
ernments can safeguard the countryside. However, considering the special 
position of this municipality after the regrouping of municipalities, Midden-
Delfland can be seen as an exception to the rule. Besides, the municipality 
of Midden-Delfland’s intention to build houses at the Maaslandsedam, in line 
with provincial cross-subsidy policy, makes me qualify the statement that lo-
cal government, such as Midden-Delfland, will safeguard the countryside.
Various examples have illustrated that, although most projects to protect 
and improve metropolitan green areas take place in dynamic and complex 
environments, a fully decentralized, network-oriented approach might not 
contribute to increasing spatial quality, efficiency and effectiveness. The Bloe-
mendalerpolder and the land consolidation in Midden-Delfland illustrated the 
need, over the course of the project, to reduce complexity, and they illustrated 
the usefulness of institutions able to deal with the different interests of the 
many parties involved in the project. Therefore, in line with Mintzberg (1983), 
due to the hostile exogenous factors and in order to reduce the complexity of 
planning processes, planning processes require hierarchical elements too.
Conclusion6.4 
The aim of this chapter was to discuss whether and under what circumstanc-
es a shift from a hierarchical towards a network-oriented approach is pref-
erable. First of all, in practice, older, supposedly outmoded planning institu-
tions turned out to contain both hierarchical and network-oriented elements. 
A detailed examination of institutions illustrated how a combination of both 
elements helps democratic and effective protection and improvement of met-
ropolitan green areas.
This can be explained in terms of the model described in Chapter 2. In or-
der to get public support for an area, it is important that the area’s physical 
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appearance fits the ideas about spatial quality that the people who use the 
area have. To learn about their ideas, a network approach for plan making 
might be useful. Besides, a network approach might help to make plans more 
acceptable for the guardians of the landscape. To implement projects and 
make changes to zoning and the landownership situation, measures taken by 
higher levels of government are important. In order to make representatives 
from central government enthusiastic about plans, it might be helpful to in-
volve them in the plan making process. These top-down influences might also 
strengthen the general public’s belief that the plans will be implemented.
Important reasons to choose for a transparent and inclusive network-ori-
ented process are that it is democratic, it enables learning, and it can raise 
public support. Such an approach is suitable for the plan-making phase, when 
it is decided what should be planned where. If land development institutions 
and physical changes to the landscape are considered, however, a fully bot-
tom-up approach might have some pitfalls. Hierarchical elements might con-
tribute to the effectiveness of projects, especially when specific parties do not 
have an interest in all the elements of the project. Hierarchical elements can 
help to make public participants speak with one voice and make negotiation 
with a reduced number of private parties more effective. Since local interests 
are not always the same as more general interests, the involvement of central 
government could contribute to the protection and improvement of metro-
politan green areas. One of the most important reasons for involving higher 
levels of government is that physical measures and changes to the landown-
ership situation often require substantial budgets, civil servants, authority 
and adequate institutions. Although, at first glance it would appear that only 
operational land developers need these hierarchical influences for successful 
implementation, spatial planners might also consider involving higher levels 
of government during the planning phase, as this might increase the chance 
that central government will make resources available. Besides, given the fi-
nancial and organization structure of Dutch government, it is more likely that 
central government will decide not to allow more construction in new land-
use plans than that local governments will.
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Spatial planning and 7 
land development
This chapter discusses tensions between (1) measures a planning agency 
takes to influence spatial disposition and to achieve a coherent distribution 
of land uses (referred to as spatial planning) and (2) the production of serviced 
plots for specific land uses (referred to as land development). Strategic spa-
tial planning, operational spatial planning and land development use different 
worldviews or rationalities. Since spatial quality requires a combination of a 
zoning-oriented planning system on the one hand, and land development in 
order to facilitate development on the other hand (Korthals Altes, 2007; Siraa 
et al., 1995, p. 29), conflicts caused by these different rationalities can cause 
problems. For example, Henneberry (2005) stated that large parts of the British 
planning profession hold the view that planning is an end in itself, and Adams 
(2005) stated that the near-neglect of property rights remains a severe weak-
ness of much of the British planning system. At present, the interaction be-
tween spatial planning and land development and between the strategic and 
operational level is especially interesting because, as discussed in Chapter 3 
and elsewhere, the restructuring of the welfare state makes it necessary to ad-
just coordination mechanisms within spatial planning and land development.
This chapter fulfils two functions. Chapter 3 explained that both spatial 
planning and land development have an important impact on landscape 
changes, and this chapter examines the differences between spatial planning 
and land development rationalities to help understand the contemporary 
problems facing the landscape. Second, understanding spatial planning and 
land development rationalities can help institutional change; new institutions 
are more likely to be successful if they fit the basic principles of these ration-
alities. This chapter thus provides a basis for Chapter 8, which deals with 
institutional change. Since rationalities are rooted in a context, the method 
used to discuss rationalities within the Dutch institutional framework was in-
spired by discourse analysis (see Chapter 1).
This chapter addresses the differences between spatial planning and land 
development and between the strategic and operational level. To discuss this 
issue, I constructed an operational and strategic spatial planning-land de-
velopment matrix (see Section 7.1.); in Section 7.2, I discuss the roots of the 
rationalities within the Dutch planning tradition. Section 7.3 illustrates how 
mono-rationality can result in a limited understanding of landscape problems. 
Section 7.4 gives examples of problems facing institutional change caused by 
tensions between public interests and private rights.
The operational and strategic spatial 7.1 
planning-land development matrix
The model presented in Chapter 2 relates spatial quality, the implementation 
of physical measures, zoning, land prices, and ownership situation. In that 
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way, it combines spatial planning and land development issues. As discussed 
in Chapters 2, 3 and 6, it emerged from the case studies that money and le-
gally binding stipulations, subjects concerning operational land development 
and operational spatial planning, have a considerable influence on spatial 
quality, the main concern in strategic spatial planning. In order to explain the 
interaction between spatial planning and land development, I made a model, 
Figure 7.1, which not only distinguishes spatial planning and land develop-
ment, but also distinguishes a strategic and an operational level.
Depending on one’s perspective, land development can be considered a 
part of planning, or planning can be considered a part of land development; 
land development can be considered the implementation phase of a planning 
process, or planning, like other activities such as land acquisition, reparcella-
tion and physical changes to the environment, can be seen as one of the ac-
tivities that together form the land development process. Following the idea 
of polyrationality, the idea that we can experience other rationalities and lis-
ten to different voices as soon as we let go of our own rationality a bit (Davy, 
2007), this dissertation treats both fields on an equal basis.
The operational and strategic spatial planning-land development matrix 
distinguishes four groups: strategic spatial planning, operational spatial plan-
ning, operational land development and strategic land development. In order 
to distinguish spatial planning from land development, in line with Needham 
(2000, p. 444), the concept of spatial planning is restricted to those cases in 
which a planning agency tries to influence many different aspects of the spa-
tial disposition of a particular area to achieve a coherent distribution of land 
uses and activities. This dissertation defines land development as the produc-
tion of serviced plots for specific land uses. Basically, these measures concern 
land ownership and the implementation of physical measures. Land develop-
ment often refers to the implementation of one of the specific aspects, sec-
tor interests, covered by spatial planning. Although land development is often 
considered operational, and planning is often thought of as strategic planning, 
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both planning and land development can take place on a strategic and an op-
erational level. On the strategic level, general policy is formulated. On the op-
erational level, concrete actions are undertaken that have an effect on specific 
pieces of land and specific land owners.
Strategic spatial planning
When the literature refers to spatial planning, this is frequently strategic spa-
tial planning (e.g., Faludi, 1989); strategic spatial planning coordinates projects 
and measures taken by various actors. Strategic plans are often indicative; 
communicative tools are used to coordinate among actors. Strategic spatial 
planning generally takes place at the regional and national level. Figure 7.2 il-
lustrates one of the most important strategic spatial planning concepts in the 
Netherlands, the Randstad (WWdL, 1958).
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Figure 7.2 The Randstad with the National Buffer Zones
Source: WWdL, 1958
A practical example of Dutch strategic spatial planning would be the mak-
ing of a new memorandum on space. Korthals Altes (1995) described how the 
Ministry of Spatial Planning mediated the demands of the various sector de-
partments such as the ministries concerned with transport, agriculture and 
economic affairs when preparing a new memorandum. In the Netherlands, 
this type of planning worked; sector departments generally acted in accord-
ance with the basic principles of the strategic plans because they had been 
actively involved in preparing the plans, because they needed the plans to 
make sure that the land was allocated according to their departments’ in-
terests, and because the information provided by the plans was valuable for 
them (Korthals Altes, 1995). Section 4.5 suggested that it might also matter 
that these departments belong to the same entity, the government.
In the case studies, the effect of strategic spatial planning was experienced 
in different ways. Strategic spatial planning documents provided the basic 
planning concepts that guided the most important measures applied in the 
case study areas, such as the National Buffer Zone concept (see Figure 7.2). 
These concepts influenced the measures that were taken by the sector de-
partments and the budgets available for these measures. The influences of 
strategic spatial planning can be explained in terms of the model presented 
in Chapter 2; in a sometimes derived way, strategic spatial planning can in-
fluence available governmental budgets, decisions to adjust zoning, and deci-
sions to implement physical measures.
Operational spatial planning
Operational spatial planning influences land uses on specific pieces of land. 
Since much land is privately owned and most planning is enforced by pub-
lic parties, operational spatial planning involves the government imposing 
rules on private parties. Private parties with an interest in new plans are of-
ten involved in the making of those plans. The type of parties involved differs 
between strategic spatial planning and operational spatial planning: strate-
gic spatial planning generally involves coordination between different parts 
of the government, whereas operational spatial planning is about influencing 
the land uses of public and private parties.
In the case study areas, as in the rest of the Netherlands, operational spa-
tial planning centers round the bestemmingsplan. This is a planning document 
made by the municipality which determines the type of land use allowed on 
every parcel of land. In the Netherlands, the Government Service for Rural 
Areas (Dienst Landelijk Gebied/Bureau Beheer Landbouwgronden: DLG/BBL) also 
makes operational spatial plans in the case of land consolidation projects. 
Municipalities incorporate these plans in their bestemmingsplannen. The deter-
minations made in bestemmingsplannen have a direct effect on private prop-
erty rights. In the case studies, potential changes to these plans played an 
important role. For example, the possibility that a new bestemmingsplan might 
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allow construction can cause land prices to increase. In terms of the model 
presented in Chapter 2, operational spatial planning through bestemmingsplan-
nen is one of the most important zoning measures in the Netherlands.
Operational land development
Operational land development influences spatial quality by changing land 
ownership and implementing physical measures. It involves land transactions, 
implementing physical changes, and land reallocation. Financial matters play 
an important role here. Civil servants concerned with land development can 
come from various backgrounds, such as law, land-economics, geodetic engi-
neering, or civil engineering. They make contracts, develop schedules for land 
development activities, and create land servicing budgets. Their contact with 
private parties differs from that of people working for planning departments. 
Land developers make one-to-one agreements that also deal with financial 
aspects.
In general, land development is executed by sector departments imple-
menting sector policy or by the restates departments of the municipalities 
working on new building sites. The case studies revealed many examples of 
land development measures: the acquisition of land by DLG/BBL, the making 
of an agreement between the public and private parties in the Bloemendaler-
polder, and the implementation of physical measures to create a recreational 
area. In terms of the model presented in Chapter 2, land development aims 
at changing the landownership situation and carrying out work to improve 
spatial quality.
Strategic land development
Although most land development takes place at an operational level, there are 
examples of strategic land development. For example, the Ministry of Agricul-
ture, Nature and Food Quality developed a policy on the price that the govern-
ment will pay when acquiring agricultural land (e.g., Ministry LNV, 2008; Raad 
Landelijk Gebied, 2008), and the Ministry of Finance formulated a policy for 
the management of land ownership by the different ministries (e.g., Interde-
partementaal beleidsonderzoek, 2006). Because most land development takes 
place on an operational level, this chapter does not discuss strategic land de-
velopment separately.
Roots of Dutch spatial planning and 7.2 
land development rationalities
Rationalities are rooted in a context. To understand the difference between 
planning and land development on an operational and strategic level and the 
different rationalities behind them, it is important to understand the theoret-
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ical and practical context in which these differences have been discussed and 
elaborated in the Netherlands. Dutch theories on sector and facet planning 
and on planning and implementation are used to illustrate how different ra-
tionalities, using different criteria, could develop here.
In the Netherlands, facet planning is used to coordinate land use issues 
between policy sectors. This section first discusses Dutch ideas on the dis-
tinction between sector and facet in order to illustrate the difference between 
spatial planning and land development. After that, the distinction between (1) 
allocation of land uses, (2) construction, (3) maintenance, and (4) availability 
(De Haan et al., 1986, p. 272) is used to explain differences between operation-
al spatial planning and operational land development. After that, these dis-
tinctions are used to discuss central norms within strategic spatial planning, 
operational spatial planning, and operational land development.
As in other countries, the Dutch administration recognizes different sec-
tors such as agriculture, transport and housing. The ministries and their de-
partments are organized on the basis of this division into sectors. These sec-
tor departments implement most of the strategic spatial plans. Healey (1999) 
stated that many sectoral policy communities, with their focus on particular 
functions or topics such as economic development, housing and agriculture, 
have developed as isolated bastions. Topics such as spatial planning require 
that these sectors be coordinated. This type of coordination has been called 
facet planning (Dutch Lower Chamber, 1970-1971; De Haan & Fernhout, 1981; 
De Haan et al., 1986). As Priemus (1996) explained, physical planning is “facet 
policy,” which seeks to spatially integrate a number of policy sectors, among 
them Transport & Public Works, Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisher-
ies, Economic Affairs, and Housing and the Environment. Other types of facet 
planning, such as economic planning and social planning, have been present-
ed in the literature, though in practice they have not been elaborated as thor-
oughly (De Haan & Fernhout, 1981; De Haan et al., 1986).
The concept of facet planning can illustrate strategic spatial planning’s at-
titude towards government expenditure. Priemus (1996, p. 152) explained that 
in the strict sense, strategic spatial planning can be regarded as coordination 
requiring little or no expenditure, since the largest expenditure relevant to 
spatial planning takes place in the sectors that implement the policy. This has 
been considered an advantage for spatial planning. Because the cost of im-
plementing strategic spatial planning goals is very high, the planning depart-
ment would never have enough money. Since the planning department does 
not have the money to implement the planning goals, it is clear that other 
departments are expected to implement the policy (Hajer & Zonneveld, 2000).
Since spatial planning has been considered a separate type of facet plan-
ning from economic planning, spatial planning should be based on spatial-
ly relevant arguments, rather than economic or environmental ones. This is 
reflected in Article 10 of the Dutch Spatial Planning Act, which states that a 
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bestemmingsplan may only contain stipulations needed for a good spatial or-
der. Consequentially, stipulations in a bestemmingplan may only be based on 
spatially relevant (ruimtelijk relevante) arguments. For example, a municipality 
is not allowed to sell its planning power to the highest bidder or to demand 
disproportional contributions from developers in exchange for a new bestem-
mingsplan.
In practice, a terminology has developed to explain the spatial relevance 
of what appear at first sight to be economic arguments. For example, a mu-
nicipality is permitted to defend its choice not to change the bestemmingsplan 
to allow construction if a developer does not contribute to public facilities fi-
nancially, by arguing that implementing the plan is not financially possible. In 
this case, the financial impossibility of implementing the plan is considered 
to be a spatially relevant argument.
To understand the different type of norms used within land development, 
this dissertation uses De Haan et al.’s (1986, p. 272) distinction between (1) al-
location of land uses, (2) construction, (3) maintenance, and (4) availability ([1] 
bestemming, [2] inrichting, [3] beheer, [4] beschikking). Although many definitions 
have been given about planning and its relation to implementation (for Dutch 
examples see De Haan & Fernhout, 1981; Dutch Lower Chamber, 1970-1971; 
Kreukels, 1980), De Haan et al.’s (1986) distinction between strategic planning 
and implementation is relevant because it can help to explain the different 
norms in spatial planning and land development. “Allocation of land uses” re-
fers to the different plans described in the Spatial Planning Act that deter-
mine the activities which may take place on the land (De Haan et al., 1986, 
p. 272). “Construction” and “maintenance” refer to physical measures such as 
contract work. “Availability” refers to how the property rights to the land can 
be made available for the activities that are planned on the land, for exam-
ple by means of purchase by the government or land reallocation (De Haan et 
al., 1986, p. 274). In the Dutch administrative system, “allocation of land uses” 
is taken care of separately by spatial planning departments (ruimtelijke orden-
ing). “Construction, maintenance and availability” are often referred to as land 
development, and are taken care of by sector departments or the municipal 
estates departments.
This enables different departments to use different norms. Those depart-
ments concerned with construction, maintenance and availability can imple-
ment these plans based on the idea that implementation should be effective 
and efficient in line with the Dutch system for Policy Budgets and Policy Ac-
countability (Van Beleidsbegroting Tot Beleidsverantwoording, VBTB) (e.g., IOFEZ, 
2004). On the other hand, since one of the norms of spatial planning is that 
spatial planning decisions should not be made on the basis of a government’s 
interest as a private party buying and selling land and making contracts to 
implement planning, spatial planning departments can plan on the basis of 
spatially relevant (ruimtelijk relevante) arguments, as discussed earlier. Regard-
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ing planning as policy preparation can help us understand why spatial plan-
ning is led by norms such as a “good spatial order” and legitimate plan-mak-
ing instead of efficient and effective implementation.
Consequences of mono-7.3 
rational approaches
Chapters 2 and 3 were written to increase the understanding of problems 
with respect to green landscapes in metropolitan areas and ways to deal 
with them. Basically, these chapters combined knowledge on problems and 
solutions from spatial planning and land development. To illustrate that this 
knowledge is often not combined, this chapter gives examples of what can 
happen when a mono-rational approach is used instead of a poly-rational 
one.
“Farmland that will become vacant”7.3.1 
The debate about “farmland that will become vacant” (vrijkomende landbouw-
gronden) illustrates how a mono-rational approach to strategic spatial plan-
ning can hinder the improvement of spatial quality. The assumption that 
farmland will become vacant and will turn into nature has often been ex-
pressed in the Dutch strategic spatial planning debate (Pols et al., 2005; Frou-
ws, 1998). The former Chief Government Architect, Crouwel, spoke of land 
that will become vacant since there is less need to safeguard national agricul-
tural production and to produce agricultural products near densely populated 
areas (e.g., Hulsman, 2007). The question then becomes what the appropriate 
types of future land use will be. In the eyes of Crouwel, central government 
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Figure 7.3 Farmer in the Midden-Delfland region who does not work 
competitively
lacks vision in this matter, and this is the problem; instead, the government 
should have an idea which of the areas that will become vacant will be zoned 
as recreational areas and which will be reserved for new types of agriculture 
(Hulsman, 2007).
On an operational level, in the case study areas, people did not speak about 
“farmland that will become vacant”. In fact, Van der Kamp, Midden-Delfland’s 
alderman, expressed his worries about this way of reasoning. He acknowl-
edged that some farmers in the region do not work competitively (see Figure 
7.3). However, he was worried that people might think that the conversion of 
agricultural land to nature will take place autonomously, and since there are 
bestemmingsplannen, no other action will be needed to preserve metropolitan 
green areas (see Figure 7.4). In that case, people might forget that the land 
has a value and that the land is owned by people. Chapters 2 and 3 discussed 
the importance of ownership, maintenance and land prices for the protection 
and improvement of green metropolitan landscapes.
The debate about “farmland that will become vacant” illustrates how 
strategic spatial planning is concerned with facet aspects and is not con-
cerned with “construction, maintenance and availability”, which can cause 
the strategic spatial planning debate to disregard such topics as land prices, 
landownership and maintenance costs, all of which play an important role 
in operational land development. Disregarding these aspects can help to cre-
ate ideas about ideal types of land use. However, it also distracts attention 
from the landscape problems which were discussed earlier, such as the cost 
of maintaining the landscape and the financial position of farmers. In that 
way, it might actually hinder the protection and improvement of spatial qual-
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Figure 7.4 Conversion of agricultural land to this kind of nature conservation sites will not take place 
autonomously
ity. Awareness of operational aspects can help to understand problems asso-
ciated with green metropolitan landscapes and can help to find ways to deal 
with them.
The effect of cross-subsidy approaches  7.3.2 
on land prices
The effect of cross-subsidy approaches on land prices illustrates how insuf-
ficient knowledge of land development topics can cause spatial planning de-
cisions to become counterproductive. As explained in Chapter 5, a planning 
decision to welcome some cross-subsidy approaches intended to improve the 
quality of green areas can cause land prices to increase in a large area and by 
doing so can threaten the future for farmers. In turn, this can affect the qual-
ity of metropolitan green areas. If people expect that built developments will 
be allowed, land prices tend to rise and high land prices make it difficult for 
farmers to buy new land to begin farming or to enlarge a farm. This is an ex-
ample of a spatial planning decision with unwanted consequences because it 
did not take land development aspects such as land prices into consideration.
A cross-subsidy approach combines strategic spatial planning (for exam-
ple, the general decision to apply cross-subsidy strategies in the Nota Ruimte, 
Ministry VROM et al., 2004), operational spatial planning (for example, adjust-
ments to Bestemmingsplannen), and operational land development (for exam-
ple agreements with developers). By doing so, it breaks through traditional 
distinctions of sector and facet planning and “allocation of land uses, con-
struction, maintenance and availability” principles. When considering large 
institutional changes, a thorough examination of the effects of the change 
using a poly-rational approach might help to reduce the risk of unintended 
side effects.
Mismatch between strategic and collaboratively 7.3.3 
made plans and operational resources
For operational spatial planning and land development, financial resources 
and the governmental power to limit private property rights are important 
tools to influence spatial quality. If strategic spatial planning takes a mono-
rational approach, only focussing on spatially relevant aspects, it might pay to 
little attention to the availability of resources at the operational level. As dis-
cussed in Chapters 3, 5 and 6, decentralization and privatization might reduce 
the availability of resources at the operational level. A mismatch between 
strategic and collaboratively made plans and operational resources might af-
fect the working of strategic spatial planning.
Chapter 6 discussed the problem of collaboratively made decisions that 
lack funding and appropriate institutions to implement them. For example, 
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the mismatch between the budgets for the National Landscape and the aims 
of the Nota Ruimte illustrates this problem (Mulder, 2006). The large number of 
green projects that, according to the Nota Ruimte, should be funded by cross-
subsidy strategies (Ministry VROM et al., 2004; see also Chapter 5) is another 
example of planners making plans which have little chance of implementa-
tion.
Planning processes designed with the coordinating principles of strategic 
spatial planning in mind run the risk of not being implemented on an op-
erational level because of a lack of resources. The idea that if local parties 
have a real say in the planning process, the plans will be voluntarily imple-
mented can lead to the idea that no financial resources or binding regulations 
are needed. Although coordination without binding regulation and without fi-
nancial resources might work for strategic spatial planning, it might not work 
sufficiently on the operational level. All in all, when approaches used within 
strategic facet planning to coordinate sector departments, are used for opera-
tional coordination, these coordination mechanisms might be less effective.
The aim of planning7.3.4 
The last sections gave examples of coordination mechanisms used in strate-
gic spatial planning, operational spatial planning and operational land devel-
opment. Section 4.5 discussed different theoretical notions regarding plan-
ning. This section links these notions to the rationalities introduced in this 
chapter.
Alexander (2001a; 2001b) defined the aim of planning as the provision of 
information to reduce uncertainties in order to facilitate the market. The 
working of plans through providing information might suggest that on an op-
erational level, like strategic spatial planning, providing information is suffi-
cient to coordinate parties who voluntarily act according to the plan. However, 
in operational spatial planning, in the case study areas, planning was basical-
ly experienced through zoning. More precisely, this was through the bestem-
mingsplannen, the most important land-use plans in the Netherlands. These 
determined the types of land uses that were allowed. As discussed in Section 
4.5, one of the aims of these institutions is to safeguard the green amenities 
of the land for public use. This requires non-voluntary coordination mecha-
nisms, such as legally binding rules. Examining the reasons why parties act 
according to the information provided by plans illustrates the basic difference 
between the ways strategic spatial planning influences society and the way 
operational spatial planning and land development influences it.
Earlier chapters already explained why the protection and improvement of 
metropolitan green areas requires a combination of strategic and operational 
levels, and why it requires both binding and non-binding plans. Chapter 6 ex-
plained the need to combine network-oriented, communicative coordination 
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mechanisms with hierarchical and legally-binding coordination mechanisms 
such as bestemmingsplannen. In line with Chapter 5, since private parties tend 
to act according to their interests, in the case of cross-subsidy strategies, le-
gally binding coordination mechanisms such as signed agreements and bind-
ing land-use plans are needed to support a joint vision. This requires strategic 
spatial planning, operational spatial planning and land development.
As discussed in Chapter 4, these considerations on the aim of planning 
have consequences for the relation between spatial planning and the need for 
budgets to compensate those parties whose land uses are being restricted. Fi-
nancial resources for compensation did not have to be considered when plan-
ning was limited to strategic spatial planning coordinating different sectors 
in line with the concept of facet planning. However, when operational spatial 
planning and operational land development are used to provide non-traded 
goods to the public, it becomes clear why binding regulations and budgets for 
compensation might be needed. This might explain why mismatches between 
strategic and collaboratively-made plans and operational resources might oc-
cur.
Overstretched use of strategic 7.3.5 
spatial planning rationalities
The examples discussed above illustrate how the use of strategic spatial plan-
ning rationalities can be overstretched. This might lead to insufficient consid-
eration of operational land development problems and to the idea that co-
ordination mechanisms used in strategic spatial planning can also be used 
in operational situations. This might cause institutional and landscape prob-
lems to be overlooked and unfruitful trajectories for institutional change to 
be elaborated.
Since strategic spatial planning is considered to be facet planning in the 
Netherlands, it should be based on spatially relevant considerations. Unlike 
operational spatial planning and land development, strategic spatial plan-
ning does not generally depend on binding regulations or financial resources 
needed to compensate or persuade others to implement plans. Strategic spa-
tial planning can work within this frame since it basically coordinates among 
different facets, different ministries.
On the other hand, operational spatial planning and land development are 
confronted with concrete private rights. Therefore, especially in the case of 
operational land development, there is every reason to consider private own-
ership rights, land prices and budgets for maintenance. However, if these as-
pects are not considered at the strategic level, this might lead to insufficient 
understanding of the problems that affect the landscape, which might in turn 
hamper institutional change. Unawareness of the importance of binding regu-
lations and budgets for compensation might contribute to this. Therefore, the 
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improvement of institutions for green landscapes in metropolitan areas re-
quires a poly-rational approach.
Institutional change and tensions between 7.4 
public interest and private rights
One of the core issues in debates on institutional change in spatial planning 
and land development is the tension between the public interest and private 
property rights. To protect spatial quality and improve the effectiveness and 
efficiency of land development institutions, less strong protection of private 
property rights might be welcomed. However, as discussed in Section 7.1, ra-
tionalities in the field of land development have always been concerned with 
the protection of private property rights. Since these rationalities are part of 
what Williamson (1998) called the institutional level of embeddedness (see Ta-
ble 8.1), it might influence the possibilities to change many other institutions. 
This section examines examples where tensions between public interest and 
private rights influenced institutional changes. This illustrates differences 
between the rationalities and might help to understand which institutional 
changes are more likely to be implemented or take place and which not. It 
also illustrates why incremental institutional change might be a more useful 
approach than radical institutional change (this will be further discussed in 
Chapter 8).
Compensation: zoning versus 7.4.1 
compulsory purchase
Tensions between the public interest and private rights are one of the main 
issues when institutional changes in planning and land development are dis-
cussed (e.g., Ploeger & Groetelaers, 2007; Van der Pot et al., 1995, p. 317). To 
illustrate how different rationalities deal with this, this section will discuss 
basic ideas on compensation for changes to bestemmingsplannen and compul-
sory purchase.
The protection of fundamental or human rights, including the protection 
of private property rights, basically concern protection from the state (Van der 
Pot et al., 1995). Article 14 of the Dutch Constitution and Article 1, Protocol No. 
1 of the European Convention on Human Rights guarantee the Fundamental 
Right to Property. Chapter 8 deals with institutional change and will discuss 
the necessity of secure property rights for the functioning of economic and 
legal systems; only if property rights are sufficiently secured against powerful 
parties, such as the state, will people invest in property and can an economy 
be established.
The protection of the right to property dominates Dutch compulsory pur-
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chase legislation. The Dutch constitution, founded in 1848, explicitly prohibits 
unlawful expropriation (Article 14). It contains no mention of the general right 
to property, since this is considered self-evident. According to Van Buuren et 
al. (2002, p. 113), it is also self evident that, due to the far-reaching charac-
ter of compulsory purchase, strict rules are needed to protect the party who 
is forced to sell. Therefore, compulsory purchase legislation contains strict 
conditions for the application of compulsory purchase and it states that full 
compensation must be paid (Van Buuren et al., 2002; Van der Pot et al., 1995). 
For example, this legislation determines that a civil judge can determine the 
amount that is to be compensated with the help of an expert committee (Ar-
ticle 27, Compulsory Purchase Act (Onteigeningswet).
Unlike compensation in the case of compulsory purchase, which is based 
on individual property rights, collective interests are more important in the 
debate on compensation when changes are made to bestemmingsplannen. It 
has even been suggested that spatial planning institutions have eroded the 
constitutional stipulation on expropriation (Van der Pot et al., 1995, p. 317). 
Examining the rationalities behind legislation on compensation for changes 
in bestemmingsplannen can help to explain these differences.
One of the basic ideas here is the legal principle of “égalité devant les char-
ges publiques” (the equal bearing of public burdens). In the Netherlands, this 
principle is explained in the following way: the burdens that go with a certain 
governmental decision may not burden an individual or a specific group sub-
stantially more than others (Van Wijk et al., 1997). In the Dutch debate on the 
entitlement to compensation due to changes in bestemmingsplannen, the fol-
lowing passage from the explanatory memorandum to Article 49 of the Spa-
tial Planning Act on compensation (Dutch Lower Chamber, 1955-1956, p. 18, 
original Dutch text can be found in Appendix B) has often been used (Van Bu-
uren et al., 2002, pp. 253-268): “Damage caused by bestemmingsplannen is al-
ways damage caused by limitations to the freedom of individual citizens. The 
government does not have to pay damages if these limitations to the freedom 
of individual citizens do not exceed the realization of the limitation of free-
dom due to the fact that citizens live together on a small surface. This limi-
tation can be considered to burden all citizens equally. However, it is possi-
ble that measures need to be taken that limit individual freedom more. Then, 
there are grounds for compensation. The administrative judge will address 
this as a “disproportionate burden.”
This example illustrates tensions between public interest and private 
rights and also illustrates the differences between compensation in the case 
of compulsory purchase and compensation in the case of changes to bestem-
mingsplannen. In the case of changes to bestemmingsplannen, not all damage 
has to be compensated, only a disproportionate burden. Although the enti-
tlement to compensation has been extended in recent decades, far from all 
citizens who suffer damage due to bestemmingsplannen receive compensation 
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(Van Buuren et al., 2002, p. 256). For example, the new Dutch Spatial Planning 
Act states that damage within the sphere of normal risk in a society (normaal 
maatschappelijk risico) should not be compensated (Article 6.2.1 Wro). The act 
specifies this by stating that, except in a few specific cases, damage less than 
two percent of the value of the damaged good will not be compensated (Arti-
cle 6.2.2. Wro). Additionally, unlike the civil law judge who can determine the 
amount of compensation, the administrative judge only decides whether the 
effects of a certain governmental decision burden an individual or a specific 
group too much, using a limited juridical review to examine the municipal-
ity’s decision on the amount of compensation (Van Wijk et al., 1997, p. 369).
These examples on compensation illustrate how the balance between pub-
lic interest and private rights can be interpreted differently. In the case of 
compulsory purchase, the debate on compensation centers around the idea of 
fully protecting individual property rights, whereas one of the leading princi-
ples in the debate on compensation for changes in bestemmingsplannen is that 
people have shared interests in planning and that living in a densely popu-
lated country entails some burdens, with or without planning.
Transaction Cost Theory (see Chapter 4) can help to explain why the 
Dutch rationalities on compensation might lead to efficiency. Compensation 
involves transaction costs such as the costs associated with estimating the 
amounts to be compensated, the costs of civil servants dealing with the re-
quest for compensation, and the costs of legal procedures. Basically, three sit-
uations can be identified when a change in zoning results in a public benefit 
and individual damage:
Public benefit < individual damage1. 
The public benefit of a planning decision is smaller than the individual 
damage it would cause.
Public benefit > individual damage > transaction costs compensation2. 
The public benefit of a planning decision is larger than the individual dam-
age it would cause, and this individual damage is larger than the transac-
tion costs involved in compensating it.
Public benefit > transaction costs compensation > individual damage3. 
The public benefit of a planning decision is larger than the individual dam-
age it would cause, and this individual damage is smaller than the transac-
tion costs involved in compensating it.
In the first case, since the total costs are higher than the total benefits, mak-
ing no planning decision is the most efficient choice. In the second case, since 
the total benefits are higher than the total costs, it is efficient to make the 
planning decision. Since the individual damage is larger than the transaction 
costs involved in compensating it, compensating the planning decision is the 
most efficient. For example, this might be the case with compulsory purchase, 
or when a change in a bestemmingsplan causes major damage. In the third case, 
[ 133 ]
public benefits are also larger than the individual damage, so making a plan-
ning decision is efficient. However, since the individual damage, the amount 
that could be compensated, is smaller than the transaction costs involved in 
compensating the damage, it is not efficient to compensate in this case. By 
using terms such as “a non-disproportionate burden,” “limitations to the free-
dom of individual citizens that do not exceed the realization of the limitation 
of freedom due to the fact that citizens live together on a small surface,” and 
“damage within the sphere of normal risk in a society,” the Dutch rationalities 
would appear to deal efficiently with situations such as described in the third 
case. This might be one of the reasons that many binding planning decisions 
could be made in the Netherlands and that the Netherlands could have devel-
oped into a planner’s paradise (for the idea of a planner’s paradise see Faludi 
& Van der Valk, 1994).
Cross-subsidy agreements and 7.4.2 
the “two hats problem”
Making a cross-subsidy agreement, as explained in Chapter 5, requires a com-
bination of spatial planning and land development since agreements on spa-
tial planning issues such as green area developments and built developments 
are made jointly with agreements on property developers’ financial contribu-
tions. Here, tensions emerge between spatial planning and land development 
rationalities and between serving public interests and protecting private 
property rights. Central terms in this discussion are the “two hats problem” 
(dubbele petten probleem) and “ownership planning” (eigendomsplanologie). After 
these terms have been explained, this section will discuss why attempts were 
made to decouple spatial planning rationalities and land development ra-
tionalities, and how this was done. Then, it will show that these rationalities 
have not been fully decoupled and explain why there is a call for recoupling. 
This section finishes by discussing the consequences of this for institutional 
change with the help of Williamson’s model (see Table 8.1).
The “two hats problem” refers to the conflicts associated with the govern-
ment’s double role as both regulator and as a private party, buying and sell-
ing land and entering into private agreements (Ministry VROM & Ministry of 
Finance, 2001). An example of this double role is a municipality that uses rev-
enues earned by selling land prepared for building to finance public services 
or supports social housing by asking lower prices for land to be used for its 
construction. This double role also occurs in the case of cross-subsidy agree-
ments between governments and property developers.
The “two hats problem” addresses a tension between financial interests 
and planning ethics (Ministry VROM & Ministry of Finance, 2001). A conflict 
of interest can occur between the role of the government (often a munici-
pality) as regulator and its interest as a private party working to realize its 
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policy goals efficiently. For example, this double role could become a problem 
if a municipality made a certain planning decision in favor of a property de-
veloper who is willing to make a higher contribution to the municipality in 
exchange for a change to a bestemmingsplan. The Ministry of Housing, Spatial 
Planning and the Environment and the Ministry of Finance have acknowl-
edged this problem: there is a chance that policy decisions are made exclu-
sively on the basis of profit (Ministry VROM & Ministry of Finance, 2001 pp. 
33-34).
The terms “ownership planning” addresses similar problems. It is used 
when plans are made in favor of a specific land owner; spatial characteristics 
should be the input for planning, not ownership situation. In the Netherlands, 
the word “ownership planning” has a negative connotation (e.g., Molenaar, 
2004; Groetelaers, 2004). Dutch municipalities have been accused of applying 
“ownership planning” when planning profitable new types of land use, such as 
building houses, on their own land.
In the Netherlands, formal and informal institutions deal with the “two 
hats problem” and “ownership planning.” Spatial planning and land develop-
ment have been decoupled in the planning and development process. Spatial 
planning generally takes place within facet departments and land develop-
ment is taken care of by sector departments. Both fields have developed their 
own rationalities, and spatial planning and land development often occur in 
different phases. Besides, as was discussed in Section 7.2, in line with the idea 
of spatial planning as facet planning, planning decisions should be made on 
spatially relevant considerations.
The “two hats problem” also plays a role when the juridical limitations to 
cross-subsidy approaches are discussed (e.g., in Section 5.4). Juridical institu-
tions that address this issue seek to balance public interests such as efficient 
improvement of spatial quality with the rights of developers and owners of 
private property. In order to protect spatial quality, the law allows the govern-
ment to restrict the ways private owners may use their lands, for example 
by means of bestemmingsplannen. In order to arrange funds for public services, 
the law allows the government to force property developers to contribute fi-
nancially. However, since the combination of spatial planning institutions and 
land development institutions gives the government significant power, and in 
order to protect private parties against the government, these powers of the 
government have been limited. For example, in accordance with Article 42 of 
the former Spatial Planning Act (WRO), land servicing contracts could only de-
termine that property developers must pay costs directly related to the devel-
opment of buildings, such as the costs of local infrastructure, but they could 
not force the developers to finance regional green areas. If contracts between 
property developers and municipalities were made that forced property devel-
opers to pay more, the courts would decide that they were invalid (Van Buu-
ren et al., 2002, p. 134). Under the new act, property developers can be forced 
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to contribute to the development of green areas. However, these contributions 
can only be made obligatory when three criteria are met: (1) profit, (2) causal-
ity, and (3) proportionality (De Wolff, 2007; see Section 5.4). Although the new 
act also leaves more room for voluntary agreements between municipalities 
and property developers, this is also restricted by law, with Article 6.24 of the 
new Spatial Planning Act stating that these agreements must be voluntary 
and must fit a regional vision of spatial development.
Despite the reasons for decoupling spatial planning and land development, 
there are important reasons for coupling them. The Nota Grondbeleid (policy 
document on land policy) explained that the double role enables municipali-
ties to ask low prices for land prepared for building social housing, and that 
revenues obtained by selling land are used to finance public services (Minis-
try VROM & Ministry of Finance, 2001). Coupling can help land development 
departments to execute their tasks more efficiently. Often, they can only buy 
land at a low price if they acquire it before plans have been made public. For 
example, when asked what mattered in the negotiations with private parties 
about the combined green and built development in the Bloemendalerpolder, 
civil servants stated that it had been essential that public parties owned land 
in the area. Otherwise, it would have been less likely that the DLG/BBL would 
have been invited to the negotiations. All in all, despite the theoretical reasons 
for decoupling spatial planning and land development, practice suggests that 
coupling is required. Sophisticated institutions might help to facilitate this.
In order to serve the public interest, there have been calls for the creation 
of more possibilities for cross-subsidy approaches, and for the private rights 
of property developers to be further curtailed. In terms of Williamson’s model 
(see Table 8.1), the desire to involve private parties requires that the under-
lying formal rules change. However, these formal rules, as stipulated in the 
Spatial Planning Act, can only change when this fits underlying informal in-
stitutions and their implicit rationalities, such as the principle that public 
interests and private rights should be balanced. Therefore, awareness of the 
different rationalities behind spatial planning and land development, such as 
ideas about sector and facet planning, might help to improve institutions suc-
cessfully.
Cross-subsidy approaches and the 7.4.3 
“I develop the project” principle
The term zelfrealisatiebeginsel (the “I develop the project” principle) refers to 
the principle that the landowner can avoid compulsory purchase if he can 
implement the bestemmingsplan in the way proposed by the government (Van 
Buuren et al., 2002, p. 117). On the other hand, if the government can prove 
that compulsory purchase is necessary for the implementation of the plan, or 
that the public interest requires a specific implementation of the plan, then, 
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the government is allowed to proceed with the compulsory purchase (for a 
summary of jurisprudence, see Schueler & Mellenbergh, 2006, p. 6).
Spatial planners have advocated the abolition of the zelfrealisatiebeginsel, 
stating that it hinders planning objectives and that uncertainty about the 
principle might lead to time-consuming legal procedures and project de-
lays (e.g., Priemus & Louw, 2003; Schueler & Mellenbergh, 2006; Dutch Lower 
Chamber, 2005-2006b). According to De Wolff et al. (2004), the zelfrealisatiebe-
ginsel makes it more difficult for municipalities to acquire land and prepare it 
for building themselves. As explained in Section 5.1, this so-called active land 
development has been and still is an important way for municipalities to con-
trol developments and to create funds for cross-subsidy strategies (Groete-
laers, 2005). The PPP-Agency for Rural Areas stated that the zelfrealisatiebegin-
sel principle might hinder cross-subsidy projects (PPS-bureau landelijk gebied, 
2002). The discussion on the abolition of the principle illustrates how tensions 
between public interest and private right influence institutional change.
On the other hand, as Priemus and Louw (2003, p. 376) already expected, 
abolition of the zelfrealisatiebeginsel is not something that jurists will under-
take lightly. Considering the importance of protecting private property rights, 
abolishing the zelfrealisatiebeginsel is an idea at odds with the legal system. In 
fact, abolition of the principle would conflict with the Fundamental Right to 
Property as protected by the European Convention on Human Rights (Alkema, 
2000; Schueler & Mellenbergh, 2006). Consequently, the Minister of Housing, 
Spatial Planning and the Environment decided not to follow this route toward 
institutional change any further (Dutch Lower Chamber, 2005-2006b).
As was seen with the “two hats problem” and “ownership planning,” the at-
tempt to abolish the zelfrealisatiebeginsel illustrates that an attempt to change 
institutions to serve the public interest better could encroach on private 
rights. In this case, formal rules could not be changed because they did not 
fit the underlying principles stipulated in the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights. This illustrates how a specific institutional change that fits spa-
tial planning rationalities might not fit land development rationalities.
Compulsory purchase for green types of land use7.4.4 
The discussion whether compulsory purchase can be used to acquire land for 
recreation and nature conservation also illustrates how public interest can 
conflict with private property rights. Considering the protection and improve-
ment of green metropolitan landscape, the Advisory Council for Rural Areas 
(Raad landelijk gebied, 2008) recently advocated the use of compulsory pur-
chase to acquire green areas. The council stated that this was needed to make 
the implementation of spatial plans for projects like the National Ecological 
Network (Ecologische Hoofdstructuur, EHS) more successful. In this way, com-
pulsory purchase for green types of land use might be in the public interest. 
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Opposed to that, farmers concerned about their private property rights have 
protested the use of compulsory purchase for green types of land use. Off 
the record, I have heard experts say that the objections of farmers were ad-
dressed in a gentlemen’s agreement between the Minister of Agriculture, Na-
ture and Food Quality and representatives of farmers, in which the minister 
promised not to use compulsory purchase for the acquisition of new nature 
and recreation areas. In practice, according to the Advisory Council for Rural 
Areas, compulsory purchase via the civil judge has hardly ever been used to 
acquire regional recreation areas near cities or to acquire land for the Nation-
al Ecological Network, with the exception of the Midden-Delfland area (Raad 
landelijk gebied, 2008, p. 8).
One of the factors that might have influenced this tension is the different 
land values for meadows where construction is allowed or is going to be al-
lowed and for green areas. The Dutch government has a standing policy of 
paying less for areas that are going to be developed as green areas, such as 
recreation areas and nature conservation sites, than for areas that are going 
to be developed for construction (Raad landelijk gebied, 2008, p. 8). In the case 
of compulsory purchase, the type of land use can influence the amount of 
money received by the former land owner. Consequently, the compensation 
the government has to pay land owners in the case of compulsory purchase 
differs according to the land-use plan made by the government. Even when 
planning decisions have been made based on spatially relevant arguments, it 
might be hard for farmers to accept that land prices will be much higher on 
one side of a line on a map than on the other side of that line. This might 
be even more difficult to accept when there are few objective arguments for 
drawing this line (for example, the proximity of a road), and when, as in the 
case of compulsorily purchase, farmers cannot choose to wait for the next be-
stemmingsplan, which might allow new development.
The differences in land prices is a particularly delicate issue in the case of 
compulsory purchase for green areas, because farmers might be forced to sell 
their land at a low price to the same government which made the planning 
decision that affected the price. Although the planning decision is generally 
made by another department than the department which manages the com-
pulsory purchase, and the decisions might be made using different and ap-
propriate rationalities, there might still be a tension between the rationalities; 
land owners might wonder whether the government made its planning deci-
sion on spatially relevant arguments or on the basis of financial arguments. 
The supposed gentlemen’s agreement not to make compulsory purchases for 
green areas has been used to reduce this tension. This gentlemen’s agreement 
might be interpreted as a reflection of an underlying institutionalized princi-
ple that defends private property rights. A change to this agreement might 
require this underlying principle to be reconsidered as well.
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Public interest versus private rights7.4.5 
Tension between public interest and private rights is an important issue with-
in operational spatial planning and land development. In the case of compen-
sation, an institutional framework has been developed to deal with this. Since 
strategic spatial planning, operational spatial planning and operational land 
development use different rationalities to deal with this tension, coupling 
spatial planning and land development requires these rationalities to be con-
sidered. In spatial planning rationalities, serving public interests by improving 
spatial quality is an important aim, and using spatially relevant arguments 
to make decisions is an important norm. In land development, efficient pol-
icy implementation is an important norm. Unsurprisingly, land development 
measures are often confronted with private property rights. Since operational 
land development often confronts private property rights, norms to protect 
private property rights play an important role in land development rationali-
ties.
The “two hats problem,” “ownership planning,” the “zelfrealisatiebeginsel,” 
and compulsory purchase for green types of land uses all illustrate the impor-
tance of deeply rooted institutions such as the principle that private property 
rights should be protected against the state. If attempts are made to change 
formal rules, such as planning regulations, to serve public interests, it is im-
portant to consider these deeply rooted institutions. This concurs with Van 
Eeten and Roe’s (2002) statement that recoupling, in this case combining land 
development and spatial planning in a new way, can only be achieved if it fits 
the actual situation and context dynamics.
Conclusion7.5 
This chapter has discussed the differences between strategic spatial plan-
ning, operational spatial planning and land development rationalities to cre-
ate a better understanding of contemporary problems facing the landscape 
and ways to protect and improve green areas. This understanding might help 
when making decisions on measures to protect and improve the landscape. 
Understanding these different rationalities can also help institutional change, 
since institutional change is more likely when new institutions fit the basic 
principles of these rationalities.
Distinguishing the operational and strategic levels might help to under-
stand the differences between spatial planning and land development. It ex-
plains why coordination in the case of operational spatial planning and land 
development differs from coordination in the case of strategic planning. Un-
like strategic planning, which coordinates different governmental depart-
ments or sectors, operational spatial planning and land development, which 
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foremost coordinate private parties, generally requires binding regulations 
and adequate budgets to be effective. In the past, budgets for implementing 
plans only played a significant role in land development, and this was gener-
ally taken care of by sector departments. With the restructuring of the welfare 
state, the influence of these sector departments has declined, and the avail-
ability of budgets needs to be reconsidered. Examining the different ration-
alities shows why, in line with Chapter 6, a combination of network-oriented 
and hierarchical coordination mechanisms might be fruitful.
Seeing strategic spatial planning as concerned with facet aspects and not 
with “construction, maintenance and availability”, strategic spatial planning 
debates can disregard land development issues. Although disregarding these 
issues could stimulate ideas about ideal types of land uses, it might also dis-
tract attention from the problems discussed in Chapters 1 and 2. This might 
in turn hinder the improvement of spatial quality.
Spatial planning and land development have been historically decoupled, 
as a way of dealing with the conflict between the government’s role as regula-
tor and as a private party, which buys and sells land and enters into private 
agreements. In practice, this decoupling was accomplished by putting spatial 
planning and land development in different departments which used differ-
ent rationalities and different norms and which were active during different 
phases of the development process. This decoupling was influenced by basic 
principles such as the “sector and facet” concept and the idea that (1) allo-
cation of land-uses, (2) construction, (3) maintenance, and (4) availability are 
separate tasks. The central norms in spatial planning rationalities are improv-
ing spatial quality, legitimate plan making, and deciding on the basis of spa-
tially relevant arguments, whereas the central norms in land development are 
efficient and effective implementation. Because land development measures 
are likely to conflict with private property rights, the principle that private 
property rights should be protected has been deeply rooted in land develop-
ment institutions.
Transaction Cost Theory, which was discussed in Chapter 4, can help to ex-
plain how Dutch spatial planning rationalities, for example the application of 
the concept of “égalité devant les charges publiques,” have produced efficient de-
cisions on compensation. When individual damage due to a planning decision 
is smaller than the transaction costs involved in compensating this damage, 
it is not efficient to compensate this damage. Embedding this idea in institu-
tions, so that not all planning damage needs to be compensated, might have 
contributed to the Netherlands developing into a planner’s paradise.
When spatial planning and land development are coupled, as in the case 
of cross-subsidy strategies, and when attempts are made to change institu-
tions, their deeply rooted principles, the rationalities behind their approaches, 
should be considered. This fits one of the basic ideas of Williamson’s model 
which will be discussed in Chapter 8: changing governance structures may 
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require changing formal rules. However, these formal rules can only change 
if they fit underlying informal institutions, such as the rationalities. Therefore, 
awareness of the different spatial planning and land development rationali-
ties, such as the idea that private property rights must be respected, might 
help to improve institutions.
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Slow Planning 8 
and incremental 
institutional change
This project was conducted within the framework of the Metroland research 
program. The English version of the factsheet of this program states: “In the 
metropolitan landscape, the complexity and dynamics of societal develop-
ments no longer allow the classical role of the government and its policy in-
struments to be effective. Dutch spatial planning needs to critically analyse 
the driving forces in the metropolitan landscape and why classical spatial 
planning is not effective anymore, in order to define new adequate ways of 
co-ordinating spatial developments” (Metroland, 2008). In addition, Van Dijk 
(2006) noted that contemporary planning institutions for green metropolitan 
areas are too slow in today’s dynamic society and suggested that, to cope with 
this, institutions needed to be changed radically.
The case studies conducted in this project showed another picture. In Laag 
Holland, a plea for more dynamics was used to prepare the way for new be-
stemmingsplannen that allow new built developments. This might hamper the 
protection and improvement of the metropolitan green area. Opposed to that, 
Midden-Delfland’s Slow Planning process, involving a land consolidation pro-
cess that took over thirty years, resulted in successful open space preserva-
tion (Van Rij et al., 2008). Slow Planning can be defined as a way of spatial 
coordination to preserve potentially high dynamic landscapes by reducing dy-
namics and increasing the time frame of projects (Van Rij & Korthals Altes, 
2008). The first part of this chapter examines “dynamic” and Slow Planning 
and elaborates the concept of Slow Planning.
Using institutional economic theory and legal theory, the second part of 
this chapter considers institutional change. Radical institutional change 
can hamper Slow Planning. Uncertainty about restrictive planning institu-
tions can give room to those forces that are strong in a non-regulated mar-
ket, which are the forces that can lead to built developments. Besides, radical 
institutional change can be accompanied by unintended side effects. On the 
other hand, institutional change might be needed to improve institutions for 
internalizing landscape values. This chapter analyzes changing planning con-
cepts in Laag Holland, new land development legislation, and hypothetical in-
stitutions for market-coordinated spatial order as examples of institutional 
change which could affect the protection and improvement of metropolitan 
green areas. The Midden-Delfland Act serves to illustrate how institutional 
change can work.
Slow Planning8.1 
Interviewees and scholars have criticized planning institutions such as the 
land consolidation process in Midden-Delfland for their sluggishness (see 
Chapter 2 and Van Rij et al., 2008). The extended time frame of land consolida-
tion processes is a frequently heard complaint (Van Rij & Zevenbergen, 2005; 
[ 143 ]
Van Dijk, 2006). In general, planning has often been criticized for being slow, 
and sluggishness is generally seen as one of the shortcomings of planning 
processes (De Jong, 1999, p. 185). Sluggish institutions can make plans too 
static and can make changing them too time consuming. In this light, Web-
ster (2005) mentioned the negative effects on efficiency of old or outdated 
plans. Critics argue that today’s dynamic society requires quicker adaptation 
of plans and land uses. Ideas about globalization, defined as the “accelerated 
circulation” (Brenner, 1999, p. 431) of all kinds of flows, tend to emphasize the 
need for swifter decision making of decisions, since otherwise these flows 
may bend away in today’s “rapidly changing territorial organization” (p. 432). 
The rural-urban fringes, in particular, are considered to as “dynamic and rap-
idly changing environments” (Gallent & Shaw, 2007, p. 635). In general, the 
planning literature views the extended time frame of planning and imple-
mentation processes as important shortcomings (Carmona & Gallent, 2004; 
Gallent & Carmona, 2004). This section compares examples of dynamic and 
Slow Planning.
Dynamic planning in Laag Holland8.1.1 
Inspired by the idea of discourse analysis, the terms used in the discussion 
on “Living in Waterland” were examined (see also Section 6.2). This illustrated 
the role dynamics can play in planning. Figure 8.1 shows possible locations 
for new houses in Laag Holland, and Figures 8.2 and 8.3 give an impression of 
the area. After years during which very few built developments were allowed, 
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Figure 8.1 Examined locations for new built developments in Waterland
Source: Mulder, 2005
central-right cabinets (2002-2007) chose a more development-friendly policy 
with more decentralized decision making. Since Dutch municipalities have a 
tendency to welcome new built developments, many official local policy docu-
ments aimed to prepare the way for new bestemmingsplannen. To allow the de-
velopment of dwellings in the countryside, these documents used a discourse 
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Figure 8.2 View of a village at the peninsula Marken
Photo: Nico Langeveld
Figure 8.3 Reasonably new developments on Marken with traditional houses in the 
background 
contrasting dynamics and vitality to the sluggishness associated with terms 
such as “lock up” and “museum.”
Built developments have been proposed as a solution to problems associ-
ated with a lack of dynamics (e.g., Mulder, 2005). The regional plan on living 
in Waterland (Streekplanuitwerking Waterlandswonen, Provincie Noord-Holland, 
2006b) claimed the following (the original Dutch text can be found in Appen-
dix C): “Planning policy for greenfield developments consisted of “freezing” 
precious rural areas and small settlements and concentrating the necessary 
built developments in less valuable areas close to larger built areas. A lack of 
renewal and rejuvenation has apparently decreased the livability in the small 
settlements and has started to turn the landscape into a museum (p. 11).
New greenfield development must contribute to:
the vitality of the settlements;1. 
the vitality of the countryside;2. 
Waterland’s identity regarding landscape, cultural history and nature con-3. 
servation (p. 22).”
The lack of vitality to which these documents refer was not grounded by re-
search. On the contrary, in a quantitative analysis, Koomen and Van Wilgen-
burg (2006) found that the Dutch countryside and small settlements were 
surprisingly vital with respect to population/demography, economic activity, 
and available facilities. Large cities, such as Amsterdam, located near the case 
study areas provided many facilities for the surrounding areas, and because 
of the proximity of these cities, people often spoke of a single housing market 
in the large city and the surrounding green metropolitan areas. Consequen-
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Figure 8.4 Study on local attitudes towards housing in Waterland
Source: Overman, 2003
tially, it can not be stated that the Dutch countryside and small settlements 
are not vital, nor that they necessarily lack new built developments. A survey 
among the local population showed that the majority of the people in Water-
land did not favor new developments, especially large scale ones (Overman, 
2003; see Figures 8.4 and 8.5).
With respect to green metropolitan area preservation, the term vitality was 
used strategically. At first sight, the use of the word vitality suggests a con-
cern about the landscape, nature preservation, and the economic situation of 
farmers. However, in the policy documents on “Living in Waterland,” the term 
vitality was used to address topics such as addressing local housing demand 
and maintaining existing facilities (Mulder, 2005). Building houses was sup-
posed to create a basis for local facilities, and thus was supposed to increase 
vitality. Consequently, the term vitality was used to advocate new built devel-
opments.
Another concept that is used in a similar way is “preservation by devel-
opment” (“behoud door ontwikkeling”). This was the leading concept of the 
Belvedere memorandum, dealing with the preservation of landscapes and 
monuments (Ministries OC&W, VROM & LNV, 1999). The basic idea is that 
monuments and landscapes can be preserved better if they serve other pur-
poses, which are not in conflict with their preservation (for example, an old 
church might be used as a congress center). However, in many policy docu-
ments, this concept was used to advocate for building houses in the country-
side (e.g., Mulder, 2005, pp. 6, 14; Provincie Noord-Holland, 2006b, pp. 7, 9, 12, 
31). All in all, assuming that the economy in green metropolitan areas needs 
to be more dynamic and that current land use is “frozen” might be used to 
advocate for built developments, thereby hampering the protection and im-
provement of metropolitan green areas.
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Figure 8.5 Protest against the development of new commercial areas in Laag Holland: “Keep Waterland 
Green, No business park here, Support www.kloosterdijk.nl” 
Slow Planning in Midden-Delfland8.1.2 
Although interviewees and planning literature have often criticized Slow 
Planning, the land consolidation process in Midden-Delfland illustrates how 
this process became effective due to Slow Planning rather than in spite of it. 
The Midden-Delfland Act was made in 1977, and the land readjustment pro-
cedure is finally expected to be finished in 2008 (see Figure 8.6 for one of the 
last projects). The project took more than thirty years, which is generally con-
sidered to be a long time for a planning project. Farmers who participated at 
the beginning of the process have often been succeeded by a new generation 
during the project. During these thirty years, the main goals of the project, 
preserving open space, developing recreational areas, and improving farming 
conditions, remained unchanged (Van Rij et al., 2008). The land readjustment 
procedure was governed by a durable platform for collaboration, the Land 
Consolidation Committee. This committee has been a powerful discussion 
and decision-making platform in the area.
Asked about the project’s shortcomings, interviewees often mentioned 
its long duration. They mentioned the emphasis on discussion in the 1970s, 
and the sluggish planning procedures provided by the many opportunities to 
present objections. My examination of the process showed that the project’s 
long time frame was not basically due to sluggish planning. In fact, much 
time was needed to assemble the land required for the project. In order to 
avoid pushing up the land prices, the acquisition of land was a time-consum-
ing process.
Still, the question needs to be answered: Was the land consolidation 
project in Midden-Delfland effective due to the project’s long time frame or 
despite of it? Throughout the project’s thirty years, the basic planning policy 
objectives remained unchanged. As a consequence of these clear objectives, 
no other types of land use, such as building houses, have been seriously dis-
cussed for thirty years. During this period, the Land Consolidation Commit-
tee decided on whether or not to allow new construction. Consequently, no 
built developments took place during this long planning process, except for a 
few, mostly agrarian, buildings (Van Rij et al., 2008). In this way, the land con-
solidation process reduced land-use dynamics, especially construction, in the 
area.
Other measures implemented during the land consolidation process also 
aimed to reduce dynamics. Land reallocation was used to make the agrari-
an sector more economically vital and therefore the farmers’ role in the area 
more durable. The transition of land ownership to the state forestry organi-
zation and the nature conservation union was also used to create a durable 
ownership situation with owners who were not likely to allow construction 
on their land. In the meantime, new recreation areas created durable pub-
lic support for the area. Although increasing land-use dynamics in the short 
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term (Van Rij et al., 2008), all these measures aimed at reducing dynamics in 
the long term. Besides, a lack of dynamics with respect to zoning can also de-
crease dynamics with respect to ownership situation and vice versa. If a pro-
construction municipal council wants to change bestemmingsplannen, this can 
be countered if the land owner does not want to develop the land, or if the 
public supports the green areas.
Though the basic planning policy objectives were not questioned during 
the project, now that the end of the project is near, they are being questioned; 
ideas about building houses in the area, for example the Maaslandsedam 
project, are entering the discussion. With the end of the Midden-Delfland Act, 
plans are no longer submitted for approval of the Land Consolidation Com-
mittee, which has always been a de facto extra barrier to development. Many 
interviewees, for example inhabitants, farmers and local politicians, were 
concerned that the Land Consolidation Committee is being disbanded.
The Slow Planning approach8.1.3 
As stated earlier, there is a tendency to associate dynamic planning with good 
planning and Slow Planning with bad planning. The Laag Holland case illus-
trates how a plea for more dynamics can threaten metropolitan green areas. 
At first sight, terms such as “vitality of the countryside” and “preservation by 
development” would appear to support the green functions in the countryside. 
However, in policy documents, they were used to advocate for built develop-
ments in the countryside. This illustrates how dynamic terms with a positive 
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Figure 8.6 One of the last projects in the Midden-Delfland land 
consolidation, creating a recreational area near Vlaardingen, picture 
taken in 2008
association can threaten green metropolitan areas.
Opposed to that, the example of Midden-Delfland shows that Slow Plan-
ning does not have to have negative effects on the protection and improve-
ment of green metropolitan areas. In fact, if the goal is to preserve rural land-
scapes in a dynamic metropolitan context, decreasing urban dynamics can 
help to achieve it. In this way, Slow Planning can be an asset for preserving 
green areas. It is a way of spatial coordination to preserve potentially high 
dynamic landscapes by reducing dynamics and increasing the time frame of 
projects (Van Rij & Korthals Altes, 2008).
Slow Planning is by no means a passive approach. In view of the negative 
developments described in Chapter 3 – rising land prices, reduced agricultural 
incomes, and the constant pressures for built developments – only action can 
protect and improve green metropolitan areas. In fact, in line with the idea of 
Slow Food, Slow Planning requires a sophisticated approach based on durable 
policy objectives for an area. On the operational level, Slow Planning requires 
a mix of spatial planning and land development institutions. As long as the 
basic policy objectives are not changed during a project, increasing the time 
frame can be a key to Slow Planning. In the meantime, the model presented 
in Chapter 2 demonstrates the different measures that can help to reduce dy-
namics in the long term: measures dealing with spatial quality, zoning and 
the ownership situation. To ensure spatial quality, measures can be taken to 
improve the recreational usability of the area or to guarantee that the land-
scape is maintained. Zoning can be used to prohibit dynamic urban types of 
land use and to preserve agricultural land uses. Finally, low land prices and 
policy to keep them low can be used to ensure that farmers continue to own 
land. Land ownership by nature preservation unions or the state forestry or-
ganization is another way to create a durable pro-green landownership situa-
tion.
Different time frames are required to change spatial quality, zoning and 
the land ownership situation, especially when considering opportunities for 
new development. A combined strategy aiming at spatial quality, zoning and 
ownership is therefore more likely to be durable. Besides, a combined strategy 
can strengthen the general public’s opinion that a green area will be durable. 
In this way, Slow Planning, as it was applied in Midden-Delfland, in what was 
sometimes considered an outmoded planning process, actively and effective-
ly reduced urban dynamics.
Institutional change in planning8.2 
On the one hand, institutional change may be needed to create institutions 
that apply a Slow Planning approach. On the other hand, many Slow Plan-
ning institutions have been used for quite some time and a Slow Planning ap-
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proach requires a reliable and predictable institutional framework; too radical 
institutional change can hamper Slow Planning. To address this dilemma, this 
section elaborates on institutional change.
In planning, the necessity of institutional change is often treated as a 
starting point. In their article on a theory of institutional change, Buitelaar et 
al. (2007) only discussed the circumstances under which institutional change 
takes place, and they did not discuss motivations for institutional change. Re-
ferring to Innes (1995) and Healey (1998) and Healey et al. (2002), Buitelaar et 
al. (2007) stated that institutional design is the essence of planning and that 
the goal of planning is to break through the institutional pathways and their 
structural forces. Healey (2006) wrote that new concepts have to challenge 
and shift an array of already routinized governance processes, with their 
complex mixture of conscious modes of practice and ones that are taken for 
granted. New concepts have to “jump” boundaries and “break through” resist-
ance, involving implicit and explicit struggles. When advocating for institu-
tional change, these scholars seldom explore the reasons for choosing change 
or not to choosing it, or the possibility of changing institutions incrementally.
Spatial planning objectives can urge scholars in the field of planning to ad-
vocate radical institutional change. For example, Van Dijk (2006) advocated a 
radical change in institutions instead of slow iterative adaptation. He argued 
that more radical changes are necessary because slow adaptation may result 
in a situation where formal rules no longer fit the situation by the time they 
are applied (Van Dijk, 2006). Likewise, Priemus and Louw (2003) remarked that 
a radical amendment of Dutch compulsory purchase legislation seems neces-
sary to safeguard the public dimension of urban development.
Other literature has discussed why institutions seem to evolve instead 
of being radically changed or designed (e.g., Nelson, 1979; Alexander, 2004; 
Adams, 2005). Webster (2005) argued that institutions evolve and that it takes 
a long time for good policies to be discovered and bad policies to be dropped. 
Consequently, radical changes can result in large errors. Salet (2002) wrote 
that there can be a tension between planning motives and the way institu-
tions evolve. For example, Raitio (2003) explained the importance of legal 
certainty and Visscher (1986) discussed the risks associated with careless in-
stitutional change. In a more general context, Hart (1994) discussed the per-
sistence of law as one of the necessities for a legal system.
To put the aforementioned pleas for radical institutional change in per-
spective, the remainder of this chapter discusses the reasons for iterative in-
stitutional change. It discusses Williamson’s (1998) model on different levels 
of institutions and the change frequencies of these different levels. It explains 
that since institutions operate as a system, this can be a reason to change 
them iteratively. This is illustrated by different practical examples. In addi-
tion, the example of the Midden-Delfland Act is used to illustrate how itera-
tive change can take place.
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Institutions’ different change frequencies8.2.1 
In order to gain a better understanding of the change frequency of institu-
tions, this section discusses Williamson’s (1998) model (Table 8.1) on different 
levels of institutions and the times it takes for these institutions to change. 
Although Williamson’s model originates in economics, it provides useful in-
sights for other institutional disciplines too.
The first level of institutions consists of norms, customs, mores, traditions 
and other informal structures that have developed of themselves over time. 
In general, these institutions are taken for granted and change slowly, on the 
order of centuries or millennia. An example of this is the principle that “pacta 
sunt servanda” (agreements must be respected), or the Dutch predilection for 
order and neatness, as Faludi and Van der Valk pointed out (1994). These in-
formal institutions are the domain of social theory, such as history and an-
thropology.
Williamson (1998) calls the second level the institutional environment. The 
institutions at this level are the products of politics and provide the rules of 
the game within which economic activity is organized. According to William-
son (1998), polity, judiciary and bureaucracy of government are located at this 
level. This level defines the formal rules by which a society operates, and the 
definition and enforcement of property rights plays an important role in this. 
Institutional choices made at this level are very important to economic activ-
ity, but cumulative and gradual change is hard to orchestrate. Times of crisis 
can provide windows of opportunity that provide occasions for sharp breaks 
from established procedures. This happens rarely and Williamson stated that 
major changes in the rules of the game occur in the order of decades or cen-
turies.
Institutions of governance, which determine how the “game” is played, are 
located at the third level. At this level, we find alternative models of coordi-
nation which can be based on market mechanisms or not. Choices for spe-
cific contracting strategies and make-or-buy decisions are made at this level. 
Transaction Cost Economics addresses this type of questions. These decisions 
can be reconsidered every year or decade.
The fourth level deals with resource allocation on the basis of price and 
output. Neo-classical economics is the most important discipline that deals 
with this level. Adjustments in price and output take place continuously.
The change frequencies in Williamson’s model are only indicative. Some 
aspects of property rights, “level two” institutions, have not changed since 
the Roman Empire. Other aspects, such as protective provisions in the case 
of Dutch land readjustment, have changed several times during the last hun-
dred years (Zevenbergen & Van Rij, 2005). The more durable aspects of prop-
erty rights, for example those which have not been changed since the Roman 
Empire, are often embedded in “level one” institutions, such as the command-
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ment that you shall not steal.
The idea that the change frequencies of institutions differ and that more 
fundamental institutions change more slowly concurs with findings from 
the field of parliamentary history. Visscher (1986) found that it took parlia-
ment longer to change more complex and important statutes than simpler 
ones. Changes that were relatively more fundamental, such as changes to the 
Dutch civil code and the approval of the European Social Charter, took the 
most time (Visscher, 1986).
Institutional system8.2.2 
The arrows between the different categories of institutions in Williamson’s 
model illustrate the way different institutions interact with each other and 
operate as a system; changes to one institution can have consequences on 
other institutions. In his work on the concept of law, Hart (1994) explains how 
legal institutions form a system. Williamson’s model incorporates this con-
cept into a general institutional system.
Because institutions work within an institutional system and interact with 
each other, path dependency can develop (North, 1991). Path dependency 
means that decisions in the past determine which developments are possi-
ble in the future. Salet (2002) stated that divergent traditions have established 
themselves in different countries, and that different patterns of institutional 
change also appear. For example, a set of level-two institutions can be based 
on a level one norm. This level one norm can limit the possibilities of institu-
tional change at the second level. Since institutions interfere with each oth-
er, the set of institutions that have come into existence influence the chance 
that particular institutions will emerge.
Understanding that institutions operate as a system can have conse-
quences for the decision whether to change institutions or not, or whether 
to change them incrementally or radically. There are transition costs associ-
ated with changes to an institutional system, such as the cost of learning to 
work with the new institutions and the cost of the risks associated with these 
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Table 8.1 Williamson’s model on different institutional levels
Level Institutions Change frequency (years) Theory and research disciplines
1 Embeddedness: informal institutions, customs, 
traditions, norms, religion
102 to 103 Social theory e.g. history and 
anthropology
2 Institutional environment: formal rules of the game 
– especially property (policy, judiciary, bureaucracy)
10 to 102 Economics of property rights, 
legal studies, political science
3 Governance: play of the game – especially contract 
(aligning governance structures with transactions)
1 to 10 Transaction cost economics
4 Resource allocation and employment (price and 
quantities; incentive alignment)
continuous Neo-classical economics and 
Agency Theory
Source: Williamson, 1998; Groenewegen, 2004
changes. Unpredicted effects of one changed institution on other institutions 
can cause increased transition costs. These transition costs are a special type 
of transaction costs (Challen, 2000). If new institutions fit the existing insti-
tutional framework and are based on it, it is less likely that the institution-
al change will bring high transition costs (Van Rij, 2006, p. 72). Incremental 
change may provide certainty to agents, when planning their behavior (e.g., 
Raitio, 2003). The importance of continuity in an institutional setting and of 
a good fit between new institutions and the existing institutional framework 
have been emphasized by various authors (e.g., Alexander, 2004; Scott-Morgan, 
1994; Van Bueren & Ten Heuvelhof, 2005).
Because institutions operate as a system, when considering changing a 
specific institution, it is important to consider the institutional context. Be-
cause higher levels, starting with level one, have an important influence on 
the possibilities for different governance structures, theories dealing with 
these higher levels are useful for improving institutions at other levels too. 
This knowledge urges us to take various parts of the institutional system into 
consideration when dealing with institutions for internalizing landscape val-
ues: both the higher level institutions that affect them and the lower level 
institutions that are influenced by them.
Planning institutions at different levels8.2.3 
This section uses Williamson’s (1998) model to compare planners’ ideas on 
the change frequency of planning institutions to more general ideas. Wil-
liamson’s model is also used to explore which planning institutions are more 
fundamental and to explain which institutions can be influenced by a certain 
institutional change and are therefore important to consider when discussing 
institutional change.
A close look at institutions for metropolitan green areas shows that insti-
tutions at all levels do influence the internalization of green metropolitan 
landscape values. Considering planning history, norms such as the wide ac-
ceptance of planning and zoning in the Netherlands, compared to the more 
property oriented system in Flanders might be examples of “level one” insti-
tutions. The second institutional level consists of such things as land read-
justment legislation, compulsory purchase legislation, and legislation on de-
veloper’s payments to the government. An example of third level institutions 
is the policy decision to aim at more Public Private Partnerships. The price of 
the land and agricultural products is determined at the fourth level of institu-
tions.
Many of the changes to institutions that planners have proposed – such 
as the previously discussed propositions of Van Dijk (2006) and Priemus and 
Louw (2003) – are changes to level-two institutions, the formal rules of the 
game, the rules that determine property rights. According to Williamson 
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(1998), these institutions take between 10 and 100 years to change. However, 
these changes can be so fundamental that they affect basic concepts about 
property rights, which are “level one” institutions. From this perspective, a 
short change frequency for planning institutions would be an exception to 
general change frequencies. In fact, the model puts the claim that planning 
institutions change too slowly into perspective; planning institutions do not 
change more slowly than institutions in general.
Although not every planning institution fits exactly one institutional level, 
Williamson’s (1998) model can also help to explain why some planning rules 
can be changed more easily than others, and why some changes to the plan-
ning system proposed by planners are more likely to be implemented than 
others. Specific stipulations, for example a provision in a bestemmingsplan 
about the type of land use permitted in an area, or a contract between a mu-
nicipality and a developer are examples of the most dynamic type of planning 
rules. The rules of the planning game, such as the Spatial Planning Act are 
less dynamic. They determine how changes to more dynamic rules such as be-
stemmingsplannen can be made. Therefore, the Spatial Planning Act is a more 
static institution, which changes less frequently. Other kinds of rules are even 
more static, for example the basic protection of ownership rights. In most of 
the European continent these rights are protected by civil codes, which sel-
dom change. The basic underlying presumptions on which these codes are 
based, for example fundamental rights and other juridical principles are, like 
all Williamson’s “level one” institutions, very static.
In general, when one considers formal rules, the more extensive the pro-
cedures to make them, the lower the change frequency and the more durable 
they will be. Besides, rules made by a higher authority often overrule those 
made by a lower authority, and when they do so, these rules are often more 
fundamental. In general, the more institutional change affects more funda-
mental institutions, the harder it is to accomplish these changes, because 
they affect the institutional system more.
Balanced institutional system: public 8.2.4 
interest versus private rights
As we have seen, institutions become effective within a system of institutions. 
Different institutions within such a system keep each other in balance. Sec-
tion 7.4 discussed the sophisticated balance between public interest and pri-
vate rights. Because this balance and the idea that property rights should be 
protected against the state can be seen as “level one” institutions, changes to 
institutions that affect these “level one” institutions will be hard to accom-
plish. First, this section discusses an example of institutional balance within 
the Flemish institutional system. Then, it discusses the debate on the zelfre-
alisatiebeginsel and new Dutch land consolidation legislation, considering the 
[ 155 ]
tension between institutional changes which are preferable from a planning 
perspective and the necessity to durably protect private property rights for 
the sake of the legal system.
Studying the Flemish institutional system, it appeared to me, as a foreign 
researcher, that at first seemed to be imbalances were actually balanced by 
other institutions. At first sight, it was striking that the Ruimtelijk uitvoerings-
plan RUP (a combination of a land-use plan and a document introducing land 
development institutions to execute the plan) could change permitted land 
uses so drastically. The introduction by the plan of the possibility for compul-
sory purchase (see Figure 8.7) to develop a forest also seemed quite radical. 
However, a closer look at the institutions and how they were applied in prac-
tice, revealed a less radical situation. Institutions unknown in the Dutch con-
text, such as the verkavelingsvergunning (parcel subdivision permit), continued 
to be effective and protected existing development rights.
Besides that, the introduction of the possibility for compulsory purchase 
might de facto not make a difference. In Flanders, this option must be used 
within five years of the RUP becoming effective (Leenders et al., 2006). Al-
though the RUP became effective in 2005, at the time of the interviews in the 
beginning of 2007, this option had not been used. Interviewees expressed 
their worries about this and said that there was a fair chance that the option 
would not be used in time. Different reasons were mentioned for this. Some 
blamed the Flemish government agency for rural projects, the Vlaamse Land-
maatschappij (VLM), for acting too much in the interest of farmers and estate 
owners. Others stated that, because of unknown, perhaps political reasons, 
other departments than the VLM, which are responsible for estimating the 
compensation, did not give priority to these estimations. As a consequence, 
they doubted whether the possibility for compulsory purchase would be used 
in time. In that case, the introduction of the possibility for compulsory pur-
chase would not change the balance between the public interest and private 
property rights de facto. This example illustrates how the old balance within 
the institutional system might be continued informally.
The tension between public interest and private rights also played a role 
in the discussion on new Dutch legislation on land reallocation projects. For 
example, in order to make land reallocation procedures less complex, stipula-
tions about estimating the value of the land and compensating a possible loss 
in value were not included in the new Dutch land consolidation legislation 
(Van Rij & Zevenbergen, 2005). Planners stated that, in practice, they would 
continue to use their estimation models and therefore, private interests 
would be protected. However, at least from a legal perspective, a legal stipula-
tion is more secure provide more protection than an informal statement that 
administrative procedures will be continued. Therefore, with Zevenbergen, I 
previously argued that, considering the importance protecting property rights 
has for the entire institutional and economic system, the rights of landown-
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ers deserve better protection by law (Van Rij & Zevenbergen, 2005). From our 
point of view, replacing these legal stipulations by informal practices would 
be a too radical institutional change.
The examples discussed in this section and in Section 7.4 illustrate how 
institutions operate within a system and how the working of some institu-
tions depends on other institutions. The abolition of the zelfrealisatiebeginsel 
and new Dutch land consolidation legislation illustrated how radical institu-
tional changes designed to better reach planning goals can conflict with core 
principles of the institutional system such as the protection of property rights. 
When discussing these changes, it is important to consider that insecure 
ownership rights can threaten the legal and economic system because they 
would discourage investments and make juridical reasoning meaningless. It 
is therefore important to consider why these more fundamental rules are in 
use. Understanding this can help to design institutional changes that fit the 
general institutional system.
Changing planning concepts8.2.5 
When discussing institutional changes in planning, the concepts that under-
lie Dutch planning doctrine need to be considered too. In its study on Nation-
al Landscape, the Netherlands Institute for Spatial Research (Ruimtelijk Plan 
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Figure 8.7 Areas where compulsory purchase is allowed, marked in dark grey
Source: Ministerie van de Vlaamse Gemeenschap, 2005
Bureau, RPB) stressed the importance of long term policy decisions and du-
rable concepts (Janssen et al., 2007). Strategic spatial planning concepts are 
important because they guide other strategic decisions that influence the 
landscape. Memoranda on space can determine that certain types of land use 
are not allowed in areas that are specified in the memorandum, such as the 
Green Heart. In the Netherlands, the most important planning concepts, such 
as the Green Heart, have been said to form a body of thought, a doctrine (e.g., 
Faludi & Van der Valk, 1994; Faludi, 1999). The basic principles of this doctrine 
and the different labels used by this doctrine, such as the Green Heart, are in-
stitutions. This section discusses theory on changing doctrine. Then, it briefly 
discusses how two important concepts in Dutch planning doctrine, the Green 
Heart and the National Buffer Zone, affect the preservation of metropolitan 
green areas. The example of the “Living in Waterland” movement illustrates 
how an established concept, in this case the National Buffer Zone, had more 
impact on the preservation of open space than the more recent National 
Landscape concept.
In their book on planning doctrine, Faludi and Van der Valk (1994) dealt 
with change in planning. They stated that “doctrine may impede change. Af-
ter all, doctrine represents an investment. To unravel it is not a step to be un-
dertaken lightly (p. 25). … .As will be evident, the gist of our proposals is not 
to radically change doctrine but to make it more robust. The reason is that 
existing doctrine serves a useful purpose” (p. 246). In this way, Faludi and Van 
der Valk stressed the importance of a durable doctrine based on durable con-
cepts. Like the persistence of Law, which is a crucial ingredient for a legal sys-
tem (see Hart, 1994), a doctrine also depends on its recognition over time. On 
the other hand, like many other planners, Faludi and Van der Valk (1994) saw 
rigid concepts as a major weakness of planning (p. 251), which is why they 
also wanted to open up doctrine (p. 246).
The tension between dynamics and stability in planning concepts can be 
illustrated by the Dutch discussion on the Green Heart and National Buffer 
Zones; these planning concepts may be more than fifty years old, but they 
are still dominant. The Dutch planning debate has often dealt with the ques-
tion whether the Green Heart and the National Buffer Zone concepts should 
be replaced by concepts that would fit today’s society better. Although some 
scholars have stated that the Green Heart is an inadequate and outdated con-
cept (e.g., Van Eeten, 1999; Nyfer, 1996), this old concept is still being used and 
is still considered an important part of Dutch planning doctrine (Faludi & Van 
der Valk, 1994; Van der Valk & Faludi, 1997; Kuhn, 2003; Maruani & Amit-Cohen, 
2007). A little less well known, the National Buffer Zone concept dates back 
to the same period and is also an important aspect of the doctrine (Faludi 
& Van der Valk, 1994; Lambregts & Zonneveld, 2004; Van Gessel, 1990). Land-
use change analysis using GIS showed that, although National Buffer Zones 
have been situated in the most threatened parts of the Randstad, built devel-
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opments in the Green Heart and the National Buffer Zones were significantly 
smaller than in the rest of the Randstad (Koomen et al., 2007; Van Rij et al., 
2008; Koomen, 2008). This shows that despite the criticism of these concepts 
as being outdated, they are durable and have an important influence on the 
preservation of metropolitan green areas.
The “Living in Waterland” movement in Laag Holland (discussed in Chap-
ter 6) illustrates the difference between the National Buffer Zone concept, 
now more than fifty years old, and the more dynamic “National Landscape” 
concept, introduced in 2004. Both concepts determine what kinds of develop-
ments are not allowed. The Nota Ruimte allows the development of houses in 
“National Landscapes” as long as the net migration is neutral (migratiesaldo 0); 
the number of new houses can not exceed what is needed to cover the natu-
ral population growth in an area (Ministry VROM et al., 2004, p. 85). Although 
this stipulation might be useful for guiding developments in non-metropoli-
tan agricultural areas, for metropolitan green areas, this is not as restrictive 
as it might seem; according to the province of Noord-Holland, in Waterland, 
this would have meant that 6,000 dwellings could be developed (Provincie 
Noord-Holland, 2006b). For National Landscapes in general, the RPB concludes 
that the balance between preservation and development has tipped toward 
development (Janssen et al., 2007).
The National Buffer Zone policy allows no further urbanization in National 
Buffer Zones (vrijwaren van verdere verstedelijking) (Ministry VROM et al., 2004, 
p. 69). In the debate about “Living in Waterland,” the area’s status as National 
Buffer Zone played a more important role than its more recent status as “Na-
tional Landscape.” Answering questions in parliament about the development 
of new houses in Waterland (Dutch Lower Chamber, 2005-2006a), the Minister 
of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment said that she would con-
tact the province in order to bring the local policy in line with the National 
Buffer Zone policy (Dutch Lower Chamber, 2006-2007a).
In light of the discussion about the flexibility of planning doctrine, it is in-
teresting to consider the different effects an established label such as the Na-
tional Buffer Zone concept and a new label such as the “National Landscape” 
had on the protection of green metropolitan areas. The discussion on “Living 
in Waterland” illustrates how the established National Buffer Zone concept 
was more important for restricting built development than the new Nation-
al Landscape concept. This suggests that paying respect to old concepts that 
have proved their worth in a specific area can help to protect metropolitan 
green areas. In this way, the idea of robust doctrine fits the concept of Slow 
Planning.
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Radical change: market-coordinated spatial order8.2.6 
One of the reasons people have stated that planning is too slow for modern 
times is that planning adapts to new developments more slowly than dy-
namic market mechanisms. In line with the contemporary planning or mar-
ket debate, as discussed in Chapter 4, Webster (2005) stressed that compared 
to market order, allocation by planning and political decisions responds less 
directly to changes in society. Unlike planning, in a perfect economic mar-
ket, transactions are instant (Alexander, 2001b). The time required to come to 
a decision can be considered to be one of the costs of a land use decision 
(Buitelaar, 2007). Therefore, within the framework of the “reinventing land-
scape planning in MetroLand” program, replacing the existing Dutch planning 
system for protecting metropolitan green areas with a market-coordinated 
spatial order has often been discussed. This section discusses why replacing 
the existing Dutch institutional system with its bestemmingsplannen with a 
market-coordinated spatial order would not be a fruitful institutional change.
Skaburskis (2003) discussed the idea that pricing policies might be an ef-
fective planning tool, since they directly engage developers by making them 
accept the full costs of a project. For such a market-coordinated spatial order 
system, researchers could calculate the value of open space, a positive exter-
nality which currently plays no role in a developer’s decision to build or not to 
build. If a developer were forced to pay a certain amount that represents the 
social value of metropolitan green area for the development of green fields, 
he would take the societal value of open space into consideration. In this way 
the balance between built-up area and open space would reflect the demands 
in society. This institutional arrangement would supposedly respond to the 
demands in society more effectively and dynamically than the traditional 
zoning system.
Although this is an inviting idea, in practice, there are some important 
constraints (Skaburskis, 2003; Korthals Altes, 2008). One of the major practical 
problems facing such a system is calculating the value of the green assets of 
a specific piece of land (Korthals Altes, 2008). Within the MetroLand program, 
at the VU, various attempts were made to do this (Koomen, 2008; Brander & 
Koetse, 2007). Various types of valuation research provided information about 
the value people attribute to metropolitan green areas (e.g., Brander & Koet-
se, 2007), and these amounts can be used to compare how much different ar-
eas are appreciated. Still, the sum of these amounts does not represent the 
height of the externality, the societal value of the openness of a specific piece 
of open space, and merely charging this sum as a tax would not result in an 
optimal amount of green.
When investigating such a tax, it was found that if it were introduced, giv-
en price elasticity, suppliers would lower their price (Needham, 1998). In that 
case, such a tax would have an insignificant effect on the number of green 
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field developments. Considering Needham’s (1998) findings, it could be more 
appropriate to base the tax on the amount that would prevent a property 
developer from developing his land. However, since the aim of the policy is 
not to prevent all built developments, a decision should be made on the ar-
eas where this amount should be high enough to prevent development and 
the areas where it should be lower. In that case, just as with zoning, a deci-
sion still needs to be taken on which areas should be protected and which 
should not be protected. In view of this, Skaburskis (2003) remarked that the 
problems in setting explicit prices for development are similar to the implicit 
trade-offs that underlie most planning decisions.
Besides, if it were possible to calculate such an amount, calculating the ex-
act amount for a specific area each time a developer considered development 
would put a heavy burden on regulatory authorities; transaction costs might 
be high. These transaction costs would be even higher if the risks involved 
were considered. Skaburskis (2003) stated that the main difficulty with explic-
it pricing policies and with trying to rely totally on market solutions is their 
uncertain impact. Because of unexpected developments in all kinds of prices, 
there is a risk that those green areas closest to cities and most valuable for 
citizens will be built on. Inadequate calculation of the height of the externali-
ty and consequently the development tax might result in too many or too few 
built developments. Additionally, the risk involved and the need to regularly 
calculate the dynamic tax might lead to high transaction costs.
The risks involved would be especially high if the institutions for “market-
coordinated spatial order” replaced the Dutch zoning system, including the 
bestemmingsplannen. The risk of a too high tax or an ineffective low tax makes 
it less likely that such a system will be introduced. It is also not clear how 
such a system would fit the Dutch taxation system. Finally, introducing a 
market-based spatial order which replaces the existing Dutch zoning system 
would require an institutional change that might involve high transition costs, 
not in the last place because of the risks involved.
The discussion about “market-coordinated spatial order” illustrates some 
of the reasons for not changing institutions radically. Replacing Dutch zoning 
regulations with a system for “market-coordinated spatial order” would be a 
radical change to the Dutch institutional system; there is too little experience 
calculating the value of the green amenities, with using this amount as a tax, 
and with the effect taxation can have on decisions to build or not to build 
on land. Considering the risks involved, the transition costs that go with the 
introduction of this system might be too large. Other experiments with col-
lecting contributions from developers for green areas, such as the Bloemen-
dalerpolder case (see Chapter 5) were based on the sophisticated Dutch land 
development practice. Adapting this approach is more likely to work then the 
type of market-coordinated spatial order discussed in this section.
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Incremental institutional change: 8.2.7 
Midden-Delfland Act
The preceding examples might give the impression that institutional change 
is hardly possible. This is, however, short-sighted. This section discusses the 
Midden-Delfland Act to illustrate how institutional change can work.
Changes to the institutional system did take place in Midden Delfland. 
In fact, the Midden-Delfland Act can be seen as an example of a large insti-
tutional change. Because the area was recognized as being one of the most 
threatened metropolitan green areas half a century ago (WWdL, 1958, pp. 66-
67, 104), central government decided to apply the National Buffer Zone policy 
in Midden-Delfland first. The Midden-Delfland Act (of 1977) was a pilot act on 
which later land consolidation legislation has been based (Zevenbergen, 1998). 
One of the novelties of the act was that land consolidation institutions dealt 
with the development of recreation areas and nature conservation instead of 
only agriculture. The act changed the interaction pattern in the area, thanks 
to the formation of the Land Consolidation Committee.
On the other hand, the new act was closely connected to the existing con-
text. The Midden-Delfland Act was based on ideas suggested by the munici-
palities in the area and the province, working through the Midden-Delfland 
Study Foundation. Besides, the instrument for land consolidation in the act is 
much like regular land consolidation. The act describes the various stages of 
the project, intervention tools for managing it, and the rights of owners and 
other concerned parties. The act prescribed the formation of a Land Consoli-
dation Committee, consisting of leading representatives of the municipalities, 
the province, the Farmers Union, the Midden-Delfland Countryside Union, the 
district water board, and the ANWB (the Dutch Automobile Association). Civil 
servants from the already existing Government Service for Rural Areas (Dienst 
Landelijk Gebied/Bureau Beheer Landbouwgronden: DLG/BBL) administered the 
project. A public recreation board was established to coordinate maintenance 
of the recreation areas, with representatives from the central and local gov-
ernmental authorities that provide the funds. The special land consolidation 
instrument in the Midden-Delfland Act is an addition to the general land-use 
planning system, in which the “bestemmingsplan,” a binding municipal land-
use plan, is the most important element (Thomas et al., 1983; Needham, 2007).
The Midden-Delfland Act can be seen as an example of an institutional 
change that worked. The act reached most of the goals that had been set (Van 
Rij et al., 2008). Because the Midden-Delfland Act is quite similar to existing 
land consolidation legislation and like all acts was made following careful 
procedures, it was no surprise that interviewees had no complaints about le-
gal certainty. Despite the sometimes underestimated cost of the project, the 
new act had no major unintended negative outcomes and did not put the 
working of the legal and economic system at risk. Therefore, in general, the 
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introduction of the Midden-Delfland Act can be seen as an example of how to 
achieve effective institutional change.
The question can then be asked what contributes to successful institution-
al change. Although the act imposed some changes to existing institutions, 
the choice to make the Midden-Delfland Act a pilot act reduced the scope of 
the risks involved. The Midden-Delfland Act worked because it fit the existing 
institutional system. For example, the Midden-Delfland Act was quite similar 
to already existing land consolidation acts and contained many articles about 
the protection of existing property rights. The national zoning system was 
not affected by the act. In addition, the institutional framework incorporated 
existing organizations such as the Nature Conservation Union, the Farmers 
Union, the district water board (Hoogheemraadschap), DLG, and the ANWB. By 
fitting the existing institutional framework, the new act was able to change 
patterns of interaction between agents, to increase communication through 
the Land Consolidation Committee and to cater for options that were valu-
able for various participants in the coalition, such as, citizens and farmers. In 
this way, the Midden-Delfland Act showed how institutional change can be 
accomplished.
Conclusion8.3 
Contemporary planning institutions for metropolitan green areas have been 
criticized as too slow, and radical institutional change has been advocated. 
In contrast with that, case studies have illustrated how Slow Planning might 
succeed in protecting and improving metropolitan green areas. Slow Planning 
is a way of spatial coordination to preserve potentially high dynamic land-
scapes by reducing dynamics and increasing the time frame of projects. Slow 
Planning requires a reliable and therefore predictable institutional framework; 
too radical institutional change can hamper Slow Planning. Other case study 
examples have illustrated reasons for not changing institutions or changing 
them incrementally.
The case studies illustrated how Slow Planning can help to protect and im-
prove green areas in a dynamic metropolitan context. The long duration of 
projects to protect and improve metropolitan green areas can contribute to 
their preservation. Extending project planning can be seen as a tool to reduce 
dynamics in highly dynamic metropolitan areas. A combination of sustaina-
ble zoning, land ownership and spatial quality are keys to metropolitan coun-
tryside preservation. Such a combined policy approach can strengthen the 
general public’s opinion that the green character of an area will be sustained.
The old institutions used for this might provide more certainty than con-
temporary market-based institutions. In addition, cases studies demonstrated 
how established planning concepts had more impact on the protection and 
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improvement of green metropolitan areas than new ones. The idea of robust 
doctrine fits the concept of Slow Planning. Too radical changes to the exist-
ing institutional system can involve high transition costs, including the cost 
of risks. If changes to an institutional framework are made slowly and itera-
tively, it is more likely that these changes will fit the complex existing institu-
tional context. In terms of path dependency, the existing context determines 
the possibilities for change.
With the help of insights from institutional economic theory and legal the-
ory, we can explain how institutions work as an institutional system. Because 
institutions operate within a system, a change to one part of the system influ-
ences other parts of the system. Propositions to change institutions radically 
in order to better reach planning goals can conflict with core principles of the 
legal system such as the protection of property rights. When discussing these 
changes, it is important to recognize that insecure ownership rights might 
threaten the legal and economic system; investments might not be made an-
ymore, and juridical reasoning might become meaningless. This explains why, 
when working on institutional change, it is important to consider context, es-
pecially the legal and economic context.
Recognizing the importance of context for improving institutions for 
green landscapes in metropolitan areas has consequences. Before advocat-
ing changes to institutions, their context needs to be examined. For exam-
ple, though many planning theorists prefer decentralization, the positive at-
titude of many Dutch municipalities towards built developments, means that 
decentralization might threaten metropolitan green areas. To examine such 
a complex context requires different theories and methods from different 
disciplines. For example, considering Williamson’s level-one institutions, the 
Dutch planning culture has a tradition of relying on public law tools such as 
bestemmingsplannen. This reduces the chance that market-oriented institu-
tions can be radically introduced to the Dutch institutional system. Likewise, 
other basic principles such as the protection of property rights reduce possi-
bilities for changes to planning institutions for the sake of public interest. The 
recognition of the importance of context can also help to explain why there 
might be a need for recoupling between strategic and operational planning 
and land development, as discussed in Chapter 7. The likelihood that insti-
tutional changes will be successfully implemented increases if new institu-
tions fit a broader institutional and economic context and are closely linked 
to practice.
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Conclusion9 
This project has addressed the question how various institutions for green 
landscapes in metropolitan areas work, which problems hamper their work-
ing, and how they can be improved. The following sub-questions were formu-
lated as a response to the case studies:
What are the major developments in green areas near cities, and how are 1. 
they related to institutional developments?
To what extent can private parties play a role in preserving green areas: 2. 
the market vs. government dilemma?
Are network-oriented institutions or hierarchical institutions more suitable 3. 
for the protection and improvement of green areas near cities?
Why do tensions occur between spatial planning and land development? 4. 
How does this affect institutions for green landscapes in metropolitan ar-
eas?
Do the major developments in the landscape and their institutional con-5. 
text require more dynamic planning processes, and are radical institution-
al changes necessary?
First, this conclusion addresses these questions in relation to each other. Then, 
it makes some recommendations about how institutions for green landscapes 
in metropolitan areas can be improved in general and, more specifically, in 
the Netherlands. During this project, new ideas were elaborated about basing 
methodology on Transaction Cost Theory, and on selecting theories from the 
fields of planning, law and economics in general. These methodological impli-
cations will be discussed in Section 9.3.
What is going on?9.1 
The first aim of this project was to identify influential developments concern-
ing institutions for green landscapes in metropolitan areas. For this purpose, I 
did not select specific planning concepts, policy documents, or institutions in 
advance. In line with Grounded Theory, a “from practice to concept” method 
was chosen rather than a “from concept to practice” approach. Individuals in-
volved in landscape developments were asked what had influenced their de-
cisions in particular and what influences developments in the landscape in 
general. The factors they mentioned were compared to the information pro-
vided by policy documents and legal documents. This section describes the 
most important developments.
Soft Planning9.1.1 
This “from practice to concept” approach revealed that money flows and le-
gal stipulations play an important role in landscape developments. Spend-
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ing substantial amounts to purchase land and to perform contract work, and 
applying appropriate regulations may result in effective protection and im-
provement of metropolitan green areas. On the other hand, spending small 
amounts of money, primary on process-costs, and applying non-restrictive 
policies might lead to uncertain outcomes.
Though the importance of money and legal stipulations sounds self evident, 
in planning research, much more attention has been paid to concepts than to 
money flows and legal stipulations. Together with ideas about collaborative 
planning and the restructuring of the welfare state, at times when cut-backs, 
decentralization and deregulation are leading, this might result in widely sup-
ported plans having little chance to be implemented due to a lack of financial 
and legal resources. This can lead to what I call Soft Planning, planning with 
much public support for plans but little achievements in terms of physical 
developments. In this case, the parties who, made plans collaboratively in a 
network-oriented planning process are often not the same parties as the ones 
who are expected to execute these plans and invest in it. If these parties are 
not influenced by these plans, their actions are not likely to contribute to spa-
tial quality. Considering this, planning processes require some hierarchical el-
ements too. All in all, in order to increase the effect of planning on physical 
developments, it is important to consider money flows and institutions.
Preservation instead of creation9.1.2 
Before discussing money flows and institutions, some contemporary prob-
lems in metropolitan green areas need to be explained. One of the problems 
is that, compared to active changes to the landscape, such as the creation of 
new nature or recreational areas, preservation has received little policy atten-
tion and little funding. There are various reasons for this. First, it is harder for 
politicians to present their achievements in preservation to the public than it 
is for them to present actual changes to the landscape. Besides that, the pres-
ervation of agricultural land is often regarded as an unimportant policy goal 
because peoples’ valuation of small-scale historic agricultural green areas has 
not received much attention in studies; these small-scale agricultural land-
scapes often fall into the general category “agricultural land,” which, because 
statistics works with averages, is less valued than forests or nature. In addi-
tion, the threats to agricultural land are not very visible. Despite the idea that 
land-use plans are sufficient measures to maintain the status quo, negative 
exogenous developments can lead to landscape changes if no measures are 
taken to preserve it. Abandoning established policy measures that supported 
landscape preservation might contribute to this development.
For a variety of reasons, land-use plans are not sufficient tools to preserve 
metropolitan green areas. If agricultural land is owned by a party who aims 
to build there, this party can put pressure on a municipal government to 
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change the land-use plan. The threat is especially urgent if local governments, 
in charge of changing land-use plans tend to welcome new commercial and 
residential developments. As the emphasis is on decentralization, these local 
parties might receive more room to change their land-use plans and facilitate 
these developments. One pro-development local government can make irre-
versible decisions. Besides, landowners can try to force changes in the land-
use plans by decreasing spatial quality on their land and asking for a change 
in the zoning to improve spatial quality through new built developments. If 
policy makers are more aware that people value small-scale agricultural land, 
and if they understand the threats to these lands, policy attention might shift 
from creation to preservation.
Recurring costs9.1.3 
During the case studies, I was confronted with general unawareness of the 
recurring costs of financing and maintaining metropolitan green areas and 
the consequences for the landscape of increasing costs. People assumed that 
if no money is spent, the traditional landscape is not maintained and nature 
will develop by itself. A closer look at the case study areas illustrates how, es-
pecially in metropolitan green areas, lack of maintenance might frequently 
lead to less attractive types of land use.
First of all, metropolitan agricultural land is owned by landowners, who in-
vested in their land and expect a return on their investments. For them, doing 
nothing and letting their land turn into a nature conservation site is not a 
profitable option; if agricultural activities are not profitable enough, landown-
ers will seek other ways of earning money, for example by lobbying for chang-
es to the land-use plan, by splitting parcels, or by introducing types of land 
use which decrease spatial quality such as storing recreational vehicles. The 
current landownership situation and the value of the land make it less likely 
that a silent conversion from agricultural land to nature will take place.
To develop nature, it has been proposed that nature conservation unions or 
the government purchase land. In this case, not only the purchase costs, but 
also the recurring costs, especially the costs of maintaining the land, need to 
be considered; due to its proximity to the city, without proper maintenance 
and surveillance, areas might be used for dumping litter and other criminal 
activities which might lead to social insecurity. If that happens, the decision 
to build houses in these areas can easily be made. Besides, if these areas are 
not maintained, they will be less accessible and therefore of less recreational 
value to citizens. Examples of nature conservation areas showed how insuf-
ficient maintenance, especially mowing, can change the habitat which can 
affect the preservation of rare species. For these reasons, maintenance is an 
important topic when considering how institutions for green landscapes in 
metropolitan areas can be improved.
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This led me consider the parties that are most likely to bear the costs of 
maintenance. What is their income and what are their expenditures? Govern-
ments, nature conservation unions and private parties, mostly farmers are in-
volved in maintaining larger metropolitan green areas. For the government, 
maintaining recreational areas by itself is the most expensive option. Giving 
subsidies to nature conservation unions and private parties, such as farmers 
is less expensive for the government, because nature conservation unions 
have additional income from donations and the lottery, and these private par-
ties have an income from agriculture. Because it is unlikely that additional in-
come from donations will increase dramatically, it is unreasonable to expect 
nature conservation unions would be able to maintain all green areas with 
the same kind of subsidies that they currently have if all agricultural land 
would be converted into nature conservation sites. It is therefore important 
to consider the future of metropolitan farmers.
Future of metropolitan farmers9.1.4 
In the case study areas, the future of metropolitan farmers was uncertain. 
Because of the financial problems faced by metropolitan farmers, their long-
term maintenance of metropolitan green areas is at risk. The difference be-
tween annual interest charges or rents and annual revenues, the so-called 
“rent-gap” is the central problem. Land prices in metropolitan green areas are 
high, because people believe development may be permitted in the future. In 
the meantime, as a consequence of environmental legislation and difficult 
conditions for agricultural production in small-scale congested landscapes, 
agricultural revenues are low and consequently the land price which farm-
ers can afford to pay. Because of this rent-gap, farm enlargement and succes-
sion becomes prohibitively expensive in metropolitan areas. These problems 
manifest themselves in the long term and are not very visible in the land-
scape. Nevertheless, the introduction of messy types of land use, such as the 
storage of recreational vehicles, and limited investment in maintaining the 
land can be seen as a sign of these problems. Consequentially, the effects of 
institutions on the maintenance of the landscape and on land ownership are 
important research topics.
Because of the weakening economic position of metropolitan farmers, new 
activities and types of land use have been proposed such as the conversion 
of farms into houses, and farm-care and recreation services. These services 
can be provided by farmers or newcomers. Although these new services can 
provide important extra income for farmers, coupling these new sources of 
income to the maintenance of the landscape is difficult. The new activities 
take place at the farmhouses, points in the landscape where money is earned. 
The maintenance of the surrounding “planes”, the meadows, is still costly. Al-
though attractive planes, the beautiful meadows, are important ingredients 
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for the services provided at the points, in practice, forcing the activities at a 
point to support the maintenance of a plane is a problem. For example, there 
is a risk that farmers only provide their recreational services and stop their 
farming activities. Given this “point and plane-problem,” it is important to pay 
particular attention to the maintenance of the planes, when considering how 
to improve institutions for green landscapes in metropolitan areas.
Cross-subsidy strategies9.1.5 
The difficulty of combining costly and profitable types of land-uses is also 
an important issue if attempts are made to claim property profits for the de-
velopment and maintenance of regional metropolitan green areas. Such an 
approach can only be successful if the development of the property can cre-
ate a “plus value” and if this “plus value” is large enough to buy, develop and 
maintain the green areas for a long time. However, this is not often the case. 
Only under special circumstances can this approach work, for example when 
public parties own land in the area, or when building has long been out of the 
question. In addition, authoritative and experienced public parties are neces-
sary for the approach to work.
There might be reasons not to apply a cross-subsidy approach. The large 
number of public and private parties involved can make the process too com-
plex. In many cases, the investments in green areas cannot counterbalance 
the loss of green areas due to built developments. Conflicts can emerge be-
tween the ideals of collaborative planning, such as inclusiveness and trans-
parency, and the closedness that is needed to make an agreement between 
public and private parties about their contribution to the green areas. In ad-
dition, cross-subsidy concepts can have an effect on land prices, and they can 
be misused to make the public initially enthusiastic about a combination of 
green and built developments, whereas ultimately only built developments 
are implemented. Therefore, although cross-subsidy approaches can contrib-
ute to improving green areas, before relying on such an approach, it is impor-
tant to consider their disadvantages and limitations.
Model for green area protection and improvement9.1.6 
Institutions have long been used to influence developments in the metropoli-
tan rural landscape. To improve institutions for green landscapes in metropol-
itan areas, it is important to consider how these established institutions have 
worked in the past, and what might happen if they are changed. To provide 
insight into this, I have developed a model for ways to influence the protec-
tion and improvement of metropolitan green areas, based on the case stud-
ies. The ways to do this are categorized into supporting spatial quality, zoning 
and modifying land ownership.
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Improving spatial quality by implementing physical measures and main-
taining the land is not only an end in itself; it is also a means of mobilizing 
public support. The protection of metropolitan green areas requires this sup-
port, especially at times when adjustments to land-use plans are being con-
sidered. Physical measures that make areas more suitable for recreation may 
strengthen public support. When spatial quality is low, protective green land-
use plans are more likely to be changed to allow constructions.
Zoning is a classical tool planners use to influence spatial developments. 
Strategic plans can play a key role in making resources available. Land-use 
plans can be used to prohibit profitable but, unwanted types of land use such 
as the construction of dwellings. If the market expects the zoning to be dura-
ble, zoning will also keep land prices low. Without such low prices, land will 
be unaffordable for agricultural purposes, and continued agrarian land use 
will often be impossible.
The ownership situation is important to protect and improve metropolitan 
green areas, because it not only affects current land use, but it also influences 
land use in the future. Once land has been sold to property developers, they 
might exert pressure on the government to change land-use plans. Because 
of this, the financial position of the parties who maintain and own the land, 
in particular farmers, is important if we are to improve institutions for green 
landscapes in metropolitan areas.
A combination of measures influencing zoning, the land ownership situa-
tion, and spatial quality might not only increase people’s trust in the success 
of a policy program, it might also contribute to a more durable outcome. This 
is because the various ways of influencing the protection and improvement 
of metropolitan green areas have different time frames. Such a combined ap-
proach requires substantial expenditure. In general this requires governmen-
tal budgets. The model supports the idea that negative exogenous develop-
ments regarding ownership and spatial quality mean that the ration between 
built-up and green in metropolitan areas is at risk, unless appropriate meas-
ures are taken.
The restructuring of the welfare state9.1.7 
The restructuring of the welfare state, with processes of decentralization, pri-
vatization and deregulation, is changing established institutions. This might 
affect the landscape.
Decentralization might influence the reduction of metropolitan green are-
as in two ways; decentralizing government might allow local governments to 
change their land-use plans to allow constructions, and decentralizing tasks 
might mean reduced budgets for these tasks. When local governments favor 
new built developments, decentralization can reduce the influence of restric-
tive central policy plans. In addition, small rural municipalities, in particular, 
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might lack the resources (budgets and staff) to protect and improve metro-
politan green areas. They are also not in the position to create new legislation 
to support their task. Furthermore, if tasks, such as the development of green 
areas, are decentralized, there is the risk that central government will lose it 
interest for such issues, and there is also the risk that the budgets necessary 
for these tasks will not be made available to the local governments. Besides, 
since green areas and areas being developed often lie in different municipali-
ties, it may be difficult to coordinate their efforts and budgets. For these rea-
sons, unbridled decentralization can threaten metropolitan green areas.
The move towards a less dominant government and more privatization 
have been motivated in two, sometimes conflicting, ways: on the one hand, 
ideas on collaborative planning argue the public should have a larger say in 
planning processes; and on the other hand, retrenchment policy argues that 
money should come from the market rather than from government. Both of 
these motivations can cause central governments to reduce their budgets for 
green areas. If this occurs, it is less likely that costly policy programs will be 
started to acquire land, to implement physical measures, and to reallocate 
land. The move to privatize reveals one of the problems of Soft Planning: the 
government withdraws and spatial quality is left in the hands of private par-
ties. If these private parties are property developers, this might open the door 
for built developments, and if these private parties are ordinary citizens, it 
is likely that planning decisions will be made to protect and improve green 
areas. However, it is not likely that financial contribution by these ordinary 
people will be large enough to replace former governmental budgets for green 
area protection and improvement. In stead of deregulation, privatization re-
quires regulation to make property developers compensate the loss of spatial 
quality.
Deregulation can also lead to more built developments; deregulation of 
restrictive land-use plans might create opportunities for new constructions. 
When policies are less restrictive and future policies are less certain, land 
prices in metropolitan green areas might increase and the chances for farm-
ers to own land might be reduced. In this way, deregulation might threaten 
metropolitan green areas.
Slow Planning and incremental 9.1.8 
institutional change
In view of today’s dynamic society and the current popularity of dynamic 
market mechanisms, Slow Planning processes have been widely criticized. In 
contrast to this, the case studies illustrated how a dynamic term such as “vi-
tality” can be used to create possibilities for new built developments and how 
Slow Planning can help to preserve green areas in a dynamic metropolitan 
context. Slow Planning is defined as a way of spatial coordination to preserve 
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potentially high dynamic landscapes by reducing dynamics and increasing 
the time frame of projects. A longer project time frame can contribute to suc-
cessful protection and improvement of metropolitan green areas. This Slow 
Planning approach might give the impression that doing nothing is the best 
way to preserve metropolitan green areas, but this is not necessary the case. 
Considering the negative exogenous developments, that were discussed ear-
lier, a Slow Planning approach that aims to protect and improve metropoli-
tan green areas requires adequate institutions. A combination of institutions 
dealing with durable zoning, land ownership and spatial quality used in a 
long-term project is a key to metropolitan green area preservation.
The idea of robust doctrine and incremental institutional change fits the 
concept of Slow Planning. Because institutions operate within an institution-
al system, too radical changes can involve high transition costs, with poten-
tially costly risks. If radical changes which affect private property rights are 
made for the sake of spatial quality, one of the core principles of the legal and 
economic system might be affected too much. This can threaten the general 
economy and the rule of law; people will not invest if property rights are un-
certain. Because institutions are interdependent, it is important to consider 
context when trying to improve institutions for green landscapes in metro-
politan areas. If changes to an institutional framework are made incremen-
tally, it is more likely that these changes will fit the complex existing institu-
tional context.
Spatial planning and land development9.1.9 
It is important to understand the coupling and decoupling of strategic spa-
tial planning, operational spatial planning and land development because it 
helps to explain why the importance of hierarchical elements in planning and 
budgets for planning measures might have been underestimated, why the re-
structuring of the welfare state means that coordination mechanisms need to 
be reconsidered, and why certain institutional changes are more likely to be 
implemented successfully.
Spatial planning is said to work by providing information. How do parties 
base their activities on this information? For many parties, this information 
can provide useful knowledge on future possibilities. Other reasons to act in 
accordance with this information differ for strategic spatial planning, opera-
tional spatial planning and land development. In the case of strategic spatial 
planning, the coordinated sector departments base their actions on the in-
formation provided by the strategic plans, because they have been involved 
negotiating these plans, they belong to the same entity and they need these 
plans to allocate land for their activities. In the case of operational spatial 
planning, private parties act in accordance with a land-use plan, partly be-
cause there is a notion that planning benefits land owners in general, but also 
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because regulation forces them to base their actions on the information pro-
vided by the plan. This is particularly relevant when plans restrict profitable 
built developments. This is even more important in the case of land develop-
ment institutions, such as with compulsory purchase, where a budget may be 
required for compensation or persuasion of people to adjust their land use.
Understanding the distinction between strategic spatial planning, opera-
tional spatial planning and land development helps to explain why hierarchi-
cal elements in planning and budgets for planning measures can be impor-
tant. On an operational level, since private parties do not always base their 
actions voluntarily on the information provided by plans, hierarchical ele-
ments, such as regulations might be needed to make them take certain ac-
tions. In those cases, or when agreements have been made about restricting 
certain types of land use, budgets might be required to compensate for dis-
proportionate individual burdens.
This also urges us to consider the consequences of the restructuring of the 
welfare state on coordination mechanisms used in spatial planning. Strate-
gic spatial planning becomes effective by coordinating sector departments. As 
decentralization, deregulation and privatization, has lessened the ability of 
these sector departments to implement plans, the traditional motivation for 
parties to base their activities on the information provided by strategic spa-
tial planning is also lessened. At present, planners are attempting to use dif-
ferent coordination mechanisms, using operational rationalities rather than a 
strategic rationalities.
On the level of institutional change, attempts have recently been made to 
combine spatial planning and land development institutions. When this is 
done, tension may occur between spatial planning rationalities, which use 
criteria such as spatial quality, and land development rationalities, which use 
criteria such as efficiency. These two rationalities view the tensions between 
public interest and private property rights differently. Since land development 
legislation may directly infringe on certain private property rights dispropor-
tionately to the rights of other citizens, it contains many stipulations to pro-
tect private property rights against the power of the state. On the other hand, 
such stipulations are often less dominant in spatial planning, since spatial 
planning is considered to benefit land owners in general, and these land own-
ers also have to bear burdens from others if there were no spatial planning 
legislation. In the case of spatial planning, stipulations on compensation fre-
quently only apply when there is a disproportionate burden. Using spatial 
planning rationalities when trying to change land development institutions 
might meet difficulties in parliament or in the courts, for example in the case 
of a conflict with the European Convention on Human Rights that protects 
property rights. The likeliness that institutional changes will be implement-
ed successfully increases if new institutions fit existing spatial planning and 
land development rationalities.
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Recommendations for practice9.2 
How can the knowledge gained from this project be used to improve insti-
tutions for green landscapes in metropolitan areas? First, this section makes 
some general suggestions: be careful about replacing old institutional ap-
proaches with more fashionable ones, couple strategic and operational spatial 
planning and land development, combine zoning with physical measures and 
changes to the land ownership situation. Then, this section makes some rec-
ommendations for the Dutch situation in particular: distinguish cultural his-
toric recreational areas, agricultural production areas and mixed areas, and 
apply different institutions to each area.
General recommendations9.2.1 
In theory, the internalization of landscape values can take place in two ways. 
First, the amount of green areas can be planned, and different strategies can 
be used to influence the protection and improvement of these green areas. 
Second, taxing on building on green areas based on peoples’ valuation of 
green areas, the decision whether or not to build on land can theoretically be 
regulated by market forces. This second approach would imply radical insti-
tutional change. Because of the many practical restraints associated with ac-
curate valuation of green areas, as well as the problems associated with radi-
cal institutional change such as high transaction and transition costs, such 
institutional changes are not proposed here. Therefore, only the first way, has 
been examined further.
This project started with the assumption that it would be efficient to pro-
tect and improve certain amounts of green areas. At the start of the project, 
institutions for improving green areas seemed to be more interesting and 
more urgent than institutions for protecting existing green areas. However, it 
rapidly became clear that protecting is the main challenge in metropolitan 
areas. Therefore, most of the institutions recommended aim at protection.
The protection and improvement of metropolitan green areas involve stra-
tegic and operational spatial planning and land development. Though there 
are good reasons to separate these activities, such as legitimate decision 
making and improving skills due to specialization, in general, protecting and 
improving metropolitan green areas requires that (1) operational spatial plan-
ners and land developers consider the added value of inspiring visions and 
plans, and that (2) strategic spatial planners consider the difficulties faced at 
the operational level. A better coupling can be accomplished by asking: “How 
does a specific type of plan influence spatial quality? Which parties, institu-
tions and resources are influenced by the plan and why are they influenced?” 
Since it is fair to presume that parties act in their own interest, when par-
ties pursue developments in accordance with a plan, they must have a reason 
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for doing so. (1) Plans may provide useful information. (2) Parties can see col-
laborative plans as their own plan. (3) Parties have a financial (or other) inter-
est in the planned types of land use. (4) Binding regulations or agreements 
force them to act or not to act in a certain way. (5) Agreements between gov-
ernment departments and their relations make departments act accord-
ing to plans, and their policy influences private parties. (6) The government 
implements plans on its own land. Considering these reasons and how they 
influence peoples’ decisions can help when choosing a specific coordination 
mechanism.
This knowledge can be used to make planning more effective. Since no 
money can be earned from developing green areas, people will not general-
ly voluntarily choose not to build on their land. The same may hold for lo-
cal governments, if they have reasons to favor built developments. Therefore, 
the protection and improvement of metropolitan green areas might require 
financial and legal measures and the involvement of central government. A 
combination of physical measures, zoning measures and measures to change 
the ownership situation might provide a solid basis for green area preserva-
tion. Although modern market-oriented institutions might serve certain pol-
icy aims, considering the earlier mentioned ingredients for successful green 
area protection, these institutions might not protect and improve metropoli-
tan green areas as successfully as old institutions, such as restrictive policy 
and land consolidation. Using landownership by the state to influence spatial 
quality is another example of a currently unpopular institution that has prov-
en its use for metropolitan green area protection and improvement.
Specific recommendations9.2.2 
Although these specific recommendations emphasize the Dutch institutional 
framework, there are many similar characteristics in other countries, so these 
recommendations might inspire institutional change elsewhere. More de-
tailed recommendations for the Dutch context can be found in Van Rij and 
Korthals Altes (2007a and 2007b).
Considering the general recommendations, the question can be asked 
whether, in order to improve Dutch institutions, contemporary institutions 
might simply need to be replaced by the traditional Dutch institutions that 
are currently being abandoned? To a certain extent this might be the case, be-
cause traditional ways of supporting farmers through land consolidation can 
be very helpful to revitalize metropolitan green areas. The Dutch Government 
Service for Rural Areas’ (Dienst Landelijk Gebied/Bureau Beheer Landbouwgronden: 
DLG/BBL) land bank for rural areas, together with land reallocation, land con-
solidation and leasing out plots to farmers, can help to revitalize metropoli-
tan farmers. Established binding zoning policy can prevent construction and 
can help to keep land prices low.
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Although the value of traditional planning institutions should not be un-
derestimated, the current Dutch context also requires new institutions. 
Former rural policy aimed at improving conditions for all Dutch farmers. This 
egalitarian approach needs to be revised for various reasons. First, the social 
role of agricultural areas varies. Agricultural areas near cities are primarily 
used for recreation, to enjoy the historic landscape, the rural idyll and nature, 
whereas more remote agricultural areas are primarily used for agricultural 
production. Second, subsidizing all Dutch farmers does not fit the general pol-
icy goal of reducing government expenditure. Third, EU policy prohibits state 
aid for agriculture as such. Fourth, green types of land use are not the only 
claim on metropolitan areas; land is also needed for construction. This urged 
me to make a distinction between three types of rural areas: (1) cultural-his-
toric recreational areas, (2) mixed areas, and (3) agricultural production areas.
Cultural-historic recreational areas
The main function of cultural-historic recreational areas is recreation, to 
give city dwellers the opportunity to enjoy nice green areas. The appearance 
of these areas is determined by the cultural-historic landscapes, which con-
sist of peat polders with ditches, windmills and attractive cultural-historical 
villages. Farmers play a crucial role as land owners and maintainers of this 
landscape. These are the landscapes city dwellers visit on their bikes and 
show their children. Most of this land is maintained by medium sized dairy 
farms of about 30 to 60 hectares. The specific landscape provides a habitat for 
rare species. With its small parcels, high water-levels and small-scale infra-
structure, the landscape puts restraints on agricultural production. Because 
of the proximity of the city, land prices are high. The recreational value, the 
nature conservation value and the cultural historic value all depend on the 
farmers maintaining the landscape. Basically, these are the most valued and 
most threatened rural areas.
Agricultural production areas
The main aim of agricultural production areas is to provide agricultural prod-
ucts. Because they are in non-metropolitan areas, away from the cities, land 
prices are based on agricultural production. Farmers using these lands com-
pete in a global economy. In general, the landscape is adjusted to create opti-
mal circumstances for agricultural production, land prices are based on agri-
cultural revenues and farm enlargement continues to take place.
Mixed areas
The mixed areas combine characteristics of the other areas, though they are 
less clear in these. Urban influences can be felt with land prices higher than in 
pure agricultural production areas. The mixed areas are not as attractive as the 
cultural-historic recreational areas and they therefore attract fewer visitors.
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Policy for agricultural production areas
Due to their different functions and characteristics, the different types of ar-
eas require different policy approaches. In the agricultural production areas, 
market forces are dominant; farmers organize their business in such a way 
that they can compete globally. If they are not able to do so, their farm will 
be bought by other farmers and farm enlargement takes place. The role of 
the government is rather limited. With respect to spatial planning, a restric-
tive planning policy may be needed to obstruct urban influences. Besides that, 
these areas are the object of pure agricultural policy, which is not the subject 
of this dissertation.
Policy for cultural-historic recreational areas
Since cultural-historic recreational areas are the most threatened and most 
valued areas. Their maintenance and preservation requires a distinguished 
combination of institutions. Because the cultural-historic appearance is one 
of the core values of these areas, policy for these areas might aim at preserva-
tion instead of development. In order to develop these areas’ full recreational 
potential, recreational developments that fit the context might be supported. 
Because maintenance by farmers is the most efficient way to maintain these 
landscapes, policy might aim at keeping farmers in the area. Using the model 
presented in Chapter 2, the following measures can be taken:
Zoning: To make it clear that construction in these areas is out of the ques- ■
tion, Slow Planning is required. This means that policy at all levels of gov-
ernment makes it clear that no construction will be allowed in the future, 
not even using cross-subsidy strategies. If the procedures to change these 
zones are complicated and time consuming and if they are carefully en-
forced, they are more likely to be effective. A special act including long-
term planning processes and hearings before specific committees could 
contribute to this.
Landownership: A land bank that buys land at market prices and leases  ■
out land at prices based on agricultural production could help farm-en-
largement and farm-succession in these areas. To facilitate these land 
banks, a pre-emption right might be considered. Land-reallocation might 
also help to create a durable ownership situation. In addition, a parceling 
subdivision permit can prevent land being purchased by city dwellers. This 
can prevent messy types of land use by these city dwellers and support the 
presence of farmers in the landscape.
Spatial quality: Peoples’ valuation of these areas supports measures to pro- ■
tect these areas. Therefore, it is important that the landscape is accessible 
and attractive. The government can take measures to make the landscape 
more accessible. It can require that the attractiveness of the landscape be 
taken into consideration when decisions are made that might affect the 
landscape.
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Economic position of the guardians of the landscape: To support the guard- ■
ians of the landscape, whether farmers or nature conservation unions, the 
government can provide subsidies for nature conservation, cultural-histor-
ic preservation, and recreational services. Transaction Cost Theory can be 
used to make these subsidy strategies more efficient.
Available government budgets: All these measures require sufficient gov- ■
ernment budgets. To properly disburse these budgets, distinctions must 
be made between areas and money only needs to be provided for those 
areas that are valued most and that need it most. A distinction between 
areas can also help to explain why state aid for farmers in cultural-historic 
recreational areas does not conflict with EU state aid policy. Because these 
farmers face specific restraints due to the landscape characteristics and 
the urban proximity, reduced ground rents and subsidies do not necessar-
ily imply unfair competition, since the farmers are only compensated for 
dealing with these restraints and paid for their work as providers of cul-
tural historic recreational areas.
Policy for mixed areas
Because of their mixed character, policy for mixed areas may vary. Some of 
these areas will be needed for construction. In other areas, a cross-subsidy 
approach might be applied to combine an increase of spatial quality in green 
areas with the development of houses. Other parts of mixed areas will con-
tinue to be used for agriculture. In order to make cross-subsidy strategies pos-
sible, restrictive land-use plans are needed in these areas too. Especially for 
these areas, it is particularly important to monitor the working of the new 
Dutch Land Servicing Act.
Deregulation and decentralization
As has been explained, decentralization and deregulation can affect institu-
tions for green landscapes in metropolitan areas. The way provinces carry out 
their new tasks with respect to zoning, subsidies and green area projects will 
influence changes in the metropolitan landscape to a large extent. To influ-
ence municipal bestemmingsplannen, provinces might use their power to make 
ordinances. It is not yet clear whether provinces used this power, and wheth-
er they will use this power in the future. It is also not yet clear whether the 
province will decide to take measures that have an effect on the ownership 
situation and spatial quality, or whether the decentralized budgets are large 
enough to do this. One way to obtain an overview of this process would be for 
central government to monitor the use of institutions by the provinces.
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Methodological implications9.3 
Studying institutions for green landscapes in metropolitan areas required a 
methodology that could deal both with institutions used in market and gov-
ernment settings, that considered economic aspects and the complex con-
text in which these institutions become effective. At first sight, Transaction 
Cost Theory seemed appropriate for this. However, after attempting to apply 
this theory as an institutional design tool, it turned out that this theory did 
not provide a sufficient basis for a methodology to benchmark institutions 
for green landscapes in metropolitan areas in detail. Instead, because of the 
complexity of the research theme and the case study settings, a multi-theory 
approach was chosen. Ideas from Grounded Theory helped to set up such a 
multi-theory methodology. This section starts by discussing the application 
of Transaction Cost Theory as an institutional design tool. Then, it discusses 
how a methodology can be developed that takes the complexity of the topic 
as a starting point.
Exploring a transaction cost methodology9.3.1 
To try to apply Transaction Cost Theory as a tool-box for institutional design 
three experimental approaches were taken: (1) the relation of transaction at-
tributes and specific institutional arrangements was investigated; (2) models 
were made to explain the working of specific institutions, such as land-use 
plans, in a transaction costs framework, and then these models were used to 
compare institutions; and (3) the transaction costs of a project were identified 
using financial reports and estimates made during interviews.
The first approach demonstrated how Transaction Cost Theory and its ide-
as about the relation between certain transaction attributes and the efficiency 
of institutions can provide useful information about the role of government 
in planning in general and about the efficiency of different subsidy strategies 
in particular. This approach is however only useful when similar transactions 
are being compared.
The second approach consists of modeling institutions in a transaction 
cost framework; this provided some interesting insights into transaction cost 
reasoning in planning theory. The transactions which planning institutions 
facilitate take place on both a strategic and an operational level. On both lev-
els, planning is thought to become effective through the provision of informa-
tion. Although this might give the impression that people act in accordance 
with plans voluntarily, this is often not true on the operational level. To pro-
vide legal certainty, land-use plans may be needed to make parties act in ac-
cordance with the information that is provided, whereas on a strategic level, 
more voluntary types of coordination may be effective.
Analyzing transactions on the operational level led to the idea that plan-
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ning is more than a tool to lower transaction cost between private parties in 
a market: the aim of planning is also to internalize non-traded externalities, 
such as the values of metropolitan green areas. It is important to distinguish 
between these two roles of planning because if planning is only seen as a tool 
to reduce transaction costs in a market, planning is considered to be in the 
general interest of all land owners; however, if planning is used to provide 
non-traded goods to the public too, it helps to understand why this might re-
quire binding regulations and budgets for compensation. This also requires 
more attention for stipulations to protect the property rights of those who 
are forced to provide these goods.
This distinction is also relevant when discussing how to reduce the costs 
borne by government, the organizational costs. If planning institutions are 
used to reduce transaction costs between private parties in a market, it might 
be efficient to spend government money to reduce these transaction costs. 
Consequentially, more transactions take place and goods will be allocated 
more efficiently.
However, if planning is used to internalize non-traded externalities, just as 
a firm’s “make or buy decision”, government can decide to take care of the 
provision of a good by itself. In that case, organizational costs can be seen 
as transaction costs. It has been advocated that these organizational costs 
should be reduced just like transaction costs in a market. Downsizing organi-
zation costs, however, will lead to downsizing the government, in which case, 
fewer transactions will take place. To counterbalance this, it has been pro-
posed that transaction benefits should also be considered. Applying such an 
analysis on a project level can take the form of a cost-benefit analysis that 
includes organization costs.
The third approach attempted to apply such an analysis by evaluating 
transaction costs of a project using financial reports and estimates made dur-
ing interviews, thus comparing organizational costs on a project level. Be-
cause the projects studied were too dissimilar, this comparison only resulted 
in the statement that far more money was spent on the successful green area 
preservation in Midden-Delfland than was spent in Laag Holland. Because of 
the complexity of institutional systems, transaction costs could not be com-
pared between specific transactions related to specific institutions.
Multi-theory approach9.3.2 
Because of the limited applicability of Transaction Cost Theory as a method, 
and since it could not provide a benchmark tool for improving institutions 
for green landscapes in metropolitan areas, and because the idea of poly-ra-
tionality demands the use of different criteria such as efficiency, spatial qual-
ity and legitimacy, a multi-theory approach was chosen for this project. Ideas 
from the field of Grounded Theory as described by Glaser (1992) helped to se-
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lect theories. This meant that the case studies preceded the selection of the 
theories and that theory and methodology were selected and formulated as a 
response to the case studies. This resulted in a selection of theories from the 
fields of law, policy analysis, planning and economics that were able to ad-
dress the main topics regarding institutions for internalizing landscape val-
ues.
This way of selecting theories is especially useful for the set up of research 
in the fields of planning, law and economics. Because planning institutions 
operate in complex systems, in which many parties, developments and insti-
tutions play a role, there is often a tension between general abstract theories 
and complex contexts. Theories are often built on the idea that a prediction, 
or a statement about causal or logical connections can be made under the 
condition that all other things are equal. In complex systems, such as in the 
fields of planning, law and economics, such an approach is generally not us-
able. Because many factors interfere and society judges institutions on many 
different criteria, this type of research requires a multi-theory framework. 
The more complex and practical the research subject is, the more theories 
might be needed. To make this kind of research operational, it is useful, first, 
to specify the object of research, the cases, and then, to select theories on the 
basis of the case-study data.
With respect to theory and methodology, this research project showed that 
it is important that future research couples spatial planning research with 
research on operational land development and the associated financial and 
legal issues. A case-based methodology could be helpful to conduct this type 
of research. This dissertation has also made a step towards embedding legal 
research in a broader institutional research framework. It has shown how 
legal theory can be combined with geographic and economic research tradi-
tions. However, more research will be needed to make legal theory, which is 
often hidden in centuries-old traditions, accessible and compatible to other 
research disciplines such as planning theory.
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IntervieweesAppendix A 
Midden-Delfland
Arnold v. Adrichem
(by telephone)
LTO-Noord afdeling Delflands Groen (Farmers Un-
ion department Green Delfland) 
Arie v.d. Berg Land consolidation committee, Agraricultural 
Nature Conservation Union “Vockesteart,” dairy 
farmer
Marja v. Bijsterveldt-
Vliegenthart
Chairman CDA (Christian Democratic Party), Mayor 
of Schipluiden 1994-2003
Tom de Boer Nature Conservation Union, advisory committee 
A4 and surroundings
Saskia Bolten Municipality Delft, recreational board, Land Con-
solidation Committee 
Leonie Claessen Glaskracht Nederland (Green house Farmers Un-
ion), formerly LTO
Ko Droogers ANWB (the Dutch Automobile Association), Land 
consolidation committee
Johan Groot Nibbelink Dutch Land Registry
Maarten de Haan
(by e-mail)
Province Zuid-Holland, Green department
Jan Heijkoop Farmers Union, advisory committee A4 and sur-
roundings
Cristiaan v.d. Kamp Alderman Midden-Delfland, recreational board, 
Land Consolidation Committee, advisory commit-
tee A4 and surroundings
Hans Kleij Province Zuid-Holland, Program manager A4 and 
surroundings
Hans en Corryne van 
Leeuwen
Dairy-farmers and owners of “De Paardenstal”
Govert van Oord Midden-Delfland Union
Dirk Polder Green service Zuid-Holland
Jaap Pieters Working Group Green fund 
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Tineke Ruijgh- 
v.d. Ploeg
Waterboard Delfland, Land consolidation commit-
tee, advisory group Vision for Midden-Delfland, 
advisory committee A4 and surroundings
Joost Schrijnen Provincie Zuid-Holland, Department spatial plan-
ning and mobility and Professor of Town planning 
at TU Delft
Jan Spijkerboer DLG, Dienst Landelijk Gebied (Dutch government 
service for rural land management), land acquisi-
tions 
Kees v.d. Vaart DLG, Dienst Landelijk Gebied (Dutch government 
service for rural land management), Land consoli-
dation committee
Ben v.d. Velde Municipality Vlaardingen, Land consolidation com-
mittee, recreational board
Jeroen Vis Ministerie van landbouw, natuur en voedselkwal-
iteit, LNV (Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food 
Quality)
J. van der Wel Land agent in Schipluiden
Bloemendalerpolder
– Real estate developer
Nico Jonker Province Noord-Holland, nature specialist
Henk Helming Province Noord-Holland, land acquisition special-
ist
Hans Farjon Milieu- en Natuurplanbureau, MNP (The Nether-
lands Environmental Assessment Agency)
Hans Groot Province Noord-Holland, Project manager green 
projects
Peter Wichman DLG, Dienst Landelijk Gebied (Dutch government 
service for rural land management)
Park Forest Ghent
Evelyne Goemaere VLM, the Vlaamse Landmaatschappij (Flemish 
government agency for rural projects)
Cecile Bauwens VLM, the Vlaamse Landmaatschappij (Flemish 
government agency for rural projects)
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Paul Vandenabeele Agentschap voor natuur en bos (Flemish govern-
ment agency for nature and forestry)
Hans Leinfelder Ghent University
Philippe Van 
Wesenbeeck and Lieve 
Evens
City of Ghent, Spatial planning department
Roel Vanhaeren Agentschap voor natuur en bos (Flemish govern-
ment agency for nature and forestry)
Laag Holland
– Municipality of Waterland, Spatial planning de-
partment 
E.P. Buijs City of Amsterdam, Spatial planning department, 
ecologist
D. van der Eerden Province Noord-Holland, Nature, landscape and 
recreation department
W.J. Kooy Area bureau Laag Holland
E.G. de Nooijer and C. 
Beentjes 
Ministerie van landbouw, natuur en voedsel-
kwaliteit, LNV Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and 
Food Quality)
J. Spaans sr. Former dairy farmer
General
Frank van de Ven and 
Jos van Oorschot
Municipality of Oss
Leonard Groen PPP contract laywer at Ecorys Kolpron and Green-
bridge Contract Management
Jeroen Gelinck
Willem de Kleijn and 
Jaap Harreveld
DLG, PPS bureau landelijk gebied
Province Zuid-Holland, Green department
Adriën Maas Province Zuid-Holland, Estate department
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Dutch text on Appendix B 
compensation
“Schade als gevolg van bestemmingsplannen is steeds schade, die veroorzaakt 
wordt door beperking van de vrijheid van individuele burgers. Met betrekking 
tot dergelijke schade kan worden gesteld, dat de Overheid niet tot vergoeding 
gehouden is, indien haar maatregelen niet verder gaan dan het concretiseren 
van de vrijheidsbeperking, die voortvloeit uit het feit, dat de burger tezamen 
met anderen op een beperkt territoir in een gemeenschap verenigd leeft. Deze 
vrijheidsbeperking kan geacht worden alle burgers even zwaar te belasten. 
Het kan echter voorkomen, dat een maatregel moet worden getroffen, die de 
vrijheid van een burger zwaarder aantast dan met de algemene sociale situ-
atie in overeenstemming is. Alsdan zal er grond zijn voor tegemoetkoming 
van schade. In de beslissingen van de Kroon ter zake van uitbreidingsplannen 
wordt in dergelijke gevallen gesproken van een onevenredig zware belasting.”
(Dutch Lower Chamber, 1955-1956, p. 18; Van Buuren et al., 2002, p. 254)
[ 213 ]
[ 214 ]
Dutch text on dynamicsAppendix C 
“Het ruimtelijk beleid voor nieuwe woningbouwlocaties bestond tot nu toe uit 
het ‘op slot zetten’ van de waardevolle landelijke gebieden met kleine kernen 
en de noodzakelijke ontwikkelingen concentreren aan grotere kernen in min-
der waardevolle gebieden. Gebleken is dat door gebrek aan vernieuwing en 
verjonging de leefbaarheid in de kleine kernen verslechtert en het landschap 
musealiseert. (p.11) (…)
De nieuwe uitleglocaties moeten bijdragen aan:
de leefbaarheid van de kernen;1. 
de vitaliteit van het platteland;2. 
de identiteit van Waterland voor landschap, cultuurhistorie en natuur. 3. 
(p.22)”
(Provincie Noord-Holland, 2006b)
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Improving institutions 
for green landscapes in 
metropolitan areas 
Evelien van Rij 
Summary
This thesis investigates how various institutions for green landscapes in met-
ropolitan areas work, which problems hamper them, and how these institu-
tions can be improved. Themes, theories and methods have been selected as 
a response to the case studies. The following themes were formulated: land-
scape and institutional developments, the market or government dilemma, 
the network or hierarchy dilemma, the relation between spatial planning and 
land development, and Slow Planning and incremental institutional change. 
Except from the Flemish Park Forest Ghent project, a reflection case, this re-
search examined the Dutch situation and in particular the land consolidation 
and contemporary developments in Midden-Delfland, the cross-subsidy ap-
proach in the Bloemendalerpolder and the National Landscape Laag Holland.
Chapters 2 and 3 discuss developments in the landscape and the influ-
ence of the restructuring of the welfare state. An important topic is the recur-
ring costs for green areas near cities, especially interests or rents and main-
tenance costs. Since farmers receive an income from farming, maintenance 
by farmers is attractive for the government. This is threatened by high land 
prices which are a consequence of people’s believe that near cities built de-
velopments will be allowed in the future. If farmers have financial problems, 
their green lands near cities will not automatically turn into nature. Restric-
tive land-use plans might not be sufficiently able to protect the landscape. If 
land prices increase, messy types of land-use might emerge, parcels might be 
subdivided and pressure might be put on the government to allow built devel-
opments.
The restructuring of the welfare state, in particular deregulation, decen-
tralization and privatization, might catalyze this. Sector departments are los-
ing power and the influence of strategic spatial planning through these sector 
departments is decreasing. Deregulation and privatization might give private 
parties room to build on their land. If municipalities have a tendency to wel-
come built developments, decentralization might threaten metropolitan green 
areas. Besides, rising land prices, due to the idea that constructions might 
be allowed, can affect the landscape. In line with deregulation, decentraliza-
tion and privatization, established ways of governmental interference in the 
landscape are being abandoned. These ways aimed at interfering in (1) spatial 
quality (by making metropolitan green areas attractive to city dwellers who 
might lobby for their preservation), (2) zoning (by means of land-use plans 
and appointments for example as National Buffer Zone) and (3) ownership 
(by land consolidation and land acquisition by the government). Chapter 2 
presents a model for green area protection and improvement which explains 
relations between these terms.
Chapter 4 discusses the limited usability of Transaction Cost Theory for 
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this type of research. This theory assumes that different institutions have dif-
ferent effects on transaction costs and that these transaction costs should be 
reduced in order to increase efficiency. Within this research, this theory was 
useful for making general remarks on the efficiency of institutional approach-
es and for analyzing agricultural nature conservation subsidy strategies in 
particular. However, it was not useful for benchmarking and designing insti-
tutions for metropolitan green areas in detail; the network of transactions is 
too complex and the transactions differ too much.
Analyzing transactions that were influenced by binding zoning institutions 
led to the idea that planning is more than a tool to lower transaction cost be-
tween private parties in a market; planning also aims to internalize non-trad-
ed externalities, such as the value of metropolitan green areas. Distinguishing 
these two roles of planning is important, because if planning is only seen as 
a tool to reduce transaction cost in a market, it will be considered to be in the 
general benefit of land owners. However, the idea that planning institutions 
are also used to provide non-traded goods to the public helps to understand 
why binding regulations and budgets for compensation might be necessary. 
This also requires attention to protecting the property rights of those who are 
forced to provide these non-traded goods.
When planning is used to provide non-traded goods, lowering organiza-
tion costs, transaction costs for coordination within an organization, in this 
case within the government, will lead to downsizing the government, which 
in turn will result in fewer transactions. Since this is not necessarily more 
efficient, transaction benefits and the effects on other transactions need to 
be considered. Applying such an analysis on a project level can take the form 
of a cost benefit analysis that includes organization costs. During my case 
studies, it became clear that, in practice, the network of transactions was too 
complex to use the examination of the transaction costs, organizational costs, 
transaction benefits and the effects on other transactions as an institutional 
design tool.
Chapter 5 discusses the limited possibilities for cross-subsidizing green ar-
eas by built developments. Such an approach is only likely to work in specific 
cases for example if the government owns land, if there is a strong restric-
tive policy which provides opportunities for a land price increase and if ex-
perienced and influential governmental parties are involved in a thoroughly 
set-up process. Reasons not to apply cross-subsidy strategies are its possible 
effect on land prices in green areas, damage to the landscape by built devel-
opments, the problem of maintenance costs, the unwanted interference of fi-
nancial motives in planning decisions and the misuse of cross-subsidy terms 
to clear the way for built developments without investments in green areas. 
Because of this, it cannot be expected that cross-subsidy strategies can be-
come the way to finance attractive cultural historic recreational areas.
In a reaction on the popularity of network-oriented institutions in plan-
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ning literature, Chapter 6 discusses the value of a combined use with hierar-
chical institutions. Because land owners and also municipalities might have 
a tendency to welcome new built developments and municipalities have lim-
ited financial resources and capacity to support green areas, totally relying on 
decentralized parties can threaten metropolitan green areas. Therefore, bind-
ing regulation provided by central government and interference in the land 
ownership situation by the same government might still be important.
The success of the Dutch planning doctrine, with concepts such as the 
Randstad, the Green Heart and National Buffer Zones, has often been related 
to strategic spatial planning. Chapter 7 discusses the importance of opera-
tional spatial planning and operational land development and the problems 
that occur if strategic spatial planning concepts are unadjustedly applied at 
the operational level. According to the Dutch concept of sector and facet, spa-
tial planning decisions should be made on the basis of spatially relevant cri-
teria. Because strategic spatial planning deals with the coordination between 
sector departments, it does not require as much hierarchical and legally bind-
ing coordination mechanisms as the operational level. If the influence of sec-
tor departments on the landscape decreases, this type of coordination might 
become less influential. On an operational level, land owners and their rights 
are important. For the design of institutions operating on that level, especially 
land development institutions, financial interests and the safeguarding of pri-
vate property rights are important issues.
In contrast with the call for more dynamics in planning, Chapter 8 intro-
duces Slow Planning. A reduction of urban dynamics can help to protect and 
improve metropolitan green areas. This requires the creation of a durable 
spatial quality, zoning and ownership situation. However, more and more, the 
government has decided not to apply such an approach. Chapter 8 describes 
the risks involved in radical institutional change such as a change in doctrine 
or a replacement of the existing spatial planning system by a tax based-spa-
tial disposition system. Because institutions function within a comprehensive 
institutional framework built on fundamental institutional principles, such as 
the protection of private property rights, radical institutional change involves 
risks. This can threaten the general economy and the authority of law; people 
will not invest if property rights are unsecure.
Chapter 9 relates the various developments with each other and gives rec-
ommendations for practice and research. The most important methodological 
recommendation for research in the field of planning, law and economics is 
to, because of complexity, use a multi-theory approach and to select method-
ology and theory on the bases of the case study data. The most important rec-
ommendation for practice is to distinguish cultural historic recreational areas 
from other agricultural areas and to apply a Slow Planning approach in these 
areas.
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Verbeteren van 
instrumenten voor groene 
metropolitane gebieden 
Evelien van Rij 
Samenvatting (Dutch Summary)
Dit proefschrift onderzoekt hoe verschillende instrumenten, zoals regels en 
beleidsprogramma’s, voor groene gebieden aan de rand van de stad werken, 
met welke problemen deze regels en beleidsprogramma’s te maken krijgen en 
hoe ze verbeterd kunnen worden. Op basis van casestudies zijn theorieën en 
onderzoeksmethodes geselecteerd en de volgende onderzoeksthema’s gefor-
muleerd:
landschappelijke ontwikkelingen en veranderingen in beleid en regels  ■
(H 2/3);
verhouding publiek-privaat (H 4/5); ■
netwerk of hiërarchie (H 6); ■
de verhouding tussen ruimtelijke ordening en grondbeleid (H 7); ■
Slow Planning en de snelheid van verandering van beleid en regels (H 8). ■
Behalve de casus Parkbos Gent, die gebruikt is om te reflecteren op de Ne-
derlandse situatie, heb ik ervoor gekozen om de Nederlandse praktijksituatie 
als vertrekpunt te nemen. Drie casussen heb ik in het bijzonder bestudeerd: 
de reconstructie en de huidige ontwikkelingen in Midden-Delfland, de “Rood 
voor Groen”-ontwikkeling in de Bloemendalerpolder, en het nationale land-
schap Laag Holland.
Hoofdstuk 2 en 3 gaan over veranderingen in het landschap, in relatie tot 
veranderingen in beleid en regels in het kader van deregulering, decentralise-
ring en privatisering. De jaarlijkse kosten voor groene gebieden aan de rand 
van de stad, de rente voor investeringen in grond en onderhoudskosten, zijn 
van groot belang. Gezien de inkomsten uit agrarische productie, is voor de 
overheid beheer van deze gebieden door boeren financieel aantrekkelijk. Een 
belangrijk probleem hierbij is de hoge grondprijzen in de buurt van de stad 
omdat men verwacht dat op termijn bebouwing zal worden toegestaan. Het is 
niet vanzelfsprekend dat in stedelijke gebieden waar boeren het moeilijk heb-
ben, natuur zal ontstaan; het verbieden van bebouwing in bestemmingplan-
nen kan het landschap onvoldoende beschermen; als grond te duur wordt 
voor de boer dreigt bijvoorbeeld verrommeling, splitsing van kavels en toe-
name van de druk op de overheid om bebouwing toe te staan.
Deregulering, decentralisering en privatisering kunnen deze ontwikkelin-
gen versnellen omdat bebouwing geld oplevert en Nederlandse gemeenten 
de neiging hebben om nieuwbouw te verwelkomen. Alleen al het vermoeden 
dat nieuwbouw mogelijk wordt, kan grondprijzen opdrijven en het landschap 
bedreigen. Deregulering, decentralisatie en privatisering, ook bij sectordepar-
tementen met een sterke wisselwerking met ruimtelijke ordening zoals land-
bouw, brengen de traditionele manier van overheidsbescherming van groene 
gebieden aan de rand van de stad in gevaar. De in Midden-Delfland toegepas-
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te aanpak heeft effectief bebouwing tegen gehouden. Deze steunde op drie 
pijlers:
ruimtelijke kwaliteit: maak groene gebieden met fysieke maatregelingen  ■
aantrekkelijk zodat burgers ze willen beschermen;
ruimtelijke ordening: bescherm gebieden met behulp van bestemmings- ■
plannen en aanwijzingen, bijvoorbeeld als bufferzone;
grond eigendom: houd gronden uit de handen van ontwikkelaars door ze  ■
aan te kopen voor bijvoorbeeld Staatsbosbeheer en houd het agrarisch 
grondeigendom vitaal door herverkaveling en verpachting van overheids-
grond voor een lage prijs.
Hoofdstuk 2 toont een model voor het beschermen en verbeteren van groene 
gebieden aan de rand van de stad dat de samenhang tussen deze pijlers be-
schrijft.
Hoofdstuk 4 bespreekt de beperkte bruikbaarheid van de transactiekosten-
theorie voor dit type onderzoek. Deze theorie is gebaseerd op de idee dat lage 
transactiekosten leiden tot meer efficientie. Binnen dit onderzoek bleek deze 
theorie bruikbaar voor de analyse van instrumenten op hoofdlijnen en voor 
het vergelijken van diverse manieren om boeren te subsidiëren voor agrarisch 
natuurbeheer. Zij bleek echter niet bruikbaar te zijn voor een gedetailleerde 
vergelijking van de efficiëntie van verschillende instrumenten en het ontwer-
pen van nieuwe instrumenten. Hiervoor was het netwerk van (sub)transacties 
te complex en waren de transacties te divers.
Door het analyseren van de rol van bestemmingsplannen met behulp van 
een transactiekostenmodel ontstond de idee dat ruimtelijke ordening niet al-
leen gebruikt wordt om transactiekosten tussen partijen in de markt omlaag 
te brengen; bestemmingsplannen worden ook gebruikt om niet verhandelde 
externaliteiten, zoals de landschappelijke waarden van groene gebieden, te 
internaliseren. Het is belangrijk om deze twee rollen te onderscheiden. Als 
ruimtelijke ordening alleen gezien wordt als een instrument om transactie-
kosten in de markt omlaag te brengen, is dit voordelig voor alle partijen. Als 
deze instrumenten echter ook tot doel hebben om een breed publiek van niet 
verhandelde goederen te voorzien, dan wordt duidelijk waarom hierbij regel-
geving en budgetten een belangrijke rol spelen en waarom er regels nodig zijn 
om groene grondeigenaren te verplichten om deze niet verhandelde goederen 
ter beschikking te stellen en deze eigenaren te beschermen tegen onrecht-
vaardige inbreuk op het eigendomsrecht.
Als ruimtelijke ordening wordt gebruikt om niet verhandelde goederen 
ter beschikking te stellen, dan zal het verminderen van organisatiekosten, 
de transactiekosten voor de coördinatie binnen een organisatie als de over-
heid, leiden tot rücksichtslose inkrimping van de overheid. Hierdoor zullen er 
minder transacties plaatsvinden. Omdat dit niet hoeft te leiden tot verbete-
ring van de efficiëntie, zouden ook transactievoordelen en effecten op andere 
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transacties moeten worden onderzocht. Een dergelijke analyse op projectni-
veau kan de vorm krijgen van een kosten-batenanalyse waarin ook organi-
satiekosten worden meegenomen. Het onderzochte netwerk van transacties 
was echter te complex om op deze manier de efficiëntie van verschillende in-
strumenten te vergelijken en nieuwe instrumenten te ontwerpen.
Hoofdstuk 5 beschrijft de beperkte mogelijkheden voor de verbetering en 
het behoud van groene gebieden aan de rand van de stad door middel van 
“Rood voor Groen”-constructies (opbrengsten van nieuwbouw worden geïn-
vesteerd in groen). Deze constructies kunnen werken in bijzondere gevallen: 
als de grond in handen is van de overheid, als er een streng restrictief beleid 
geldt, als er een groot waardeverschil is en als ervaren partijen met gezag de 
overheid vertegenwoordigen in een zorgvuldig opgezet proces. Redenen om 
niet voor “Rood voor Groen”-constructies te kiezen zijn stijgende grondprij-
zen, aantasting van het landschap door bebouwing, onopgeloste problemen 
met beheerskosten, verwatering tussen ruimtelijk relevante motieven en fi-
nanciële motieven en misbruik van “Rood voor Groen”-termen om uiteindelijk 
de weg vrij te maken voor bebouwing zonder investering in groen. Daarom 
zijn “Rood voor Groen”-constructies eerder geschikt voor minder aantrekke-
lijke landschappen met een geringe recreatieve functie dan voor cultuurhisto-
rische agrarische metropolitane recreatiegebieden.
Hoewel in planologische discussies netwerkgeoriënteerde planningsinstru-
menten populair zijn, beschrijft hoofdstuk 6 de waarde van een combinatie 
met hiërarchische instrumenten. Omdat Nederlandse gemeenten en grondei-
genaren de neiging hebben om te kiezen voor nieuwbouw en gemeenten be-
perkte financiële middelen en ambtelijke capaciteit hebben, is het voor het 
behoud en ontwikkeling van groene gebieden aan de rand van de stad belang-
rijk dat de (centrale) overheid passende regels maakt, middelen ter beschik-
king stelt en stuurt met behulp van grondeigendom.
Het succes van de Nederlandse planningsdoctrine, met concepten als 
Randstad, Groene Hart en bufferzone, wordt vaak in verband gebracht met 
strategische ruimtelijke ordening. Hoofdstuk 7 beschrijft het belang van ruim-
telijke ordening en grondbeleid op operationeel niveau en de problemen die 
kunnen ontstaan als ideeën over strategische ruimtelijke ordening onverkort 
wordt toegepast op het operationele niveau. Op basis van de sector- en fa-
cetgedachte, zou Nederlandse ruimtelijke ordening plaats moeten vinden op 
basis van ruimtelijk relevante overwegingen. Omdat strategische ruimtelijke 
ordening zich voor een groot deel bezig houdt met coördinatie tussen over-
heidsdiensten, zijn hiërarchische juridisch bindende coördinatiemechanismes 
minder belangrijk dan op het operationele niveau. Als de invloed van sector-
departementen met een sterke wisselwerking met ruimtelijke ordening, zoals 
landbouw, zwakker wordt, kan deze vorm van coördinatie minder belangrijk 
worden. Op het operationele niveau heeft men te maken met grondeigenaren 
en hun rechten. Daarom spelen bij beleid en regels op dat niveau, in het bij-
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zonder bij het grondbeleid, niet alleen ruimtelijk relevante aspecten maar ook 
hun (financiële) belangen en rechten een belangrijke rol.
In tegenstelling tot de roep om meer dynamiek in de planologie, introdu-
ceert hoofdstuk 8 het begrip Slow Planning. Om groene gebieden aan de rand 
van de stad te behouden en de gewenste kwaliteiten te ontwikkelen, is het 
belangrijk om de stedelijke dynamiek te verlagen. Dit vereist een combinatie 
van fysieke ingrepen, ruimtelijke ordening en maatregelen gericht op de ei-
gendomssituatie. De overheid kiest echter steeds minder voor beleid en regels 
die hiervoor geschikt zijn zoals herverkaveling en grondaankopen. Hoofdstuk 
8 beschrijft ook de risico’s verbonden aan radicale verandering van beleid en 
regelgeving, zoals plotselinge verandering van doctrine of de vervanging van 
het Nederlandse ruimtelijke ordeningsstelsel door een denkbeeldig systeem 
dat op belasting gebaseerd is. Omdat beleid en regelgeving onderdeel zijn van 
een samenhangend institutioneel systeem, gebaseerd op fundamentele insti-
tutionele principes zoals de bescherming van het recht van eigendom, gaan 
radicale veranderingen gepaard met risico’s. Dit kan een bedreiging vormen 
voor de economie en het recht; mensen investeren niet als hun eigendom on-
zeker is.
Hoofdstuk 9 brengt de verschillende ontwikkelingen met elkaar in verband, 
doet aanbevelingen voor de beleidspraktijk en het onderzoek. De belangrijk-
ste methodologische aanbeveling voor onderzoek in dit veld is dat de com-
plexiteit van het onderwerp vraagt om een combinatie van verschillende the-
orieën en methoden en dat deze geselecteerd kunnen worden op basis van 
het casestudymateriaal. De belangrijkste aanbeveling voor de praktijk is om 
cultuurhistorische agrarische recreatiegebieden aan de rand van de stad te 
onderscheiden van overige agrarische gebieden en om in die eerste gebieden 
een Slow Planning-benadering toe te passen.
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